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Two theories are being presented and advanced. While the theory of 
Philosophical processualism is general and aims at supporting the application of 
mathematics to guide action with precision, the computational theory of Decision 
Entropy is specific and aims at establishing a set of objective rules for assigning Bayesian 
priors, that are non-informative regarding the decision at hand. Besides, the concept of 
probability is being analyzed from a process-centered perspective, and three types of 
probability are being introduces: propensity, possibility, and credibility. The highlighted 
distinction is hoped to settle a number of long-standing disputes regarding the 
interpretation of probabilities. Also, three properties of objectivity, transparency, and 
defensibility are offered to characterize inductive systems. To evaluate defensibility, a set 
of seven theoretical principles are being offered including the principle of “unbiased 
evaluation,” which can be interpreted as the informativeness of priors for the case of 
Bayesian inductions.  
 vii 
Philosophical processualism is an original perspective advanced as the foundation 
for an epistemic machinery called pragmatic mathematics; a system of linguistically 
manifested mental constructs aimed at guiding purposive actions with precision. 
Philosophical processualism relies upon a process-centered interpretation of causality, 
which sees an event as a constellation of changes made by a process in certain states of 
the world and/or the mind. By taking concept as the fundamental constituent of the 
purposive agents’ evaluation processes, the view presents its ontological account of 
concepts and elaborate on how concepts could look like, where they could be present, and 
how they could come to realization. Philosophical processualism opposes Platonism by 
asserting that every concept is the outcomes of cognitive processes unfolding in time and 
space and is not an abstract entity in the so-called third realm, to which mind can gain 
access through unknown metaphysical processes. 
Probability concept is being analyzed from a process-centered perspective, and it 
is being divided into three types of propensity, possibility, and credibility. Propensity 
values are relative repetitions of processual outcomes, as they have come to realization. 
Possibility values for the outputs of a more-to-less process are the relative contributions 
of inputs; i.e. the relative number of inputs associated to every output. Credibilities are 
imaginary relative weights assigned to (the parameters of) the processes, who are 
hypothesized to deliver the intended outcomes. Credibilities are only means to the end of 
assessing propensities and/or possibilities, whose exact values are unknown. Bayesian 
priors are prime examples of credibilities. While the imaginary nature of credibilities 
allows subjects to assign credibilies of their own preference, their assignment might not 
 viii 
be justifiable to others. Alternatively, it is possible to establish a set of theoretical 
assignment rules on purely logical grounds, and to justify the designations based on their 
effects, or lack thereof, on the assessed propensities and/or possibilities. Due to their rule 
abidance, theoretically constructed credibilities may be described as objective, even 
though imaginary and only existing in subjects’ minds. The class of credibilities called 
non-informative are the ones, whose assignment are aimed at not informing (certain 
aspects of) the assessed propensities and/or possibilities.  
A set of properties including objectivity, transparency, and defensibility are 
defined to characterize an inductive assessment procedure. Objectivity is concluded to be 
the result of transparency and community acceptance. Although every communal rule is 
contractual by nature, its justification makes the procedures defensible, especially when a 
community is deciding whether to adopt it as the rule. A set of seven theoretical 
principles are proposed to evaluate the defensibility of an inductive system, namely (I) 
Evaluative Orientation, (II) Investigative Prioritization, (III) Explicative Sufficiency, (IV) 
Evaluative Inclusion, (V) Credibility Conception, (VI) Artifact-Reality Division, and 
(VII) Unbiased Evaluation. 
Decision Entropy Theory (DET) offers an original method for assessing credible 
outcomes of uncertain processes by incorporating Bayesian probabilities. Since DET is 
aimed at guiding purposive action with precision and through the use of mathematical 
measures, it falls under the category of pragmatic mathematics. DET aims at representing 
uncertainty in an objective and defensible way. The motivation to develop the theory is to 
account for the possibility of events occurring that are beyond our range of experience. 
 ix 
The theory characterizes uncertainty in the context of making a decision; the case of 
maximum uncertainty corresponds to the maximum entropy for the possible outcomes of 
the decision. Therefore, the starting point for assessing probabilities, i.e., the non-
informative prior probabilities of possibilities before information is included, depends on 
the decision at hand. Decision Entropy Theory is developed from the following principles 
that describe the case of no information or maximum uncertainty in making a decision 
between various alternatives. 
1. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, 
then a selected alternative is equally probable to be or not to be the preferred alternative. 
2. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, 
then the possible differences in preference between a selected alternative and the 
preferred alternative are equally probable. 
3. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, 
then the possibilities of learning with new information about the selected alternative 
compared to the preferred alternative are equally probable. 
To illustrate the theory, two examples from engineering are being worked out:  
(a) selecting the appropriate design wave height for offshore structures, and  
(b) assessing the value of test wells before committing to developing a 
hydrocarbon resource play.  
The examples highlight the following points: 
 x 
• The prior sample space depends on the decision, meaning that the importance 
of extreme uncertainty depends on its consequences to the decision and the 
availability of feasible decision alternatives to compensate for these 
consequences. 
• The prior sample space emphasizes the possibilities that distinguish two 
alternatives from one another. 
• The prior sample space can affect the final decision, even when substantive 
data are available to inform (update) this sample space.  
• It is unreasonable to assume that the probability distribution for the 
frequencies can be established based entirely on experience because that 
precludes the possibility of events beyond our experience. Such events can be 
particularly important where experience tends to be limited. 
• The value of information is enhanced when leaving open the possibilities for 
making excessive gains and losses. 
• It is possible to rationally balance between relying entirely on historical data 
versus not relying on them at all. Within this balance, direct information can 







Table of Contents 
COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP  ......................................................................................... II 
TITLE... ............................................................................................................................. III 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS... ............................................................................................. V 
ABSTRACT  ...................................................................................................................... VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  .................................................................................................. XI 
LIST OF TABLES  ......................................................................................................... XVII 
LIST OF FIGURES  ....................................................................................................... XVIII 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................1 
1.1 ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE BY EXPERIENCING AND REASONING ........... 1 
1.2 BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................... 2 
1.2.1 A Random Act/ Process and the Propensity Values for its Outcomes ....... 2 
1.2.2 Estimation/ Approximation of Propensity Values based on Statistical 
Observations ............................................................................................... 3 
1.2.3 Bayesian Approach to Estimation/ Approximation of Propensity 
Values ......................................................................................................... 6 
1.3 MOTIVATION ........................................................................................................ 9 
1.3.1 Black Swans; Rare (Low Propensity) Events with Significant Impacts ..... 9 
1.3.2 Deficiencies of Existing Method for Estimation of the Propensity 
Values of Rare Events ............................................................................... 11 
1.3.3 Deficiencies of Existing Objective Methods for Establishing Bayesian 
Credibilities ............................................................................................... 13 
1.4 OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................ 15 
1.5 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................ 16 
1.5.1 Review, analyze, and synthesize the background on prior probability 
and utility .................................................................................................. 16 
1.5.2 Establish a philosophical and logical foundation to define an 
“objective, transparent and defensible” method for establishing non-
informative prior propensities ................................................................... 16 
xii 
 
1.5.3 Describe and illustrate the principles of a theory that establishes non-
informative decision-based prior probabilities (Decision Entropy 
Theory) ...................................................................................................... 17 
1.5.4 Identify the practical consequences of applying a theory that 
establishes non-informative decision-based prior credibilities ................. 17 
1.6 OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................... 18 
 
CHAPTER 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PROCESSUALISM; FOUNDATIONS OF 
PRAGMATIC MATHEMATICS ................................................................................. 22 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 22 
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF PROCESS ............................................................................. 22 
2.2.1 Introducing Processes ............................................................................... 23 
2.2.2 Cognizing Processes ................................................................................. 24 
2.2.3 Perception and Conception ....................................................................... 25 
2.3 ONTOLOGY OF CONCEPTS .............................................................................. 27 
2.3.1 Mental Representations ............................................................................. 28 
2.3.2 Abstract Objects ........................................................................................ 29 
2.3.3 Universals as Outcomes of Typical Processes .......................................... 30 
2.3.4 Example Processual Codes ....................................................................... 31 
2.3.5 Tower of Physical Processes ..................................................................... 33 
2.3.6 Processual Interpretation of Tokens and Types ........................................ 35 
2.3.7 Processual Codes; General vs Detailed Descriptions ............................... 37 
2.3.8 Philosophical Processualism; A Pluralist Perspective .............................. 38 
2.3.9 Universals as Outcomes of Multi-World Processes.................................. 40 
2.3.10 Dependence of Universals on Cognitive Processes .................................. 42 
2.3.11 Processual Uniformity Hypothesis ........................................................... 44 
2.3.12 Worldviews; a Cognitive Explanation ...................................................... 45 
2.3.13 Example Explanation: Nominalism .......................................................... 46 
2.3.14 Explaining Specific Types ........................................................................ 48 
2.3.15 Non-observed Entities ............................................................................... 49 
2.3.16 Cognitive Explanation of Perspectival Opposition ................................... 51 
2.4 CONCEPTS; MANIFESTATION ......................................................................... 55 
2.4.1 Linguistic Manifestation ........................................................................... 56 
2.5 CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES ........................................................................... 68 
xiii 
 
2.6 PHYSICAL PROCESSES ..................................................................................... 70 
2.6.1 Quantitative Models of Physical Processes .............................................. 74 
2.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................... 74 
2.7.1 Brief Summary .......................................................................................... 74 
2.7.2 Conclusions ............................................................................................... 75 
CHAPTER 3 PRINCIPLES FOR OBJECTIVE ASSIGNMENT OF 
CREDIBILITIES ......................................................................................................83 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 83 
3.1.1 Problem Statement .................................................................................... 83 
3.1.2 Significance............................................................................................... 85 
3.1.3 Objectives ................................................................................................. 86 
3.2 OBSERVATION, THEORETICAL REASONING, AND LEARNING 
UNKNOWNS ....................................................................................................... 86 
3.2.1 Possible Approaches to Learn Unknowns ................................................ 86 
3.2.2 Challenges for Approaches to Learn Unknowns ...................................... 92 
3.3 PROBABILITY AND ITS INTERPRETATIONS ................................................ 93 
3.3.1 Probability as a Means of Representation ................................................. 94 
3.3.2 Possibility .................................................................................................. 95 
3.3.3 Propensity ................................................................................................. 96 
3.3.4 Credibility ................................................................................................. 98 
3.4 EVALUATING PROBABILITIES ....................................................................... 99 
3.4.1 Learning; Conceptual and Perceptual ....................................................... 99 
3.5 BAYESIAN ROBOT ........................................................................................... 100 
3.5.1 Historical Background ............................................................................ 100 
3.5.2 Evaluating Robots; Type A vs Type B ................................................... 101 
3.6 PRINCIPLES OF RATIONAL INDUCTION ..................................................... 102 
3.6.1 Evaluative Orientation Principle ............................................................. 102 
3.6.2 Investigative Prioritization Principle ...................................................... 102 
3.6.3 Explicative Sufficiency Principle ........................................................... 103 
3.6.4 Evaluative Inclusion Principle ................................................................ 103 
3.6.5 Credibility Conception Principle ............................................................ 104 
3.6.6 Artifact-Reality Division Principle ......................................................... 104 
3.6.7 Unbiased Evaluation Principle ................................................................ 104 
xiv 
 
3.6.8 Applications of the Principles ................................................................. 105 
3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................................... 105 
3.7.1 Brief Summary ........................................................................................ 105 
3.7.2 Conclusions ............................................................................................. 106 
CHAPTER 4 THEORETICAL DECISION-BASED ASSIGNMENT OF 
BAYESIAN PROBABILITIES .............................................................................109 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 109 
4.1.1 Black Swan Outcomes ............................................................................ 109 
4.2 MOTIVATION .................................................................................................... 111 
4.2.1 Accounting for Black Swan Outcomes ................................................... 112 
4.2.2 Directing Credible Proportional Induction ............................................. 113 
4.3 DECISION ENTROPY THEORY ....................................................................... 114 
4.3.1 General Description of the Theory ......................................................... 114 
4.3.2 Principles of the Theory .......................................................................... 115 
4.3.3 Implementations of DET......................................................................... 117 
4.4 EVALUATING THE OBJECTIVITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND 
DEFENSIBILITY OF DET ................................................................................ 120 
4.4.1 Evaluative Orientation Principle ............................................................. 120 
4.4.2 Investigative Prioritization Principle ...................................................... 120 
4.4.3 Explicative Sufficiency Principle ........................................................... 121 
4.4.4 Evaluative Inclusion Principle ................................................................ 121 
4.4.5 Credibility Conception Principle ............................................................ 121 
4.4.6 Artifact-Reality Division Principle ......................................................... 122 
4.4.7 Unbiased Evaluation Principle ................................................................ 122 
4.5 SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... 123 
CHAPTER 5 ASSESSING VALUE OF TEST WELLS IN DEVELOPING AN 
UNCONVENTIONAL PLAY ................................................................................126 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 126 
5.2 DECISION ENTROPY THEORY ....................................................................... 127 
5.3 GO - NO GO DECISION ..................................................................................... 128 
5.4 VALUE OF TEST WELLS .................................................................................. 135 
5.5 RELEVANCY OF INFORMATION FROM ANALOGOUS FIELDS .............. 140 
xv 
 
5.6 DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................... 148 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................. 152 
CHAPTER 6 ACHIEVING RELIABILITY IN THE FACE OF EXTREME 
UNCERTAINTY.....................................................................................................155 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 155 
6.2 DEFINITION OF PROBLEM ............................................................................. 159 
6.3 DECISION ENTROPY THEORY ....................................................................... 163 
6.3.1 Set of all Possibilities .............................................................................. 163 
6.3.2 Non-Informative Probabilities ................................................................ 164 
6.3.3 Implementation of Utility Theory ........................................................... 165 
6.4 RELIABILITY-BASED DESIGN EXAMPLE ................................................... 166 
6.4.1 Non-Informative Sample Space for Wave Heights ................................ 167 
6.4.2 Updated Sample Space with Historical Wave Height Data .................... 170 
6.4.3 Results of Decision Analysis for Design Wave Height .......................... 173 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................. 177 
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS ...........................................179 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................. 179 
7.1.1 Philosophical Foundations of Probability ............................................... 179 
7.1.2 Philosophical Foundations of Objective Mathematical Assessment of 
Actions .................................................................................................... 181 
7.1.3 Principles for Objective Assessment of Unknown Probabilities ............ 184 
7.1.4 Theoretical Decision-Based Assignment of Bayesian Probabilities ....... 185 
7.1.5 Implications for the Application of the Theory to Practical Problems ... 187 
7.1.6 Evaluation of the Compliance of the Decision-Based Theory with 
Established Principles ............................................................................. 188 
7.2 SUGGESTIONS .................................................................................................. 189 
7.2.1 Developing Objective Methods to Incorporate Subjective Experts’ 
Opinion ................................................................................................... 190 
7.2.2 Illustrating Probability Interpretations by Examples .............................. 190 
7.2.3 Reevaluating the Multi-alternative Decisions using Information 
Potential .................................................................................................. 191 
xvi 
 
7.2.4 Evaluating the Conditions for Increasing the Community Acceptance 
of DET .................................................................................................... 191 
APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS ....................................................................................192 
A.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 192 
A.2. NON-CATEGORIZED DEFINITIONS .............................................................. 193 
A.3. CATEGORIZED DEFINITIONS ........................................................................ 218 
APPENDIX B: FRAMEWORK FOR THEORY OF DECISION ENTROPY .......240 
B.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 240 
B.1 FORMULATION OF DECISION AND UTILITY THEORY USING 
INFORMATION POTENTIAL .......................................................................... 241 
B.2 BASIS FOR NON-INFORMATIVE SAMPLE SPACE FOR A DECISION 
ALTERNATIVE ................................................................................................. 247 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..........................................................................................................249 







List of Tables 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Table 2.1. Characteristics of Processual Perspective in comparison with other 
perspectives, in terms of perspectives’ prioritization of worlds, mind, and 
mental abilities ................................................................................................. 54 
Table 2.2. Characteristics of mental contents in comparison with their linguistic 
manifestations .................................................................................................. 58 
xviii 
 
List of Figures 
CHAPTER 1 
Figure 1.1. Alternative prior credibility density functions for mean occurrence rate of 
maximum wave height exceeding 30 m (from Gilbert, Habibi and Min, 
2012) ................................................................................................................ 14 
Figure 1.2. Alternative updated cumulative credibility distribution functions for mean 
occurrence rate of maximum wave height exceeding 30 m given no 
occurrences in 60 years (from Gilbert, Habibi and Min 2012) ........................ 14 
CHAPTER 2 
Figure 2.1. A sketch of perception process, characterized by processing of sensation 
by a modeler to yield a meaningful sensory experience .................................. 25 
Figure 2.2. A sketch of conception process, characterized by simplifying a set of 
mental objects and processing them by a modeler to new meaningful 
mental objects................................................................................................... 26 
Figure 2.3. A sketch of non-ending tower of physical process, resulting in an apparent 
feature perceivable to humans .......................................................................... 34 
Figure 2.4. A sketch of the sequences of multi-world processes involved in formation 
of a perception .................................................................................................. 40 
Figure 2.5. A sketch of a possible nominalist conception of the processes generating a 
nominal type ..................................................................................................... 47 
Figure 2.6. Processes involved in the translation of mental entities to/from linguistic 
expressions ....................................................................................................... 57 
Figure 2.7. A visual representation of a linguistic system; Left: associations between 
token objects of three different types, Right: associations between objects’ 
properties .......................................................................................................... 61 
Figure 2.8. A schematic diagram depicting a physical process, characterized by the 
trigger, circumstances, the process, and the outcome ...................................... 71 




Figure 3.1. a schematic diagram illustrating the process of (re)characterization ............. 96 
Figure 3.2. a schematic diagram illustrating the concept of propensity within the 
context of a physical process ........................................................................... 97 
Figure 3.3. a schematic diagram illustrating the two types of credibility evaluation 
processes; top: propensity evaluation process, down: possibility evaluation 
process .............................................................................................................. 98 
Figure 3.4. a schematic diagram illustrating the two types of learning .......................... 100 
CHAPTER 4 
Figure 4.1. Variation of the value of perfect information (VPI) with well cost for an 
example production unit (Min, 2008) ............................................................ 118 
Figure 4.2. Informed assessments of the parameters describing the occurrence of 
characteristic landslides at Oso if one chooses to accept the risk (Mostofi et 
al., 2019)......................................................................................................... 118 
Figure 4.3. Expected normalized information potential for different normalized 
rockfill dam failure cost (Feng et al., 2019) ................................................... 119 
CHAPTER 5 
Figure 5.1. Decision tree for a development decision .................................................... 129 
Figure 5.2. non-informative prior probability distribution for profit (p) using Decision 
Entropy Theory; Top: Applying axiom (1) to decision alternatives, Bottom: 
Applying axiom (2) to possible gains/losses .................................................. 130 
Figure 5.3. Establishing non-informative prior for frequency of good wells using 
Decision Entropy Theory; Top: relating profit (p) to frequency of good 
wells, Bottom: resulting non-informative prior for frequency of good wells 131 
Figure 5.4. Establishing non-informative prior for frequency of good wells ................. 132 
Figure 5.5. Establishing non-informative prior for frequency of good wells ................. 133 
Figure 5.6. Decision tree for evaluating the value of test wells before deciding to 
develop the play ............................................................................................. 136 
xx 
 
Figure 5.7. Probability distributions of frequency of good wells in a play with r/c = 5; 
Top: Prior distribution, Bottom: Posterior distribution from Decision 
Entropy Theory based on one result for test wells from the play .................. 137 
Figure 5.8. Value of perfect information for non-informative prior probability 
distributions for frequency of good wells in play based on Decision 
Entropy Theory compared with a uniform prior probability distribution for 
frequency of good wells ................................................................................. 138 
Figure 5.9. Value of information versus number of test wells for plays with different 
return-on-investment ratios ............................................................................ 139 
Figure 5.10. Decision tree for evaluating the value of information obtained from play 
B ..................................................................................................................... 141 
Figure 5.11. Value of perfect information about frequency for new play Field B 
versus the break-even frequency for Field B for different degrees of 
relevancy of data from analog Field A ........................................................... 144 
Figure 5.12. Distribution for frequency of good wells updated with data from analog 
Field A and from play Field B; Top: Prior distribution from analog data 
alone; Bottom: Posterior distribution with small number of test wells from 
play and results that are consistent with the analog ....................................... 146 
Figure 5.13. Distribution for frequency of good wells updated with data from analog 
Field A and from play Field B; Top: Posterior distribution with larger 
number of test wells from play and results that are not consistent with the 
analog; Bottom: Posterior distribution with equal number of wells from 
play as from analog and results that are not consistent with the analog ........ 147 
Figure 5.14. Value of information versus number of test wells in plays with different 
return-on-investment ratios ............................................................................ 148 
Figure 5.15. Example of establishing non-informative prior probability distribution 
with Decision Entropy Theory for unconventional play with gas wells ........ 150 
CHAPTER 6 
Figure 6.1. Data for wave heights from hurricanes in the central Gulf of Mexico ......... 157 
Figure 6.2. Impact of hurricanes on energy production facilities in Gulf of Mexico ..... 158 
xxi 
 
Figure 6.3. Example Venn diagram for sample space, S, that neglects the possibility 
of event E. ...................................................................................................... 159 
Figure 6.4. Likelihood function for mean occurrence rate of maximum wave height 
exceeding 30 m given no occurrences in 60 years ......................................... 161 
Figure 6.5. Alternative prior probability density functions for mean occurrence rate of 
maximum wave height exceeding 30 m ......................................................... 161 
Figure 6.6. Alternative updated cumulative distribution functions for mean 
occurrence rate of maximum wave height exceeding 30 m given no 
occurrences in 60 years .................................................................................. 163 
Figure 6.7. Decision tree comparing alternatives for design wave heights .................... 167 
Figure 6.8. Difference in utility values for two alternative design wave heights, hD1 = 
22 m and hD2 = 26 m, versus the annual frequencies that the platform 
capacity is exceeded for each design wave height ......................................... 168 
Figure 6.9. Non-informative sample space for utility differences in decision between 
two alternative design wave heights, hD1 = 22 m and hD2 = 26 m ................. 169 
Figure 6.10. Non-informative sample space (prior probability distribution) for annual 
frequencies that the platform capacity is exceeded, (𝜐𝐷1 , 𝜐𝐷1), in decision 
between two alternative design wave heights, hD1 = 22 m and hD2 = 26 m ... 170 
Figure 6.11. Likelihood function for combinations of (𝜐𝐷1 , 𝜐𝐷1) based on historical 
record for the number of exceedances of hD1 = 22 m and hD2 = 26 m in the 
past 60 years. .................................................................................................. 171 
Figure 6.12. Updated sample space (posterior probability distribution) for annual 
frequencies that the platform capacity is exceeded, (𝜐𝐷1 , 𝜐𝐷1), given 
historical data in decision between two alternative design wave heights, hD1 
= 22 m and hD2 = 26 m. .................................................................................. 172 
Figure 6.13. Expected utility difference for standard of practice (hD1 = 22 m) 
compared to a range of alternative values for the ultimate design capacity 
wave height, hD2. ............................................................................................ 174 
Figure 6.14. Comparison of results from Decision Entropy theory with those from a 





Figure B.1. Prior Decision Tree ...................................................................................... 242 
Figure B.2. Posterior Decision Tree ............................................................................... 243 
Figure B.3. Pre-Posterior Decision Tree for Perfect Information ................................... 244 








1.1 ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE BY EXPERIENCING AND REASONING 
There are things that we do know and there are (many) other things that we do not 
know. Learning is the process through which, by observing specific aspects of the reality, 
data, and by using our human reasoning faculties, we manage to add more to what we 
already knew. Two central questions regarding learning are determining how we can use 
what we already know to inform what we currently do not know, as well as determining 
the (relative) weights we have to give to evidence and reasoning in order to conclude a 
new learning. To answer the aforementioned questions, we can adopt any of the 
following approaches. 
In the first approach, we assert that until we make new observations, we take the 
set of our past observations, as of today, as the (sole) representation of the reality. The 
approach relies on a philosophy whereby (empirical) evidence is the only source of 
knowledge and results in (implicitly) ignoring unknowns, as they are yet to be observed 
and, at the moment, the only way to their existence is to hypothesize them by the aid of 
human faculties. Thus, the only way to learn new things is to wait until we observe them. 
This approach is mainly pursued in empirical science including experimental physics. 
In the second approach, most of our knowledge, is taken to be the logical 
consequence of what we already know. This approach heavily relies on imposing/ 
postulating (logical) structures/ orders on the reality, where (states of) certain aspects of 




between knowns and unknowns that makes the later a logical consequence of the former, 
i.e. by considering our current knowledge, we can deduct the existence and the character 
of what we are yet to observe. The approach relies on a philosophy whereby the real-
world is deemed to follow the (logical) orders/ structures devised by human minds and 
takes observation as a (sometimes secondary) support to demonstrate the validity of 
postulated orders. This mode of learning is mainly pursued in theoretical science 
including theoretical physics and philosophy. 
Following the second approach to learn unknowns, if one believes in the truth of 
these (imposed) orders, prediction/ characterization of unknowns look logical, 
reasonable, and natural. By the same token, an easy way to fool oneself into taking a 
(unobserved) character as real, is to postulate a certain structure on the reality and deduct 
that character accordingly.     
1.2 BACKGROUND 
 A Random Act/ Process and the Propensity Values for its Outcomes  
An Act is taken by an agent in order to achieve a desirable outcome. While a 
deterministic act/ process always results in the same outcome, a random act/ process 
sometimes result in one outcome and other times in different outcomes such that the 
agent is unable to foresee the (exact) outcome every time he takes the random act. The 
lack of knowledge and the possibility of not achieving the intended consequence make 
random acts risky. The significance of the risk depends on the undesirability of 




outcomes, which can be quantified by the measure termed (physical) probability. The 
(physical) probability/ (natural) propensity/ relative frequency, PP, for a given outcome, 
Ei, of a (repeatable) random act/ process, AR, triggered under specified conditions/ 
circumstances, C, is “defined” as the proportion of the times that taking the act results in 
the outcome, nEi, relative to the total number of (possible) repetitions (for the act), nT , 
Eq. (1-1).  
 





If the random process may result in any of the m possible outcomes/ events, 
contained in the set E = {E1, … , Em}, the set of propensity values for these outcomes 
defines the (propensity) distribution (function) of the random act, DAR = {PP1, … , PPm}. 
Propensity values for a desirable and an undesirable outcomes of a random act are 
respectively called the reliability and the risk of the random act. 
 Estimation/ Approximation of Propensity Values based on Statistical 
Observations 
To make the decision whether to take the risky act, the agent needs to assess the 
significance of its risk and for that, he needs to know the propensity values for various 
outcomes of the process. Propensity calculations, Eq. (1-1), require the knowledge of the 
outcome of the process in all (possible) instances/ repetitions of the act. In many cases, 
however, available data is limited to the outcomes of a few instances; thus, (true) 
propensity values have to be estimated/ approximated with the aid of the propensities 




Sampling is the act of observing/ learning about the outcome of a random process, 
as it is being produced or as it was. Thus, observational outcomes are also random and 
sampling itself is being considered a random process, a statistical experiment. A random 
sample is a sequence/ series/ collection, where each member/ element is an outcome of 
the random process. The set enclosing all possible observations of a statistical 
experiment, random samples, is called the “sample space” (for the act of sampling). If we 
denote a possible observational outcome, a sample, as Ij, the sample space of the 
statistical experiment composed of a sequence of n observations can be denoted as SSn = 
{I1, … , Im
n}. 
The (sequential) outcomes of sampling, as a random act, also do realize with a 
(natural) propensity if the act of sampling is being repeated, with the same number of 
observations and under the same conditions.  
The (physical) probability/ (natural) propensity/ relative frequency, PP, for a 
given observational sequence, Ij, of a (repeatable) sampling from the outcomes of a 
random act, SAR, performed under specified observational conditions/ circumstances, CS, 
is “defined” as the proportion of the times the act of sampling results in the observation 
of the sequence of interest, nIj, relative to the total number times a sample of such length 
could be observed, nTs, Eq. (1-2). Since an observational sequence is made up of single 
observations (of the outcomes of an underlying random act), the propensity of each 
sequential (sampling) outcome is related to the propensity values for its constituent 
outcomes. In other words, propensity of a sample data, PP (Ij), is a function of the 










The connection established in Eq. (1-2) between the propensity of a given 
(sequential sample) observation and the propensity distribution of the random act allows 
one to compare various sampling outcomes in terms of the chance for their realization. 
This ability is quite helpful when the propensity distribution of the random act is known 
and a comparison between sampling outcome is needed, e.g. calculating the (physical) 
probability for the realization of a winning combination in a (well-defined) game of 
chance. However, in many applications, the (underlying) propensity distribution is 
unknown; thus, the main challenge for the acting agent is to hypothesize all possible 
distributions for the random process, enclosed in the set of statistical hypotheses HD = 
{DAR1, … , DARt}, and to estimate the propensity distribution of the random act based on 
the only concrete evidence in hand, a (sample) observation.  
Since the chance of observing a given piece of (statistical) information, PP (Ij), 
depends on the (underlying) propensity distribution, DAR, it is possible to define a 
measure that allows a comparison between possible distributions based on the level of 
support provided by the observed sample. The measure, named “likelihood” by R.A. 
Fisher (1922), is the output of an (algebraic) function that associates each possible 
propensity distribution, DARk, with the probability of the realization of the (observed 
sample) information, if that distribution is the true/ real/ natural propensity distribution of 





𝐿𝑗(𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑘) = 𝐿(𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑘|𝐼𝑗) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝑗|𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑘) (1-3) 
 Bayesian Approach to Estimation/ Approximation of Propensity Values  
The existing methods of propensity estimation can be broadly categorized into 
Frequentist and Bayesian, which are different in terms of their methods, results, features, 
abilities, and essentially their foundations. While both approaches use (statistical) 
observations as the essential component of their methods and may even use the same 
measures to characterize observations, e.g. Likelihood, they differ in terms of the 
assumptions they have to make, beyond data, in order to reach conclusions. The need to 
assume (beyond data) arises from the insufficiency of data for propensity calculations. 
While frequentist (propensity estimation) methods have a data-centered approach and 
focus on finding a propensity distribution that best fits the data, e.g. the distribution 
whose likelihood (given the observed sample data) is maximum, the Bayesian approach 
to estimation (of propensities) tries to offset the (influence of) data based on the amount, 
and consequently the sufficiency, of the data at hand. 
A main feature of the Bayesian approach is the incorporation of all possible 
propensity distributions in its estimation procedures, i.e. the set of statistical hypotheses 
HD = {DAR1, … , DARt}. The incorporation materializes by assigning a degree of 
credibility/ plausibility, CR, to each credible/ plausible propensity distributions, DARk, and 
to adjust (the propensities of) each distribution by its credibility. The final result of the 
procedure is a set of all-inclusive propensity estimates, “credible propensity” values, for 




realizations. Eq. (1-4) presents the formal relationship for calculating the credible 
propensity for the outcome, Ei, of the random process, AR, under condition C, where the 
credible propensity is being calculated as the average of the propensity values suggested 
by various plausible distribution, PP(Ei|DARk), weighted by the credibility values of the 
distributions, CR(DARk). 
  
𝑃𝐵(𝐸𝑖|𝐴𝑅 , 𝐶) = 𝑃𝑃
𝑇(𝐸𝑖|𝐴𝑅 , 𝐶) = 𝐸[𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝑖|𝐴𝑅 , 𝐶)]




Since Eq. (1-4) is a variant form of the theorem/ law of total probability, “credible 
propensity” is as well called “total propensity,” PP
T. Also, Eq. (1-4) has a form similar to 
the definition of the mathematical expectation of a random set. Because it is possible to 
show that the same algebra governing (physical) probabilities (of the outcomes of a 
random process), contained in the set PAR = {PP1, … , PPm}, can be applied to the degrees 
of credibility, contained in the set CH = {CR1, … , CRt}, Cox (1946) and (1961), credible 
propensity can also be called “expected propensity,” E(PP). Because credibility/ 
plausibility values are exclusive to Bayesian approach, credible propensity can also be 
called “Bayesian propensity,” PB. 
Bayesian estimation of propensities, as presented in Eq. (1-4), requires credibility 
values, CH = {CR1, … , CRt}, for various credible propensity distributions, HD = {DAR1, … 
, DARt}. This entails a (mathematical) definition of credibility, according to which a 
specific credibility value is assigned to each propensity distribution.  Such a rule, Eq. 




credibility value for a propensity distribution, CR(DARk), is being revised/ adjusted/ 
updated by multiplying it with a factor of the likelihood of the distribution given a 
specific (sample) observation, Lj (DARk). The factor is the inverse of the Bayesian/ total/ 





] × 𝐿𝑗(𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑘) × 𝐶𝑅(𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑘) 
(1-5) 
 




Bayesian multiplication, as defined in Bayes’ theorem, Eq. (1-5), provides a direct 
and transparent way to assign a revised (degree of) credibility to each credible propensity 
distribution such that it reflects the (relative) level of support given to the distribution by 
statistical data, Lj (DARk). The theorem, however, requires a starting/ initial/ prior (degree 
of) plausibility for each propensity distribution to begin with, CR(DARk). The collection of 
starting credibility values for all plausible propensity distributions, HD = {DAR1, … , 
DARt}, is called the prior credibility distribution, CH = {CR1, … , CRt}, which follows the 
laws of probability theory and can be manipulated accordingly.  
Since Bayes’ theorem does not help in establishing the prior credibility 
distribution, a separate (mathematical) rule is needed in order to define/ assign a 
credibility distribution. Defining the prior credibility distribution, however, has turn out 
to be extremely challenging and the definitions/ assignments introduced, to the point, 




challenging and controversial. Since our goal is to help the cause of an agent, who is 
considering whether to take a risky act, we have to (1) interpret the answers we may find 
for the aforementioned questions and (2) to assign/ define prior probabilities within the 
context of making risky choices. 
1.3 MOTIVATION 
This research is motivated by (1) the importance and the influence of assigned 
credibility values on the analysis of risky decisions and (2) the shortcomings of the 
existing methods in establishing credibility values objectively, yet wisely. The 
differences between various methods and schools of thoughts matter most when data 
available is limited and inductions about propensities are more guided by the assumptions 
made rather than the few relevant observations. When data are abundant, on the contrary, 
the inductions made by various methods are heavily influenced by data and the 
assessments made by various methods are similar. The imposing challenge is that in 
many practical situations, where we must make a risky decision, relevant data are limited 
and assumptions make huge impacts on the analysis performed and the recommendations 
made. 
 Black Swans; Rare (Low Propensity) Events with Significant Impacts 
Often times we have to make our choices in the face of extremely limited 
information. In reference to the realization of such unperceived possibilities, Taleb 
(2007) reminds us the observation of “Black Swans” upon westerners’ discovery of the 




Examples of the realization of Black Swan events are numerous in engineering. For the 
first half a century of offshore hydrocarbon production in the Gulf of Mexico, the largest 
hurricane wave heights impacting production facilities were all less than 26 m. Then, out 
of the five major hurricanes occurred between 2004 and 2008, four experienced wave 
heights greater than 26 m and as a result, many platforms designed based on 
improbability of wave heights greater than 26 m were destroyed (e.g., Energo 2010). In 
another recent example, a 2014 landslide in Oso, Washington caused a debris run-out ten 
times further than the estimated maximum distance based on historical data (GEER, 
2014). The result, was the destruction of an entire community, including 43 lives, who 
could have remained alive if we had not perceived such run-out improbable.  
Another historical Black Swan in the field of petroleum exploration occurred in 
1968, when operators began the exploration of Santa Barbara Channel offshore 
California. While there was a consensus within the oil industry that these potential 
reserves were certain and even greater than those of Los Angeles basin (OGJ, 1967), the 
outcome of the exploration turned out to be disastrous as only two of the thirteen tracts 
drilled had commercial oil (OGJ, 1968). The main reason for the failure was the 
extension of the existing knowledge from the geologic structures and trends of onshore 
basin to the federal lands in the offshore channel (Newendorp and Schuyler, 2000). If 
experts, had not taken for granted the relevance of the historical data from the (perceived) 




 Deficiencies of Existing Method for Estimation of the Propensity Values of 
Rare Events 
Existing approaches for estimating physical probabilities/ propensities with 
limited information are lacking, especially when propensity values of interest are small. 
Frequentists estimate propensities of physical events that occur repeatedly given specific 
observational/ sampling circumstances mainly based on the available data. When data is 
limited, which is essentially the case for small-propensity events, frequentist estimates 
are expected to be far from reality; i.e. they do have a large standard error, in frequentist 
terminology. On the other side, the methodology of Bayesians allows for offsetting the 
influence of the data on estimates by introduction of the concept of “credibility” for a 
given set of propensity values, a statistical hypothesis. Credibility makes it possible to 
also consider (many other statistical) hypotheses that are less supported by the data, but 
still credible, to be considered in propensity estimation.  
The inferential procedures used by Bayesians for incorporating observations into 
credibility values rely on the use of Bayes’ theorem, which takes an (assumed) set of 
prior/starting probabilities and gives a revised/updated/final set of probabilities. Since 
Bayes’ theorem does not provide any guidance on the choice of the starting credibility 
values, Bayesians are divided on the choice of prior and its meaning into roughly two 
camps of subjectivists and objectivists.  
Subjective Bayesians believe that individuals are implicitly able to assign prior 
probabilities given their background information and the implicit assumptions they do 
make. Nonetheless, (1) the assignment, (2) the application, and (3) the (theoretical and 




challenges. The challenge with subjective assignments of prior credibility values, is the 
vagueness and obscurity of its assignment process, where a given set of priors is being 
postulated without informing the process through which the analyst has reached it.  
The challenge with the application of subjective assignments, in analyses aimed at 
guiding a non-personal acts, arises from the inability to examine the assignment and to 
verify its accordance with the (technical) conventions of a field. This leaves the “faith” in 
the analyst himself, and not the work itself, as the sole source for the legitimacy of the 
analysis and its recommendations (see section 4.6.1 for further details). Thus, in many 
applications, which demand the analysis process and its starting points to be examinable, 
subjective priors are set aside (Kass and Wasserman, 1996). 
Finally, the deeper challenge with subjective priors are their justification, both in 
regards to the theoretical position they may occupy within the framework of the Bayesian 
inference and in regards to the reality they may represent. As I will argue (section 4.3), 
prior credibility is a theoretical term/ construct and is only meaningful within the context 
of a Bayesian theory aimed at inducting/ estimating propensities, i.e. they are not 
observable/ measurable in the real-world (independent of the theory). Thus, the only way 
to set (prior and posterior) credibility values is to use a theoretical assignment rule/ law/ 
definition and no amount of real-world observation/ information, in itself and without 
pertinent theoretical definitions, can either set credibility values or make assignments 




 Deficiencies of Existing Objective Methods for Establishing Bayesian 
Credibilities 
 In contrast to subjectivists, objective Bayesians intend to provide the process of 
establishing prior probabilities with objectivity and transparency. The application of 
objective methods to establish non-informative priors for a decision, however, is not free 
of challenges. The most important difficulty arises from the fundamental difference 
between the context for which existing objective procedures have been developed and the 
context of making a risky decision. 
As an example to illustrate the challenges with existing Objective Bayesian 
approaches, consider assessing/ estimating the propensities for different possible 
occurrence rates of waves exceeding 20 m at an offshore location. A common Objective 
Bayesian approach is to establish the prior credibilities by maximizing the entropy of 
information, which produces a uniform probability distribution over the range of possible 
values.  
Figure 1.1 shows two possible interpretations of this approach: a uniform 
credibility distribution for the mean occurrence rate or a uniform credibility distribution 
for the logarithm of the mean occurrence rate (since it can vary over many orders of 
magnitude). 
Figure 1.2 then shows the updated credibility distribution (the one used for 
making decisions about developing infrastructure at the site) for each prior probability 
distribution given the available information about historical hurricanes at this location; 
there is a significant difference in these two distributions and they very well could lead to 




height is 30 m for one distribution and more than a 95-percent probability for the other 
distribution (Figure 1.2). 
 
Figure 1.1. Alternative prior credibility density functions for mean occurrence rate of maximum 
wave height exceeding 30 m (from Gilbert, Habibi and Min, 2012) 
 
Figure 1.2. Alternative updated cumulative credibility distribution functions for mean occurrence 
rate of maximum wave height exceeding 30 m given no occurrences in 60 years (from Gilbert, 




Making decisions rationally requires considering possibilities with considerable 
uncertainties and assessing/ estimating their propensities based on limited information. 
An Objective Bayesian approach is being developed with the intent to establish prior 
probabilities by maximizing entropy of the information in the context of making a 
decision. This theory, named Decision Entropy Theory, is described in Appendix B. 
Advancing the development of Decision Entropy Theory is the goal of this research.  
1.4 OBJECTIVES 
The goals I have tried to achieve in my research are as follows 
- Review, analyze, and synthesize the background on prior probability and 
utility 
- Establish a philosophical and logical foundation to define an “objective, 
transparent and defensible” method for establishing non-informative prior 
propensities 
- Describe and illustrate the principles of a theory that establishes non-
informative decision-based prior probabilities (Decision Entropy Theory) 
- Identify the practical consequences of applying a theory that establishes non-
informative decision-based prior credibilities  
- Evaluate whether a theory that establishes non-informative decision-based 





To achieve each of four objectives set for this research, I have provided with a list 
of tasks I have performed and a short description of each task. 
 Review, analyze, and synthesize the background on prior probability and 
utility 
- Task 1-1: to review and analyze the cause of controversies in statistics 
- Task 1-2: to review and analyze the background on the concept of probability 
- Task 1-3: to review and analyze the background on the Bayesian probabilities, 
in general, and prior probabilities in specific 
- Task 1-4: to review and analyze the background on Bayesian inference 
- Task 1-5: to synthesize the unite the reviews and analyses I performed in 
Tasks 1 to 4 
 Establish a philosophical and logical foundation to define an “objective, 
transparent and defensible” method for establishing non-informative prior 
propensities 
- Task 2-1: to distinguish between the role of assumptions and information in 
statistical inductions 
- Task 2-2: to define various types of probability including an objective 
Bayesian probability 
- Task 2-3: to scrutinize the concept of information within the framework of 
statistical inference and to define the state of no-information/ignorance 
- Task 2-4: to incorporate the concept of the “Bayesian robot” in the doctrine of 




- Task 2-5: to emphasize on context-dependency of all types of probabilities 
- Task 2-6: to incorporate the concept of “consensus” in the foundations of 
objective Bayesian approach  
- Task 2-7: to establish the concepts specific to the theory of decision entropy 
 Describe and illustrate the principles of a theory that establishes non-
informative decision-based prior probabilities (Decision Entropy Theory) 
- Task 3-1: to present the principles and mathematical axioms 
- Task 3-2: to investigate the uniqueness and consistency of the proposed 
approach 
- Task 3-3 to develop a framework for accommodating multiple decision 
alternatives. 
- Task 3-4 to create and present simple, illustrative examples 
- Task 3-5 to evaluate the theory in the context of “objective, transparent and 
defensible” 
 Identify the practical consequences of applying a theory that establishes 
non-informative decision-based prior credibilities  
- Task 4-1: to formulate a set of simplified decisions, including those involving 
the value of obtaining additional information to support making a decision 
- Task 4-2: to develop general analytical and/or non-dimensional numerical 
solutions to these problems.  





This research tackles the task of assessing the outcome of a process, when we are 
extremely uncertain about the processual tendencies due to the limitations of “relevant” 
observations. I have tried to offer answers to the questions of “when” we may face 
extreme uncertainty, “how” we can assess it, and “what” is the interpretation of the made 
assessment. Answering the three questions required different kinds of investigations, 
which is evident in the diversity of the contents presented in the dissertation. While 
answering to the question of “when to expect” was (partly) done through examining 
historical cases and inductively extending the lessons to the cases in the future, answering 
to the question of “how to assess” was done by developing mathematical formulae on the 
foundation of theoretically-postulated principles. Finally, answering to the question of 
“what interpretation” was done through analyzing existing concepts and developing new 
ones.  
The question of “when to expect” is being addressed in this Chapter, Section 
1.3.1, as well as early parts of Chapter 4, Sections 4.1 and 4.2. By refereeing to the 
concept of “Black Swan,” I have proposed that we must “always” consider the possibility 
for the realization of unprecedented events and take their extreme consequences into 
account, if we are facing a non-trivial decision. The claim regarding the potential for the 
realization of Black Swans is justified by citing historical cases and by reasoning 
inductively, that if such a phenomenon has been repeatedly taking humans by surprise, it 
is likely to do so in the future, and we need to have the foresight of considering yet-to-




To review the historical cases of Black Swans, I have mainly referred to the 
literature, including the well-known book by Taleb (2007); however, I have highlighted a 
number of cases as I see them both humbling and enlightening. One case, described in 
Section 1.3.1, was the 1968 hydrocarbon exploration in Santa Barbara Channel offshore 
California, where spatial proximity of the prospect with a highly productive area mislead 
oil companies about the profitably of the venture and cause them to lose a huge fortune 
with little return. The other case, described in Section 4.1.1, was the 1998 colossal 
collapse of the hedge fund LTCM, in the aftermath of a series of economic turmoil 
abroad, which was assessed as improbable by Nobel prize-winning frequency models that 
LTCM was using to valuate financial options.  
The question of “how to assess” is being investigated in Chapters 4, 5, 6, where 
Chapter 4 offers the principles of a method developed to address the question, Decision 
Entropy Theory (DET), and Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate the application of the theory to 
two practical problems. Also, an extensive description of DET including its mathematical 
formulation is being presented in Appendix B. 
It is being suggested that a way to quantitatively address Black Swan outcomes is 
to first consider the set of every possible outcome of significant consequence, and then to 
assign Bayesian prior probabilities to possibilities, before incorporating any empirical 
observation. After adopting a measure of information to precisely quantify the degree of 
non-informativeness for any set of theoretically-assigned Bayesian priors, DET offers a 
hierarchy of “significant variables” within the context of rational decisions, whose 




variables, as postulated by the principles of DET, are (I) “decision outcome,” (II) 
“difference in preference,” and (III) “learning potential/information value.” Nevertheless, 
minimally informing significant variables does not guarantee the non-informativeness of 
other variables, and on the contrary, it may dictate an informed distribution for another 
insignificant variable, if the variable depends on significant variables. The level of such 
informativeness is determined by the specifics of the relation between insignificant and 
significant variables, including the linearity of their relation.  
The question of “what interpretation” is being approached in Chapters 2, 3, and in 
Appendix A. In Chapter 3, I have suggested that three concepts of propensity, 
possibility/potentiality, and credibility, encompass all senses of probability; thus, all 
probabilistic assessments are of observational, and/or potential, and/or credential nature. 
 By defining credibilities as imaginary relative weights assigned to a set of 
possibilities, I have argued that credibility values cannot be obtained from empirical 
observations and must be assigned without resorting to empirical justifications. After 
declaring Bayesian probabilities as credibilities, I have defined non-informative priors as 
theoretically-established credibilities, whose assignment are aimed at not informing 
(certain aspects of) the assessment. As so, the assessments made by non-informative 
Bayesian probabilities are of potential-credential nature, and those based on partially-
informed probabilities, are of observational-potential-credential nature. 
The suggested interpretations of probability are coming from a more fundamental 
process-centered worldview, Philosophical Processualism, which I have presented in 




and suggests ways in which we can come to share, not only perceivable concepts, but 
also imaginary concepts, such as credibilities, with precision.  
Also, to increase the precision and the clarity of the concepts used throughout the 
research, a glossary of terms is being offered in Appendix A. The compendium is better 
understood as the outcome of my efforts to analyze various concepts, rather than to 
collect a dictionary of technical terms. Since I have developed the definitions across a 
rather long timespan, there is considerable variation in the definitions’ tone and format, 









The chapter introduces a philosophical perspective, I have labeled “Philosophical 
Processualism” due to the centrality of the concept of process in its tenets. While it seems 
to me that the perspective is of immense potential and may become the basis for the 
development of a rather extensive philosophy of science, currently, the view is at its 
infancy. The philosophical nature of perspective is due to its focus on the logical and 
critical examination of the rational grounds for the concepts we do use in mathematics, as 
well as natural and social sciences. While the intended application of Philosophical 
Processualism, makes its metaphysical concerns narrower than a general philosophical 
theory, establishing its position regarding a number of metaphysical issues are necessary 
and unavoidable. 
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF PROCESS 
The concept of process is central to the philosophy of probability I am proposing 
here. The concept is closely associated with the belief in causality, where each object has 
somehow come to existence. The “how” of realization is being captured by the concept of 
process, in which the outcome is conceived to be generated by a mechanism taking some 
inputs, and delivering output under specific circumstances.  
In continue, I will introduce processes by giving a definition, elaborating on the 





objectives we may achieve by such conception. I will then elaborate on our two 
fundamental ways of understanding concepts including the concept of process. I will also 
present the (general) types of processes we deal with, and finally, enlist and describe the 
cognitive operations we employ to theoretically organize processes. The term operation is 
used as an equivalent to the term process. The use of interchangeable names is aimed at 
avoiding terminological monotony, which occur if we label every realization mechanism 
a process. 
 Introducing Processes 
A process is a set of mechanisms that cause changes in a set of attributes of the 
objects involved. The definition of a process includes reference to a number of other 
concepts with labels such as object, attribute, change, and mechanism. Although I 
elaborate on these terms in the next section, I do recommend to take them as primitive 
concepts, meaning that defining them in terms of other concepts adds little clarity, and 
the audience must ultimately rely on their (default) cognitive apparatus for understanding. 
The concept of process is significant for both cognition and action, and its 
significance is due to the embedment of “change” in the fabric of the existence. In terms 
of cognition, there are few worldly phenomena not involving changes of some sort, and 
in terms of action, its objective almost involves bringing a change to the worldly affairs 
or preventing such changes from realization (status quo). Existence, from a more broad 
and general perspective, has started and continued with unexpected changes, revolutions, 





understand the worlds he encounters, and to act in accordance with his understanding. 
For such a study, I argue, the concept of process is essential. 
The main achievement of forward-looking studies is predicting the changes due to 
be realized in the future. The forecasts may then be used to verify the accuracy of the 
predictive machinery, in pure cognitive studies, or as the basis for purposive actions, in 
applied studies. In either case, contemplating the concept of process enriches the 
developed predictive machinery by considering the causal grounds of the predicted 
changes. Besides, the contemplation emphasizes the fact that a predictive machinery, 
similar to a physical machinery, relies on a set of processes to deliver its output. If the 
machinery is intended to be copied and different copies are expected to yield consistent 
output, the implanted processes ought to be known and to be imitable; otherwise, the 
apparatus remains isolated and the goal of duplication becomes unfulfilled.  
 Cognizing Processes 
Our ability to cognize processes stems from our wide-ranging ability to 
comprehend things, and it is this ability that makes our experiences meaningful and 
sensible. Since cognition and the resulting sense of meaningfulness occur inside the mind 
and are hidden from direct sensory observations, theorizing about cognitive mechanisms 
partly relies on external manifestation of our cognition. The appearances are in the form 
of behavior including linguistic utterances, as well as our reflections on the conscious 





  Perception and Conception 
Humans can understand things through a variety of methods including the 
processing of their sensory experiences to create percepts of things outside their minds. 
Perception, as a process resulting in meaningful mental experiences, must be 
differentiated with sensation, which only results in the reception of stimuli from one’s 
external environment by internal sensors. Figure 2.1 presents a schematic diagram 
depicting the complexity of perception process, where external stimuli is being received 
and processed by a sensor and the outcome is being reprocessed by a modeler to deliver a 
percept. The meaningfulness of the sensory experience, in contrast to the customary 
assumption, does not come from the work of the sensors, but mostly from the work done 
by the modelers. Meaning, generally speaking, has more to do with (the output of) 
models than data.  
 
Figure 2.1. A sketch of perception process, characterized by processing of sensation by a 
modeler to yield a meaningful sensory experience   
   Humans can also expand their understanding by processing of the things inside 
their minds, including externally-triggered percepts, to form concepts. Figure 2.2 presents 
a schematic diagram depicting the sub-processes of perception including simplification 





two processes of perception, portrayed in Figure 2.1, and conception, portrayed in Figure 
2.2. One major difference between the two is the input to the processes, where perception 
takes stimuli generated in the outside environment, whereas conception takes the (already 
processed) entities existing inside the mind. Apart from different input sources, the output 
for both processes have the shared feature of being formed inside the mind. The 
similarity in features, can also be reflected by similarity in names, where we relabel 
percepts as “perceptual concepts.” The new labeling unites all meaningful things for the 
mind under a group, whose name include the term “concept.” 
 
Figure 2.2. A sketch of conception process, characterized by simplifying a set of mental 
objects and processing them by a modeler to new meaningful mental objects   
Another similarity between the processes of perception and conception is the 
involvement of the sub-process of modeling, that going through which seems to bring 
meaning to mental entities. The significant semantic role of the model can be explained 
by its function. A model’s job is not just to combine or rearrange components, but to add 
things not present in input. In a geometric analogy, a model connects some dots, not just 
by associating them, but by creating and adding many more points of specific spatial 





along with the sub-process of simplification, depicted in Figure 2.2, may not be 
considered equivalents of the two processes of analysis and synthesis.  
A modeling process, when it results in the development of concepts expressible in 
human language, may be also be called an interpretation process, and its outcome an 
interpretation. An example interpretation, is the process-oriented philosophy such as the 
one I am presenting here for the case of cognition, which could not be produced simply 
by analyzing and synthesizing the current knowledge. My interpretation, as a new 
coherent conception, has come to realization by creating new entities and by using them 
to connect existing data, in the forms of empirical observations and theoretical 
conceptions made by other researchers. In a broader perspective, if I had followed a 
heavily empirical approach and overly relied on observations, I would have possibly 
obtained semantically-deficient conceptions. The meaning has come more from 
(internally postulated) models than (externally received) data. 
2.3 ONTOLOGY OF CONCEPTS 
The account of cognitive processes I put forward in the previous section, 
introduces concepts as things in the mind, without elaborating on how they do look like. 
The answer to the later question clarifies the ontology of concepts within the framework a 
process-centered philosophy I am advocating. Below, I will discuss how concepts could 
look like, where they could be present, and how they could come to realization. Besides, 
the offered ontology establishes the foundations of the processual philosophy and will be 





and an epistemic machinery, which I do label as “pragmatic mathematics;” a system of 
linguistically manifested mental constructs aimed at guiding action with precision.  
 Mental Representations 
Mental representation is one of the common phrases used to label objects of the 
mind. The term representation not only distinguishes between what concept refers to, the 
referent, but also indicates the existence of a difference between the form of the concept 
and its referent. The difference in the appearance depends on the way representation may 
look like. Although it is tempting to hypothesize about THE appearance of the concepts, 
as many philosophers have done, I think it is more realistic to introduce an open set of 
possible appearances for the concepts. My pluralist approach roots in my belief in (1) 
multi-modality of human cognition, and (2) cross-populational modal variabilities. While 
cognitive multi-modality of humans enables them to form their mental representations in 
a variety of ways, modal variability across human populations results in differences in 
individual tendencies to use various modes of representation. 
Visual representation seems to be the most common way of forming concepts, in 
which the referent is being represented in a seeable format. For percepts, the 
representation could be a mental image of the referent, similar to what mind experiences 
when it really sees the object. In a more sophisticated method, pictorial images can be 
substituted with visual symbols and enable the mind to conduct various kinds of symbolic 





non-perceptual concept of number with a numeral, or (c) the concept of process with an 
arrowed box, such as one I have used throughout this chapter! 
 Abstract Objects 
It is also possible not to specify the form of mental entities and simply regard 
them as abstract objects. The approach may be warranted as we can only learn about a 
very small part of our mental objects and processes, which is accessible to our 
consciousness. However, I suspect the main motivation of the advocates of the approach, 
from Plato in antiquity to Gottlob Frege in 19th century to prominent contemporary 
philosophers, is to endow humans with the ability to directly access absolute and timeless 
truth. Such a privilege, would be endangered if one has to address the potential 
differences between individuals’ mental representations of the same referent. By evading 
the question of the appearance of concepts, it is possible to overlook individual 
differences and assert the accessibility of the truth. Nevertheless, to ignore potential 
variations in individual conceptions, the theorist needs to deny mind as the place for the 
concepts, and to introduce another place, both outside physical world and human minds; 
the third realm. 
I see the Platonist view of cognition, where concepts are outside time and space, 
as inconsistent with the process-oriented account of cognition, in which every object is 
the outcome of a process unfolding in time and space. While we may not know the exact 
process underlying an outcome, our ignorance does not strip the process out of its 





alternative theory needs to explicate the phenomena the Platonist view was suited to 
explain, albeit with minimum recourse to metaphysical constructs such as the third realm. 
Among other things, we must explain the exemplification of universal properties; the 
seemingly eternal recurrence of the same properties in seemingly infinite number of 
instances. For example, it must be clarified whether there physically exist a property of 
redness, as we do perceive it, apart from the instances of red objects; and if so, how? 
 Universals as Outcomes of Typical Processes 
I propose a two-step strategy for addressing the problem of universals. The first 
step involves the use of the familiar philosophical distinction of type vs token, and 
regrading a universal property as a type and its realized instances as tokens. The second, 
and more important, step involves the introduction of a generative process with the ability 
to produce tokens of a type. The introduction will not be merely nominal, but aspectual, 
where a number of aspects of the token-generation process are being explored. The 
reason for the significance of the second step is its reliance on a materially tangible 
process, as a means of explication. The lack material hypotheses of the kind, I believe, is 
one of the reasons for non-ending disputes in philosophy; whereas in science, the 
combination of the hypotheses with the empirical investigations regarding the feasibility 
and the specifics of the hypothesized processes, results in further discrimination among 
the contending explanations and fewer argumentation. 
I offer the concept of “code” to refer to the means through which a process 





recipe for preparing a meal, containing the information regarding the participant objects 
in the process and their properties, as well as their levels of participation and the changes 
required for triggering and maintaining the process. The analogy is not perfect, as 
cooking is a process guided by a purposive agent, whereas many token-generation 
processes advance without the involvement of biological agents and the recipe is being 
activated and read in an automatic fashion. 
The code of a process is embedded in the material participants of the process in 
the form of their physicochemical arrangements. The code needs not to be in a single 
objects and parts of which could be distributed among all participants. Once all objects of 
certain character take the appropriate spaciotemporal position relative to each other, the 
process commences according to the specifics of the objects’ physicochemical 
arrangements. Even though the recent description of the code closely fits our 
understanding of chemical reactions, it can be used to comprehend not chemical 
processes, as well. 
 Example Processual Codes 
For instance, one may ask about the code for the process of the gravitation of 
heavenly bodies and wonder about the way spatially remote objects may participate in the 
process. One answer is that the mere possession of the mass by two spaced objects 
triggers a gravitational process, in which objects move to close the gap. While many 
readers may be doubtful of the description and find it somehow unbelievable, it is 





theory of gravitation, Isaac Newton, regarding his own discoveries. Based on some 
accounts, it was Newton’s skepticism about the feasibility of such simple code that 
motivated him to introduce force, as an intermediate theoretical construct, which did 
provide a more believable code for the process. Either way, the code for the process of 
gravitation is stored in each and every particle of both celestial bodies in the form of the 
physicochemical arrangements we may simply come to label as mass.  
In another example, we may inquire about the code, according to which some 
objects look red-colored to us.  While one may be content with a general description of 
the code for the color property and attribute it to the specifics of the physicochemical 
arrangements of the particles of the colored object, another may remain skeptical of the 
description and enquires about the details of the arrangement. To find the details, we need 
to learn about the underlying process resulting in the overlying feature. The learning, 
among other things, requires the development of novel hard means enabling us to sense 
the participating objects and to conceive their attributes. Such process, may result in 
characterizing the arrangement in terms of the wavelength and the intensity of the lights 
emanating from the colored-object.  
The skeptic may accept the presence of the delineated arrangement, but ask why 
the light coming from the object has such wavelength. Even though the skeptic’s inquiry 
may seem to be about the “why” of the influencing features, further explanation may be 
provided by answering “how” the influencing features come to possess their current 
arrangements. In other words, we need to undercover one more layer and learn about a 





more research, we may find out that light’s features are determined in a process, where 
emission spectra and light absorption of the surface of the colored object come to play. 
The unimpressed skeptic, can pose another why question and send us to conduct 
another inquiry resulting in the discovery of subatomic particles termed quarks and in the 
introduction of quark’s properties as determinants of the deeper arrangements within the 
colored object. In any case, the code of the process is partly captured by the 
physicochemical arrangements of the object we may simply come to label as color 
properties. 
 Tower of Physical Processes  
The chain of investigations we conducted to find the code for colored appearing 
process can be used as a prototype for framing other enquiries aimed at discovering the 
code for other attributes of the objects. One lesson we learned is the endless nature of 
such enquiries, where each discovery can entice us to ask another why question and 
motivates us to find another how answer; though, at a deeper level. To capture this 
endless nature, I sketched a visual schema (Figure 2.3), in which a series of processes 
stack up to eventually produce the target attribute perceivable to us. The processual 
tower, as an imagery of the concept, differs from a physical tower in that the first is being 






Figure 2.3. A sketch of non-ending tower of physical process, resulting in an apparent 
feature perceivable to humans 
A pragmatist, after conceiving the notion depicted by non-ending tower of 
processes, may seek to find where, if any, she/he can abort the investigation and declare 
sufficiency for her/his practical purposes. Fortunately, the answer could be positive, 
depending on (1) the precision of our processual knowledge at levels above a specific 





participating in processes higher than the specific height. The two conditions for 
investigative sufficiency are the resultants of the goals the pragmatists may possibly 
pursue. The goals could either be (a) the prediction of the appearance of overlying 
objects, as they might influence the outcome of another process, or (b) the alteration of 
the overlying appearance by manipulation of the features of the intermediate objects.  
The degree to which the pragmatist could achieve her/his aims depends on the 
degree to which her/his processual and sensual knowledge is available and precise. If the 
current knowledge above a specific level enables determination of the overlying feature 
for any to-be-generated token, the pragmatist is good to go and can stop further inquiry; 
otherwise, she/he needs to go deeper. The level of determinacy of processual and sensual 
knowledge can be analogically described as the tightness of the grasp over the tower. As 
soon as one could hold a tight grip on the tower, she/he gains predictive and (potentially) 
manipulative power over the process. The tight grip, in statistical language, translates into 
a perfect correlation between the features of the intermediate object, at a given level of 
the tower, and the features of the appearing objects. 
 Processual Interpretation of Tokens and Types 
My answer to the philosophical question regarding the ontology of universal 
categories; e.g. objects, properties, or relationships; can also be used to give an account of 
the distinction between a type and its tokens. If so, the claim that every universal 
category is out there in the world in the form of a processual code, can be used to 





Tokens, can be defined in terms of the process generating them. At every 
occasion, when the code of a process is being activated, the same token does come to 
realization. The term “same” exclusively refers to common non-spaciotemporal aspects 
of instances; otherwise, each token is a distinct, at least because of the difference between 
the time (and potentially the location) of its generation, compared to other instances. 
Thus, in a more precise labeling approach toward the inter-relation among tokens, we 
may label tokens “similar” and correspond the similarity with the “same” non-
spaciotemporal features, which they share.    
While the concept of type can be similarly elucidated in terms of a generative 
process, we may first discuss an alternative definition of a type, based on its tokens. The 
discussion matters not only because of practical concerns, as the extensional account of 
types are commonly employed in science and engineering, but because of 
epistemological concerns, as many theories in mathematics including mathematical 
statistics are founded on such conception.     
A type, in an extensional account, is defined as the set of its tokens. It is possible 
to use the shared feature as the basis of relating a number of tokens, and to form an 
extensionally defined set, i.e. by enlisting its members and specifying the extent of the 
set. However, such a finite set, my not be labeled as the type of the tokens and could only 
be considered a finite sample of tokens. A set that could be more intimately associated 
with the concept of the type, is the imaginary set containing each and every token 
generated in the past, along with the ones, yet to-be-generated in the future. The 





of already-generated tokens, which have become accessible to us. Nevertheless, one 
wonders how accepting an abstract set as the definition of a type differs from considering 
type as an abstract entity inaccessible to us. In other words, gathering tokens in a set, 
either a finite sample or an infinite unavailable population, does little in explaining how 
the tokens are related to the type.  
To identify a type, I suggest that we forgo the temptation of giving an extensive 
definition and instead, identify it with the “typical code,” according to which tokens 
come to realization. After discovering the code, the type is completely defined and the 
record of the realized tokens could be considered as a mere tally of historical events, 
differing only in terms of their spaciotemporal positions. 
 Processual Codes; General vs Detailed Descriptions 
A philosophical theory of type may only marginally help in offering the details of 
the code for a specific type. In fact, any general philosophical theory, including the one I 
have put forward, can only present the nature of types from a very broad and general 
perspective. The code for every specific type is initially hidden and can only be 
discovered through contextual inquiries, where we use all sorts of material and mental 
means, to form a body of knowledge termed natural philosophy, in earlier times, or 
science, in modern times. In fact, the constant expansion of scientific knowledge is the 
result of mankind’s effort to decode more of specific types. 
A processual code for a certain type (of object, property, or relation), at any point 





develop the natural philosophy of that type. For many contextual types, our collective 
knowledge is partial and imprecise and can yield correct predictions of the state of a 
fraction of to-be-generated tokens. Besides, we have the tendency of trying to establish 
meaningful connection among an ever-larger number of contextual types, and to form 
more comprehensive and less contextual types. Due to the desire and will for perfecting 
and generalizing the natural philosophy, the descriptions of the typical codes we see as 
plausible changes along the time; mostly in an evolutionary fashion and sometimes in a 
revolutionary manner. Since my aim here is not to develop a philosophy of science, I 
leave it here by emphasizing that postulating a universal code for types, which follows a 
metaphysical belief in causality, does not imply that we do or will have the code for a 
certain type. 
 Philosophical Processualism; A Pluralist Perspective 
    My proposal that every universal property is out there in the world in the form 
of a processual code enabling the generation of its tokens, may seem inconsistent with 
my main thesis that concepts are inside the mind and not out there in the world. The 
apparent inconsistency, may also be perceived due to the contentions of the philosophical 
schools of thoughts historically advocating various elements of my position. While the 
claim that universals and types do exist makes me a realist, the assertion of universals’ 
being out there in the world and not in an abstract realm, makes me an Aristotelian realist 
and in opposition to Platonist realists; however, the assertion that we understand the 





Nonetheless, I will demonstrate how it is possible to hold the mentalistic thesis without 
compromising the conception of the processual code. In fact, I will use the concept of the 
generative code, not only to support the mentalism of concepts, but also to elaborate on 
necessary conditions for a shared perception, when an external referent may result in the 
formation of similar perceptions across a population of minds.   
A process-centered perspective can be employed to further support the idea of 
taking concepts as mental entities. The support may be more if we first clarify the case 
for perceptual concepts, which are meant to represent things in the physical world rather 
than the worlds of human imagination. The elaboration strategy will be similar to the 2-
step analysis I gave for the age-old philosophical conundrum of universals. In the first 
step, I use the type vs token distinction and consider a percept generated in an 
individual’s mind as a token of the corresponding perceptual type; and in the second step, 
I introduce the generative process with the ability to produce the target perceptual tokens. 
My take on tokens can be used to explain the realized objects of cognition. Taking 
an instance perception as a token means that at every occasion, when the person is being 
exposed to the same external stimuli, the same mental representation is being formed in 
her/his mind. The term “same,” as I clarified before, refers to the aspects of 
representation associated with non-spaciotemporal features shared among the external 
stimuli.    
Likewise, my account of types can be employed to elucidate the concept of 
cognitive universals. The goal is to explain what makes humans to have the same 





assuming the phenomenon does occur. While a universal sensory experience can be 
ascribed to the presence of a typical code, the challenge is to introduce the generative 
process, which uses the typical code to generate the experiences. More specifically, we 
must clarify whether the generative process is out in the world, as Aristotelian realists 
claim, or is inside the mind of the experiencer, as conceptualists claim; and if the latter 
one, we must answer whose mind is the place for the process. 
 Universals as Outcomes of Multi-World Processes 
I propose that the process resulting in the realization of percepts is a two-world 
serial process, the first one in the physical world outside human mind and the second 
inside human mind. It follows that the percept’s processual code is a composition of two 
codes, one for the tower of physical processes and the other for perception process. 
Figure 2.4  illustrates the sequence of processes, which eventually yield a percept at one’s 
mind. 
 
Figure 2.4. A sketch of the sequences of multi-world processes involved in formation of a 
perception 
The multi-world account of universal percepts is in contrast with the positions of 





our minds, and conceptualists, who believed that universals do not exist outside of the 
perceiving mind. The position of the multi-world account is that even though we may 
hypothesize the existence of universals without perceiving them, both existence of 
universals and their qualitative specifics, as percepts, depend on our minds. Every 
universal does exist because of the uniformity of its pertinent typical codes, one in the 
non-mental world and the other in the mental world; without each, the universal would 
cease to exist.  
The feasibility and the utility of developing perspectives that exclude human mind 
from their accounts of universals, is questionable. Such theories, may need to explain the 
feasibility of their imaginary conditions, and to elaborate who and how has come to be 
aware of the existence of universals. Is development of a form of awareness regarding 
universals possible, without the presence of a subject? If not, and the existence of a 
subject is necessary for obtaining the information concerning the presence of the 
property, how the subject can obtain such information? Until we answer the how-
questions about the feasibility and the specifics, the imaginary scenarios and their 
potential answers may negligibly expand our understanding. Responding to the later 
questions requires theoretical development of the kind we are pursuing in our process-
centered account, and may possibly result in constructs similar to ours.  
Ignoring the role of the mind by philosophical theories may root in some implicit 
assumptions the theorists are making. It appears that the development of such 
perspectives; which are very common across a wide range of human inquiries; is only 





way we do, and (2) we implicitly assume that our way of perceiving the world is the 
default and is ubiquitous. To me, the label “made in human universe” is invisibly 
stamped all over our hypotheses, and I see it impossible to form any understanding, let 
alone a hypothesis, outside “human universe.”  
 Dependence of Universals on Cognitive Processes 
The dependence of the universals on our minds, both in terms of their existence 
and their qualitative specifics, can be illustrated by an example. Let’s consider the 
conceptual category of properties (of objects) and focus on the much-discussed property 
of color. A textbook introduction to the philosophical problem of universals goes like 
this: we see distinct and different objects, who are all red-colored.  Is there any such thing 
as redness aside from red-colored objects?  To answer this question and other questions 
of the kind, philosophers have developed their opposing theories of universals, including 
the process-centered account I elaborated above. Since we have already provided a 
number of answers to the question, I suggest we put the assumptions implicit in the 
framing of the problem under scrutiny, and ask whether it is possible for a red-colored 
object not to be red, at all? And if so, how? My answer, is a surprising yes!   
In general, every entity (either an object, a property, or a relation) does only exist 
FOR subjects, who are able to recognize the entity as such. For the case of the color 
property, an object could only be red-colored TO the subject with the abilities of (a) 
sensing the color property, in general, and (b) the red color, in specific; for subjects 





but without the ability (b) the object is colored, but not red. The proposal, can be further 
demonstrated with a review of color-perception abilities of a number of other animals. 
While a kind of fish named skate lacks ability (a) and only sees in black and white, dogs 
do have abilities (a) and (b), but with a limited extent compared to those of humans; for 
dogs, a red-colored object may look like what humans perceive as greyish brown to light 
black. In contrast, most birds not only have the ability (a), but have a stronger ability (b), 
and unlike humans, are able to differentiate between various shades of red, rather than 
bunching a wide red spectrum into a single type. 
Characterizing alternative perception mechanisms and the resulting differences 
between their generated percepts, may turn out to be a difficult task, if not impossible. In 
the above example, we reviewed how dogs may see a red-colored object like what we see 
as greyish brown to light black. One may ask about the reason for our imprecise 
knowledge of the doggy perception and for ascribing a spectrum of colors to the outcome 
of a perceptive process, less discriminating than ours.  
A simple explanation, could be given by reviewing the visual schemas in Figure 
2.1 and Figure 2.4, illustrating the two sub-processes involved in perception, namely 
sensing and modeling. Since sensing abilities are closely related to the physical construct 
of sensors; hard devices used to receive external stimuli; it is possible to analyze sensors 
at the service of dogs, and to compare them with those of humans. The comparison 
reveals that in contrast to humans whose eyes are equipped with three types of cones to 
sense the three colors of blue, green, and red, dogs’ eyes are only equipped with two 





however, is not sufficient in answering the posed question, as percepts are the product of 
a joint process between hard sensors and soft modelers. Eventually, it is the specifics of 
the soft modeler, i.e. its typical code, that determines how the outcoming percept would 
looks like to the perceiving mind. So, to find out how an object, perceived by humans as 
red-colored, looks like to a dog, you have to be a dog! 
 Processual Uniformity Hypothesis 
    Considering an entity (either an object, a property, or a relation) as a universal, 
relies on two processual uniformity assumptions, one non-mental and the other mental. 
While uniformity of a non-mental process captures the belief that numerous activations of 
a process under similar non-spaciotemporal conditions, consistently yields the same 
outcome, uniformity of a mental process captures the belief that when the subjects are 
being exposed to the same signals, they interpret them in a similar fashion. 
The universality of percepts among humans, must not to be considered a natural 
law, but a physical hypothesis, whose validity ultimately depends on the (potential) 
existence and the specifics of the differences among percepts formed in the minds of 
humans. When perceptual universality is being used as a postulate in theories aimed at 
predicting perception-dependent changes in the behavior of subjects, the outcoming 
predictions must be examined and adjusted for deviations from the universality. 
However, the more realistic theories are those, who allow deviations from the 





 Worldviews; a Cognitive Explanation  
Every philosophical account of universals, including ours, depends on the 
perspective, according to which it has been developed. The term perspective is used to 
indicate that the differences among the answers provided by various accounts, is not only 
due to methodical differences, but mainly due to their diverging worldviews. The 
simplest approach to worldviews is a descriptive one, either by giving an exclusive 
portrayal of one view; such as one I have presented for the processual perspective; or by 
comparing diverging views and highlighting the similarities and differences among their 
positions; such as one presented in philosophy textbooks, handbooks, and encyclopedic 
entries. Nevertheless, the main scholarly challenge may not be in giving descriptions, but 
in developing explanations about the reason for the divergence of worldviews among the 
brightest human minds, who have tried to make a broad sense of the world they are living 
in. Below, I try to take a small step and offer a hypothesis aimed at explaining some of 
the underlying reasonings for divergence among views toward universals.  
I suggest that we take each worldview as a distinct cognitive perspective. If so, a 
process-oriented account of realizations may be able to explain the divergence of 
worldviews by hypothesizing the cognitive processes underlying various worldviews. In 
other words, different takes on universals is due to differences in the conceptions of the 





 Example Explanation: Nominalism 
To illustrate the method, I take the nominalist position toward universals and I 
hypothesize a kind of cognitive process, which may result in development of the 
perspective. The reason for choosing nominalism is its striking position toward 
universals, which looks bizarre and preposterous to our common-sense minds. 
Nominalists, deny the existence of universals, neither in human minds, nor in the material 
world (outside human mind), or in the metaphysical realm of the abstract entities. A 
universal, nominalists assert, only exists as a name given by our minds to a set of 
empirically-observed tokens, and informs nothing typical beyond the similarity of tokens’ 
appearances. 
A nominalist position, I propose, may be the result of conceiving the types as the 
output of cognitive processes generated by, what I do label as, an “experiencing-
organizing mind,” which is able to process bodily experiences into percepts, and to 
organize the generated percepts into sets. When the mind is exposed to tokens with 
different appearances, its organizing abilities allows it to separate and group them into 
sets. Besides, an experiencing-organizing mind is capable of externally manifesting its 
internally created divisions by naming the sets and revealing them to other minds. The 
formation and the presentation of named groups is the basis of the nominalists’ claim that 
universals do not have an existence beyond those names. Figure 2.5 schematically 
illustrates the chain of processes resulting in the formation and presentation of a named 






Figure 2.5. A sketch of a possible nominalist conception of the processes generating a 
nominal type 
The nominalist denial of universals is possibly not due to their recognition of 
“experiencing-organizing mind,” but due to their lack of recognition of, what I do label 





mind is on forming organized description of observations, the focus of a questioning-
hypothesizing mind is on inquiring about the reasons for the similarity of the grouped 
tokens. By inquiring, the mind introduces the possibility for the existence of something 
beyond or beneath the observations, that is making the appearances similar. To find an 
answer to the inquiry, the mind needs not only to imagine the things beyond or beneath 
the observations, but also to hypothesize how the imagined objects and/or their properties 
are related to the appeared tokens. 
 Explaining Specific Types 
Nominalists may not supplant a general explicative-associative account of 
universals to their descriptive-collective account, due to the imaginary nature of general 
hypotheses. Even our processual account of universals and the concept of typical code 
may not sway nominalists in our direction, as it fails to provide what matters to 
nominalists. Since the nominalist position is being developed by focusing on the non-
hidden world of appearances, what may change their position is observations of different 
kinds than the ones provided by similar tokens. Such observations may be provided by a 
different kind of philosophy, natural philosophy, which focuses his resources to explain 
specific types and tries to supplements the soft means of a questioning-hypothesizing 
minds with the hard means of new devices. 
The new hard devices enable natural philosophers to look beyond or beneath the 
apparent tokens and to observe entities hidden to man’s default hard sensors. Observing 





there is something beyond or beneath the apparent tokens, it also helps the hypothesizing 
mind to explain the realization of the apparent tokens by associating them with the 
previously hidden entities. While new experiences make it difficult for the nominalists to 
shrug the proposed association off as a mere imagination, he may soon come back to 
repeat his nominalist assertion, this time for the newly observed types, and claim that 
there is nothing beyond what has been observed to the point. To react, the natural 
philosopher has to embark on another inquiry and uncover one more level of the hidden 
tower of physical processes, with the hope of satiating the nominalist. However, one may 
wonder about the possibility of a positional change under any amount of new 
observations. Maybe, the nominalist is averse to believing in anything beneath or beyond 
observables!  
 Non-observed Entities 
My examination of the nominalist position on universals had motivations beyond 
offering a new analysis of the opposing positions on one the oldest and most abstract 
problems in philosophy. Such abstract debates, to me, are ubiquitous and are very similar 
to disputes on many unsettled foundational issues across a wide spectrum of fields in 
physical and social sciences, as if the “disagreement” itself is a (higher order) universal, 
relative to the (lower order) field-specific disputed universals. If such disagreements are 
taken to be instances of a universal, uncovering its typical code will illuminate the 





I suggest that any hypothesis involving unobserved entities will generate a 
dispute, whose settlement would only be possible either by observing entities (or their 
associates), or by taking them as primitive entities. Thus, it might be tempting to remove 
all non-observed or non-postulated entities from our proposals and to make them 
undisputable. In fact, there was a movement among logical positivists in the 20th century 
to cleanse theoretical science and philosophy of such terms, which eventually faded with 
limited success.  
The inability to eliminate non-observed entities from hypothesized relationships 
could have a variety of reasons. For one thing, science and humanities contain so many 
proposals that include unobserved entities and reconstructing them needs enormous 
efforts beyond anyone’s abilities. For the other, there might not be an easy and clear way 
for the reconstruction of many theories, and if it were, each field’s experts would 
probably have done it before philosophers. Even when it is possible to drop non-
observables from the relationships among entities, their preservation is an indication of 
the theoretician’s belief regarding their existence and the role of the entities in making the 
relationship meaningful. While the hypothesis may turn out to false upon further 
discoveries, it is such works of imagination that may guide us to discover more about 






 Cognitive Explanation of Perspectival Opposition  
The cognitive approach we followed for analyzing the nominalist perspective can 
also be used to analyze other positions, including our processual perspective (Table 2.1). 
In the approach, the positions taken by the perspective are seen as the outcomes of a 
cognitive process, where the mind is conceived to plays a certain role due to the abilities 
ascribed to it. For the case of nominalism, the recognized mental faculties include 
experiencing, organizing, and labeling, and as a result, a nominalist-envisioned mind acts 
as a classifier and namer of the outside world. 
Orientation, I propose, is another property that, in combination with the perceived 
mental abilities, causes perspectives to have different positions toward universals. 
Orientation can be evaluated relative to either of the two references of (a) human mind, 
and/or (b) the apparent world, where (a) can be described as outward, inward, or both, 
and (b) can be described as within, beneath, and beyond. While orientation (a) reveals the 
theoretician’s awareness and recognition of the influence of cognitive processes on our 
knowledge, orientation (b) reveals theoretician’s psychological predispositions toward a 
suite of fundamental concepts including order, law, uniformity and truth.  
An outwardly orientation toward human mind indicates that the philosopher is 
either unaware of the relationship between one’s cognitive processes on her/his 
knowledge, or discounts it. In contrast, an inwardly orientation reveals the philosopher’s 
emphasize on the role of the mind in shaping human knowledge; in an analogy, she/he 
sees knowledge as a participant of an internal theater, directed by the mind. In between 





role of human cognition on the nature and the character of knowledge, as well as the role 
of the differences among individual cognitive processes on diversity of knowledge 
perspectives across human population.  
Most prominent perspectives including Aristotelian realism, Platonist realism, and 
even nominalism, embrace a mentally-outward orientation. Aristotelian realists see things 
as out there in the world and believes that humans can discover those things “as they 
are.” By not elaborating on the mechanisms enabling humans to understand things as they 
are, Aristotelian realists implicitly take the claimed epistemological ability as a 
metaphysical postulate.  
Also, the other major group of realists, the Platonists, see things as instances of 
the forms existing outside human mind, but also outside of the material world, and in a 
3rd non-spaciotemporal world. Platonists take even more metaphysical postulates than 
Aristotelian realists; not only they postulate the existence of a 3rd abstract realm, they also 
take connections between each of the two physical and mental worlds and the abstract 
world, as granted.  
Although the nominalists’ position that universals are only names in the mind and 
they do not exist in the physical or in the mental worlds, may appear to be mentally-
inward, their real position might be as mentally-outward as those of the realists’. While 
nominalist do not set the mind aside and ascribe minimal capabilities of organizing and 
naming it, their focus is all on observables in the material world. By denying anything 
beyond observables in the outside word, nominalists reveal their mentally-outward 





On the other side, conceptualists’ position is mentally-inward, as they see nothing 
but the mind and its processes, and as such, it leaves little to be justified by metaphysical 
postulates. While the full commitment of conceptualism to the mind, makes it an ideal 
foundation for fields such as cognitive science, social sciences, and humanities, where the 
phenomena are mainly shaped by the workings of the minds of humans. However, its 
mentalistic perspective hinders its contribution to physical sciences and engineering, 
where phenomena are commonly perceived to be shaped independently from the 
workings of the minds of humans. 
In between, is Philosophical Processualism, which does not focus on physical or 
mental worlds at the expense of the other, and sees them jointly from a more 
comprehensive perspective. Philosophical Processualism also resorts to few metaphysical 
postulates in establishing the relation between the two worlds, as it introduces a specific 
physical process through which, features of the outside world can be sensed and 
interpreted by the mind. Philosophical Processualism’s explicative sufficiency, one may 
argue, has become feasible due to contemporary advances in physical and cognitive 
sciences, which were unavailable to philosophers of the past. Regardless, the processual 
perspective, as we demonstrated, has more explicative power than perspectives of the 
past and can even explicate the conception of each past perspective, using known 
cognitive processes. Table 2.1 summarizes the features of Philosophical Processualism, 






Table 2.1. Characteristics of Processual Perspective in comparison with other 
perspectives, in terms of perspectives’ prioritization of worlds, mind, and mental abilities   
 
Orientation toward the apparent world, is another kind of orientation causing 
mentally-outward perspectives to take different positions regarding universals. The 
orientation determines the perspective’s answer to the question whether there are hidden 
things connected to the apparent things, and if so, where are the hidden things? Since the 
only way to consider non-observed entities and their relationships is through human 
imagination, the answer to both questions require taking a metaphysical stance regarding 
the legitimacy and the quality of relating objects of human imagination to observed 
entities. 
I suggest, we interpret each stance in the light of its advocates psychological 
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Without getting into the details of the suggestions, its general scheme can be constructed 
based on the following opposing ideas.  
Idea1: The only way for two ordered systems of associated entities, one inside 
human mind, and the other in the physical world, to exactly correspond each other is for 
both to correspond a model system, unaffected by each. In other words, both physical and 
mental systems must be copies of a source. 
Idea 2: The how of the correspondence between two systems does not matter. 
What it does matter is whether we can (someday) observe the correspondence between 
imagined and observed entities. 
Idea 3: We have to declare whatever, which has not been observed, as imaginary 
and unreal, at least for the time being.  
2.4 CONCEPTS; MANIFESTATION 
An external manifestation of the contents of one’s mind provides a way for others 
to become aware of the contents and act upon their awareness. The efficacy of the 
process in making other agents cognizant depends on their ability to perceive the external 
manifestation and to interpret the percept by associating it to a concept in their minds. 
Manifestation of the concepts can also be studies in terms of their effects on 
others’ conception of an individual action, where the act is a process that the purposive 
agent triggers and/or maintains to create new or to modify existing entities inside 
her/his/its mind or outside in the environment. If other cognizant agents assume that an 
individual’s action is dependent on the presence and the specifics of a set of concepts 





individual’s mental contents. In other words, the (manifested aspects of the) action 
becomes a symbol of the (hidden) concepts. The mental concepts associated with the 
action, can also assist others in providing an alternative account of the individual’s 
purpose, in which the motivation is explained in terms of the mental contents rather than 
the apparent environmental changes caused by the action.  
Manifestation of concepts in a community of agents can also become a means for 
collective actions aimed at pursuing common goals among the participants. Whether the 
goals be mental or environmental, the role of the manifestation is to facilitate the division 
of labor. When the common goal is to advance a cognitive process, the division is 
(entirely) cognitive, and when the goal is to advance a physical process, the division is 
partly physical and partly cognitive, as any action taken by purposive agents requires 
pertinent cognitive support.    
 Linguistic Manifestation 
The ability of community members to associate actions with concepts can be used 
by them to take certain actions for the pure purpose of sharing mental contents. Since in 
communicative processes, the taken acts are symbolic and provide nothing beyond 
perceivable manifestation of the concepts, the community members can come to develop 
a system of communication by entirely relying on a set of symbols; a language. 
A language can be defined as a conventional system of perceivable symbols used 
by community members as a means of communication. Since percepts can be created 





kinesthetic formats. For example, natural human languages, which are by default in 
auditory format, have also been presented in other formats, e.g. visual form of written 
languages and sign languages, or kinesthetic form of braille language. 
Development of a language adds a third world of linguistic expressions to the two 
worlds of physical entities outside human mind and of cognitive entities inside human 
mind, whose relationships could be investigated. Since some aspects of the relationship 
between physical and mental entities were being studied before, I focus the attention on 
the connection between mental entities and their linguistic expressions, and examine how 
they can be translated into another. The term “translation” indicates the directionality of 
the relationship, where the processes involved in converting meaning into a linguistic 
form have to do the opposite of the processes converting the linguistic expressions into 
entities comprehensible for the mind. Figure 2.6 gives a visual depiction of the 
manifestation processes, where a mind reveals its meaningful contents by encoding it into 
linguistic expressions, and the interpretation process, in which a mind converts linguistic 
forms into comprehensible concepts. 
 
Figure 2.6. Processes involved in the translation of mental entities to/from linguistic 





The translation processes illustrated in Figure 2.6, could be studied in a systematic 
fashion to provide detailed answers to two different “how questions;” (1) how to form 
linguistic expressions, and (2) how to interpret meaning. Table 2.2 summarizes a 
comparison between the two, in which the contents of the mind is labeled as thought and 
eternalized expressions as language. The distinguishing features of the two worlds, 
according to Table 2.2, is the latency of mental contents and the symbolism of linguistic 
manifestations. While different labels may be used for the unit of mental contents, my 
preference for the word “concept” is to emphasize the cognitive dimension of knowledge 
in processualism, and to contrast it with other perspectives, where one may choose the 
label “referent” to ignore the role of the mind when denoting things in the outside world, 
for the case of Aristotelian realists, or when denoting imaginary things inside the mind, 
for the case of Platonists. 
Table 2.2. Characteristics of mental contents in comparison with their linguistic 
manifestations  
 
I propose to take conventional acquaintance as a necessary condition for the 
translation of cognitive contents to and from linguistic expressions. The necessity can be 


























manifestations. The only way for the use of a purely symbolic form as a means for 
communicating a concept among individuals is for the participants to agree on the 
representativeness of the symbol. If so, for a new member of a linguistic community to 
generate expressions understandable to other members, she/he has to embark on a 
convention learning process and to learn how others linguistically refer to a concept.  
Being exposed to a linguistic community may also assists the individual to use 
her/his mental faculties to acquire new concepts, which were otherwise unavailable to 
him/her. Although the mental faculties of an experiencing-organizing mind suffice for the 
purpose of learning the name of the concepts already present in her/his mind, developing 
new concepts by reliance on linguistic expressions requires additional faculties available 
to questioning-hypothesizing mind. Upon encountering a new symbolic form, a 
questioning mind wonders whether the form is content-less or is a lexical concept, i.e. a 
linguistic expression of a concept; and to find an answer, the mind enters an investigation 
process to form a hypothesis regarding the meaning of the term. 
Concept acquisition may be facilitated and accelerated through the use of 
language. Generally, a new concept may be acquired through a set of processes, 
collectively labeled as thinking, where the mind defines the new concept in terms of other 
(already existing) concepts and the specific way they are connected to each other. In 
other words, the new concept becomes a member of a conceptual system composed of 
concepts associated in certain ways. The development process can be enhanced by the 
use of language in two ways: (1) by associating labels rather than the concepts 





independent, e.g. apply to all concepts of a conceptual category. The gained efficiency 
can be analogically explained by the ease of moving a set of handled containers, in 
comparison to those without handles. 
A conceptual system, as the outcome of a conceptual development process, can be 
visually imagined as a network of various connected entities, organized based on their 
types. Independent of the use of language in system’s formation process, the language 
can be used to name the imagined entities and to facilitate the communication. In an 
example system, whose concepts are of the fundamental categories of objects, properties, 
and relationships, the system can be defined based on two sets of organized associations; 
(1) objects related to each other in a hierarchical fashion based on their types, and (2) 
properties of each object related to properties of a subset of other objects. 
 Figure 2.7 gives a visual illustration of such exemplary conceptual system, in 
which the sketch on the left depicts the hierarchical relation between objects, and the 
sketch on the right depicts the relation between the attributes of the objects. One apparent 
difference between the right and the left depictions is the larger number of connections 
between properties of the objects than those between the objects. The intuitive reason I 
may offer for the presence of direct relation among properties of indirectly connected 
objects is that direct connection between objects not only cause some of their properties 
to depend on each other, but also cause the properties of other objects connected through 
them to depend. While it could be the case that the relation between properties of directly 





objects, the emphasis on depicting the relation may be due to the need for defining one 
attribute based on the other.         
 
Figure 2.7. A visual representation of a linguistic system; Left: associations between 
token objects of three different types, Right: associations between objects’ properties   
A natural human language can be used to express meaningful systems of various 
degrees of perceivability, in which the degree indicates the relation between the number 
of perceivable entities to the imaginary ones. The meaningfulness of the system does not 
depend on its degree of perceivability and on the presence of the imaginary entities, but 
on the mind’s ability to associate every entity with a mental content; e.g. when the mind 
can imagine an imaginary entity, it feels as if the linguistic expression is meaningful. In 
other words, meaningful entities could be perceivable and/or conceivable, depending on 
the degree to which the mind relies on sensory means for comprehending them.  
Since meanings are in the minds of individuals, a fundamental question is whether 
the conceived meaning of an entity in a subject’s mind is the same as the meaning 
conceived in another subject’s mind. The question, reframed within the modern context 





objective, or at least possess some objective aspects? And if so, how can we assess the 
objectiveness of the subjectively imagined concepts? 
I propose a communal verification-based account of conceptual objectivity, in 
which a conceived entity by members of a community is considered to be objective, if the 
subjects consistently deliver similar manifestations of the concept in any number of 
agreed-upon verification processes. While the stated operational definition gives a way 
for assessing conceptual objectivity, it does not offer a method to community members 
for ensuring the objectivity of their conceptions. The assurance can be provided by 
processual homogeneity, where using the same processual codes for (a) the conception 
and (b) the manifestation results in the similarity of the generated concepts and their 
manifestations. However, due to the frequent observations of natural variabilities among 
biological agents, it is realistic to assume conceptual heterogeneity across a community 
and to focus on finding ways for facilitating processual assimilation. 
Processual assimilation can be pursued by capitalization on the learning abilities 
of the subjects and by providing them with instructions on how to to create and/or with 
feedbacks on how to modify their concepts. The nature and the extent of instructions 
and/or feedbacks depend on the degree of perceivability of the target entity, where less 
perceivable entities are in need of more extensive training. To simplify exemplification, I 
offer two distinct cases: (a) an entity of high perceivability, and (b) an entity of low 
perceivability, and demonstrate the differences between the extents of the instruction and 





Consider (a); the process of imagining a red-colored entity by subjects across a 
community, and the task of assimilating the imagined perceptual concepts by conforming 
them to an agreed-upon perception, in which the color has a certain hue. The instruction 
and verification programs could be as simple as training subjects by presenting them with 
different shades of red and specifying the target hue, and verifying the correctness of the 
subjects’ imagination by asking them to identify the agreed-upon hue among the shades 
in a color wheel. Further instructions in the form of offering distinct names for varying 
shades of red may assist subjects to sharpen and expand their visual imagination and 
linguistic manifestation capabilities. 
Consider (b); the process of conceiving an imaginary entity, e.g. the number three 
hundred twenty-seven billion, by subjects across a community, and the task of 
assimilating the imagined concepts by conforming them to an agreed-upon conception, 
who possess certain properties. An instructional program can provide subjects with 
recipes on how to construct such an imaginary object, and the objects of the same kind, as 
well as recipes on how to relate such imaginary objects to each other. As a result of 
participating in the program, the subjects become able to consider the intended imaginary 
entity in their minds and reveal the compliance of their conception by manifesting it 
through a certain linguistic description, e.g. “327,000,000,000.” 
The above example, may cause a nominalist to raise the objection that conceiving 
an imaginary entity is nothing but introducing a name without any contents, and such 
entity is essentially meaningless. In specific, the nominalist can claim that manifestation 





transformation, where a symbolic form, defined in a natural human language, is 
translated to another form, defined in a numeral system such as Hindu-Arabic. In fact, the 
nominalists’ claim is likely to be true, when the imaginary object is property-less or 
isolated! 
I assert that the significance of an imaginary entity is not due to its name, but due 
(a) to its properties, (b) to its relations with other entities and/or their properties, and (c) 
to its participation in certain processes. Similar to physical objects, who have multitude 
of properties and are related to each other, imaginary objects can also possess different 
properties and be associated with other non-physical objects. In either case, the 
conceptions of a system, either of physical or of imaginary entities, can be linguistically 
described, such the example visually illustrated in Figure 2.7.  
While conceiving a property-less or isolated imaginary entity might be nothing 
but a name assignment, conceiving a property-possessing, and/or other-connecting, 
and/or process-participating is about exploration of properties, relations, and processes. 
Nevertheless, the name of an imaginary entities could be assigned based on properties it 
possesses, the relations it does have, or the processes it participates. I claim that 
imaginary entities called numbers are single-property beings, i.e. their values, and are 
named accordingly. However, each number is connected to infinite other numbers 
through their values; for instance, the natural number (with the value of) 327,000,000,000 
is related to both its preceding natural number, 326,999,999,999 and the number 1, and 





The systemic nature of an imaginary entity not only makes the entity 
multifaceted, but also does the evaluation of the objectivity for its conception by subjects, 
as the entity can be described and assessed in terms of its relation with many other 
entities in the system. As a result, the accordance of the linguistic manifestation of the 
conception by a subject with an agreed-upon form, may only provide a partial verification 
of the concept’s normal compliance. For instance, a multifaceted verification program 
may reveal the objectivity of a subject’s conception of the number 327,000,000,000 in 
some regards, e.g. the name or the value property, and its non-compliance in other 
aspects, e.g. value relations.  
I suggest that an imaginary entity may have a meaning beyond what is bestowed 
by the systems it belongs to, and that imaginary systems are not semantically self-reliant. 
The idea is that in every imaginary development project, the properties its imaginary 
entities do possess, the relationships they are in, and the processes they participate in, can 
be traced back to a set of percepts and/or to cognitive processes, who have perceptive 
roots. In another words, imaginary properties, relationships, and processes are all 
“grounded,” and are either abstracted from or analogous to perceivable realities; and so, a 
subject who cannot perceive, would not conceive! 
The thesis of the perceptual roots of imaginary constructs can be illustrated 
through an example. Consider the imaginary number 327,000,000,000, and see if we can 
uncover some of its perceptual origins through investigating the number’s properties 
and/or the relationships it does have with other numbers and their properties. Since 





property, an uncovering strategy could be tracking the relationship between property 
value of 327,000,000,000 and the property values of other numbers associated with it. A 
promising association to investigate is the recursive relationship between the value of a 
number, its preceding natural number, and the number one; here 327,000,000,000 = 326, 
999,999,999 + 1. Since the preceding number is also in a recursive relation with its own 
preceding number, and so on, the value of the number 327,000,000,000 is in relation 
(2-1) with so many repetitions of the number valued as one. 
  





The meaning of any other natural number, following an analogous approach, can 
be tied to the meaning of the three concepts of (a) the number with value property one, 
(b) the equality (of an apparent feature), and (c) repetition (of the objects with the same 
feature). The number one, I propose, is grounded in our ability to perceive objects as 
distinct wholes, who are separate from other objects. The concept of equality is grounded 
in our ability to perceive a certain property in a variety of objects and our inability to 
further differentiate between the specifics of our perceptions; e.g. perceiving two red-
colored objects as having the same red shade. The concept of repetition, which is closely 
associated to the concept of equality, is rooted in both our ability to compare objects in 
terms of their certain properties, and our life experiences of finding objects with similar 
appearances, whom we cannot differentiate; e.g. identical twins. 
Set is another fundamental imaginary concept, whose perceptual roots may be 





grounding must be presented for the formation of two distinct types of sets: finite, and 
infinite. While the concept of finite set is grounded in the limits of our perceptual abilities 
and opportunities, including our attentional resources, the concept of infinite set is rooted 
in the limitless ability of typical codes in generating tokens.  
Finite sets can be easily understood from an empirical perspective and be 
attributed to one’s simultaneous awareness and ignorance of the things outside her/his 
mind. Both awareness and ignorance can have a natural character, due to the presence (or 
lack thereof) of our abilities to cognize certain types of things and our opportunities to 
conceive tokens of the types within our spaciotemporal limits. Besides, the ignorance 
could also be intentional and a result of the willful choice of allocating our attentional 
resources, where we deliberately ignore entities possessing or lacking certain properties.   
In contrast to finite sets, who we can be understood intuitively and on the basis of 
material limitations, infinite sets are anathema to any empirical tenet and can only be 
understood from a processual perspective. I propose to take an infinite set as the 
collection of all entities that can be potentially generated by a certain processual code, 
where the realization of the potential does not depend on the code itself, but on the 
material requirements necessary for the implementation of the code. Consequently, when 
the code for an imaginary process is available to us, we can generate any of its outcomes 
(almost) at will, given that we have provided enough material power to keep our code-
containing minds up and running.  
For example, by having the recursive code for the generation of natural numbers, 





999,999,999 more than the number valued as one. Our ability to imagine the target entity 
has little to do with the fact that we may have never conceived it before, and is due to our 
access to the processual code that can generate the entity. To generalize from the 
example, we can interpret the claim that the set of natural numbers is infinite as a 
statement about the recursive code, which allows the generation of any imaginary number 
based on its value difference with the number one. 
 The generation of the (conception of) outcomes can be extended to physical 
processes, whose codes we have imagined and translated into one of our imaginary 
languages. In fact, a prediction of a future event in the outside world seems to be the 
result of us running a mental simulation of the corresponding processual code under some 
presumed conditions. For example, by having the codes for the orbital movements of the 
planets in the solar system, and assuming that the codes remains unchanged into the 
future, we may predict the relative positions of the planets in 327,000,000,000 years from 
now. Again, what seems to be limitless is not the reality itself, but is our ability to 
imagine the reality to be such! 
2.5 CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES 
Concepts may be distinguished by their features and those with common features 
can be grouped into common concept types. The process of typification can be continued 
to form hierarchies of more general types, which include more concepts but are 
characterized by less common features. The set of most general distinct types of concepts 
can be labeled as conceptual/semantic categories, where a category specifies the broadest 





introduced categories; though for the contents of the linguistic expressions rather than the 
thoughts (behind them); prominent philosophers including Kant and Husserl, have come 
to introduce their list of semantic and/or syntactic categories. Because my goal here is to 
provide just enough of background knowledge needed to support the fundamental 
categories I intend to present, especially the category of processes, I abstain from going 
through the details of the categories conceived by other philosophers. The interested 
readers can consult the wealth of reviews and analysis presented by modern scholars of 
philosophy. A number of such discussions are cited in the reference section of the script. 
The set of categories I conceive as fundamental include the three categories of (1) 
objects, (2) properties, and (3) relationships. A number of concrete examples for each 
conceptual category includes a celestial body or a biological species as objects, color or 
mass as properties of objects, and mutual gravitation of masses or dependence of buyers’ 
demand on the market price of a commodity as relationships (among properties of 
objects).  
While defining either of the three categories in terms of the other two may seem 
feasible, I, as a principle, do suggest to take these categories as both primitive and 
distinct. Humans, I postulate, are able to cognize things as wholes, and in addition, are 
able to understand attributes objects may have, as “aspects” of the whole. The distinction 
between an object and its properties implicitly assume that we may not be able to present 
a precise definition of an object by enlisting those of its properties, which we have come 
to be aware of them. My assumption is in line with the fundamental postulate of Gestalt 





its parts. The postulate is empirically supported for the case of perceptual concepts by 
observations indicating organisms’ tendency to perceive entire patterns and 
configurations rather than pieces.  
The totality postulate, nevertheless, seems somehow unreasonable. The counter 
intuitiveness of the postulate, I believe, arises from an implicit comparison of mental 
processes with physical ones, where belief in causality entails that things cannot come to 
existence out of nowhere and the components of a whole must come from somewhere.  In 
other words, physical generative processes are of analytics and/or synthetic nature, and 
are governed by the laws of conservation.  
To solve the puzzle, we must explain how it is possible for the mind to insert 
things not sensed by bodily sensors. An explanation, I claim, lies in the complexity of 
perception process, where external stimuli must first be transformed to a readable format 
for the mind, Figure 2.1. Once transformed, any other format-compatible internal mental 
process, such as one labeled in Figure 2.1 as modeling process, can manipulate the 
intermediate representation to yield a new one. This way, a new object, e.g. a curve, can 
be superposed upon a set of existing objects, e.g. some points, to form a coherent whole 
containing starting objects.  
2.6 PHYSICAL PROCESSES 
An outcome of a physical process, as well as other components of the process 
including its trigger and circumstances, can be described by a number of aspects/ 
characteristics, where each aspect may take any of the possible states/ conditions. The 





components of the process, summarized in a (set of postulated/ hypothesized) 
relationships between the characteristics describing these components. When the states, at 
which the initial and circumstantial aspects are, remain unchanged in subsequent runs of 
the process, it is expected that the states of the aspects characterizing the outcome also 
remain static. On the contrary, fluctuation in certain initial and circumstantial aspects of 
the process results in the variation in particular characteristics of the outcomes of the 
process. When the mechanics of the process and/or the pattern governing the fluctuations 
(in subsequent runs of the process) is unknown, the process is called a “random process.” 
 
Figure 2.8. A schematic diagram depicting a physical process, characterized by the 
trigger, circumstances, the process, and the outcome   
Material objects of the world can be characterized by the state of their various 
attributes and both, the objects and their attributes, are the outcomes of the physical 
process the objects have gone through. A physical process, in its general forms, can be 
described by the relationship governing the attributes characterizing the (the initial, the 
circumstantial, and the final) components of the process. A change in the process occurs 





another possible state. While a change in some aspects of the initial and circumstantial 
components may influence some aspects of the final outcome, it may not influence other 
aspects. 
Although knowing the (structural) relationships governing a process enables 
prediction of the changes caused in the attributes of the outcome given a change in initial 
and circumstantial attributes, it neither inform (1) the possible states each attribute can 
take, nor (2) the (natural) tendency to take some states more than the others in various 
runs of the process. However, if we know the answers to questions (1) and (2) for all 
attributes of the initial and circumstantial components of the process, in a quantitative 
format, we can answer the questions for the attributes of the final outcome. 
Quantitatively, the (structural) relationships governing the process are represented by a 
set of algebraic equations, and the (natural) tendency to discriminate among the states of 
the initial and circumstantial attributes is represented by the joint propensity distribution 
for the attributes. These two sets of equations, if combined, result in a (specific) joint 
propensity distribution for the attributes of the (final) outcome of the process. 
 





An outcome of a physical process, as well as other components of the process 
including its trigger and circumstances, can be described by a number of aspects/ 
characteristics, where each aspect may take any of the possible states/ conditions. The 
(mechanics) of the process can be represented by the relationship between the 
components of the process, summarized in a (set of postulated/ hypothesized) 
relationships between the characteristics describing these components. When the states, at 
which the initial and circumstantial aspects are, remain unchanged in subsequent runs of 
the process, it is expected that the states of the aspects characterizing the outcome also 
remain static. On the contrary, fluctuation in certain initial and circumstantial aspects of 
the process results in the variation in particular characteristics of the outcomes of the 
process. When the mechanics of the process and/or the pattern governing the fluctuations 
(in subsequent runs of the process) is unknown, the process is called a “random process.” 
The outcomes of a physical process can have different characteristics, where each 
(character) can take a number of states.  
The real-world outcomes of a physical process can have different characteristics, 
where each (character) can take a number of states. If the realization of the various states 
of a character in the products of the subsequent runs of the process are unpredictable (in 
advance), given the existing level of knowledge, that aspect/ character of the process is 
random/ stochastic and the process can be called a random/ stochastic process. 
Describing (and labeling) the process as random only corresponds to the characters, 





 Quantitative Models of Physical Processes 
Material objects of the world can be characterized by the state of their various 
attributes and both, the objects and their attributes, are the outcomes of the physical 
process the objects have gone through. A physical process, in its general forms, can be 
described by the relationship governing the attributes characterizing the (the initial, the 
circumstantial, and the final) components of the process. A change in the process occurs 
when one (or more) aspect(s) of the (components of the) process shifts its current state to 
another possible state. While a change in some aspects of the initial and circumstantial 
components may influence some aspects of the final outcome, it may not influence other 
aspects. 
2.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Brief Summary 
Philosophical Processualism is an original perspective advanced as the 
foundation for an epistemic machinery called pragmatic mathematics; a system of 
linguistically manifested mental constructs aimed at guiding purposive actions with 
precision. Philosophical Processualism relies upon a process-centered interpretation of 
causality, which sees an event as a constellation of changes made by a process in certain 
states of the world and/or the mind. By taking concept as the fundamental constituent of 
the purposive agents’ evaluation processes, the view presents its ontological account of 
concepts and elaborate on how concepts could look like, where they could be present, and 





asserting that every concept is the outcomes of cognitive processes unfolding in time and 
space and is not an abstract entity in the so-called third realm, to which mind can gain 
access through unknown metaphysical processes.  
 Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be made based on the contents of this chapter: 
• Philosophical Processualism is an original perspective advanced as the 
foundation for pragmatic mathematics; a system of linguistically 
manifested mental constructs aimed at guiding purposive actions with 
precision. 
• A process is a set of mechanisms that cause changes in a set of attributes 
of the objects involved. 
• If a machinery is intended to be copied and different copies are expected 
to yield consistent output, the implanted processes ought to be known and 
to be imitable. 
• Theorizing about cognitive mechanisms partly relies its external 
manifestations, as cognition and the resulting sense of meaningfulness 
occur inside the mind and are hidden from direct sensory observations. 
• The meaningfulness of a sensory experience does not come from the work 
of the sensors, but mostly from the work of the modelers, who do not only 






• The meaning has more to do with the output of (internally postulated) 
models than (externally received) data. 
• An Interpretation is the outcomes of a model. 
• Every concept is the outcomes of cognitive processes unfolding in time 
and space and is not an abstract entity in the so-called third realm, to 
which mind can gain access through unknown metaphysical processes. 
• Investigation of universals from an observational view yields a 
nominalists account, where a universal is seen as merely a name for the set 
of instances, who all share a common feature. 
• Each universal can be explained by a processual code containing the 
information on the specifics of objects and their properties, whose 
presence trigger and advance the process resulting in the exemplification 
of the universal phenomena. 
• Every exemplification of a universal property is the result of a single 
implementation of the pertinent processual code. 
• A processual tower is a visualization of a series of processes stack up to 
eventually produce a target attribute that is perceivable to us. 
• The code of a process is embedded in the material participants of the 
process and in the form of their physicochemical arrangements. Once all 
objects of certain characters take the appropriate spaciotemporal position 
relative to each other, the process commences according to the specifics of 





• Processual inquiries are potentially endless, as every observable event is 
the output of a (macro) process, whose input may come to be the output of 
another (micro) process, and so on.  
• The complete knowledge of the code for the macro process along with the 
ability to sense its input allows for the precise prediction of the observable 
event and makes the consideration of micro processes unnecessary for 
prediction purposes.  
• While the processual knowledge of the micro processes may not be of 
predictive value, it may facilitate processual manipulation such that a 
process delivers a desirable event.         
• The Processual inquiry can be visually depicted as going down a tower of 
physical processes, in which a series of processes stack up to eventually 
produce the observable attributes. Also, complete processual knowledge 
above a processual level, can be depicted as a tight grip around the tower, 
from that level above. 
• The extensional definition of a type, as the set of its tokens, is imprecise. 
While the finite set of observed tokens lacks sufficiency and can only be 
accepted as the definition for a sample (of tokens), the infinite set 
containing yet-to-be-generated tokens lacks accessibility due to the 
inclusion of entities without spaciotemporal specification.   
• Processual ontology of universals can be extended to elucidate type-token 





realized instances as tokens. In other words, the type is being defined as a 
typical code. 
• A philosophical theory of types offers little about the specifics of certain 
processual codes, and the details can only be discovered through 
contextual scientific inquiries.  
• The availability of many detailed codes, at any point in time, is at best 
partial.  
• By applying the concept of processual code to the domain of the mind, 
cognitive universals and their cognitive exemplifications are being 
defined.  
• A process-centered perspective can demonstrate the consistency of the 
mentalism of concepts with the realism of universal physical phenomena. 
• Perception is a two-world serial process, the first one in the physical world 
outside human mind and the second inside human mind; thus, a percept’s 
processual code is the composition of two codes, one for the tower of 
physical processes and the other for the perception process. 
• The multi-world account of universal percepts is in contrast with the 
positions of both Aristotelian realists, who believe that types are out there 
in the world independent of our minds, and conceptualists, who believed 





• The belief in the existence of every universal relies on the implicit 
assumption of the uniformity of its two non-mental and mental typical 
codes.  
• The universality of percepts among humans, must not to be considered a 
natural law, but a physical hypothesis, whose validity ultimately depends 
on the (potential) existence and the specifics of the differences among 
percepts formed in the minds of humans. 
• The divergence of positions among philosophical worldviews, may be 
explained by the differences in the cognitive processes they implicitly 
assume and rely upon. 
• Nominalists’ denial of universals is possibly not due to their recognition of 
the “experiencing-organizing mind,” but due to their lack of recognition 
of, “questioning-hypothesizing” mind 
• By remaining at the level of observations, nominalists ignore the 
possibility for the existence of entities beyond or beneath the perceived 
appearances. 
• Any hypothesis involving unobserved entities, is likely to generate a 
dispute, whose settlement would only be possible either by observing 
entities (or their associates), or by taking them as primitive entities. 
• The tempting idea of making scientific proposals undisputable by 
removing all non-observed or non-postulated entities is elusive; not only 





due to losing the potential contribution of hypothetical entities to the 
advancement of human knowledge.  
• The orientation toward (a) human mind, and/or (b) the apparent world is 
also causing philosophical perspectives to diverge. (a) can be described as 
outward, inward, or both, and (b) can be described as within, beneath, and 
beyond. 
• Most prominent perspectives including Aristotelian realism, Platonist 
realism, and even nominalism, embrace a mentally-outward orientation, 
and only conceptualists’ position is mentally-inward. Philosophical 
Processualism is in-between, as it does not focus on physical or mental 
worlds at the expense of the other, and sees them jointly from a more 
comprehensive perspective. 
• A language adds a third world of linguistic expressions to the two worlds 
of physical entities outside human mind and of cognitive entities inside 
human mind, whose entities could be related by directional acts of 
translation. 
• Conventional acquaintance is a necessary condition for the translation of 
cognitive contents to and from linguistic expressions. 
• The proliferating role of language in development of conceptual systems 
are attributed to (1) the association of labels rather than the concepts 
themselves, and to (2) the application of linguistic association rules that 





analogically depicted by the ease of moving a set of handled containers, in 
comparison to those without handles. 
• The meaningfulness of a mixed system composed of perceivable and 
imaginary entities is not being influenced by its degree of perceivability, 
but by mind’s ability to associate every entity, either perceivable or 
imaginary, with a mental content. 
• In a communal verification-based account of conceptual objectivity, a 
conceived entity by members of a community is considered to be 
objective, if the subjects consistently deliver similar manifestations of the 
concept in any number of agreed-upon verification processes.  
• Processual assimilation can be pursued by capitalization on the learning 
abilities of the subjects and by providing them with instructions on how to 
create and/or with feedbacks on how to modify their concepts. 
• The significance of an imaginary entity is not due to its name, but due (a) 
to its properties, (b) to its relations with other entities and/or their 
properties, and (c) to its participation in certain processes. 
• The common nominal misinterpretation of numbers may be due to dual 
nature of numerals, as manifestations of both the name and the value 
property of numbers, whose relations give a systemic meaning to numbers.  
• An imaginary entity may have a meaning beyond what is bestowed by the 






• Imaginary properties, relationships, and processes are all “grounded,” and 
are either abstracted from or analogous to perceivable realities.  
• The meaning of a natural number, is tied to the meaning of the three 
concepts of (a) the number with value property one, (b) the equality (of an 
apparent feature), and (c) the repetition (of the objects with the same 
feature). The grounds for each of the three concepts can be traced back to 
a certain set of perceptual cognitive processes. 
• While the concept of finite set is grounded in the limits of our perceptual 
abilities and opportunities, including our attentional resources, the concept 
of infinite set is rooted in the limitless ability of typical codes in 
generating tokens. 
• An infinite set can be interpreted as the collection of all entities that can be 
potentially generated by a certain processual code. 
• In processual interpretation of the concept of prediction, whenever the 
code for the physical process is being translated into one of our imaginary 





 Principles for Objective Assignment of Credibilities 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the following, I pose the philosophical challenge I intend to tackle, namely 
interpretational/perspectival reconciliation regarding the concept of probability. I will then 
elaborate on the merits of my inquiry and present a schema of the fruits of the investigation.  
 Problem Statement 
The fundamental philosophical challenge about the concept of probability regards 
its ontology; i.e. answering the questions what probability “is,” where does it exist, and 
how to define it. The answers to these questions are co-related such that a specific answer 
to what questions is expected to guide the answer to when and how questions. Each set of 
answers, can be labeled as an “interpretation” of probability. 
Probability, as historical investigations reveal, e.g. (Fienberg, 2006a), has had a 
dual nature in the mind of pioneers, who were first to conceive the notion. From one side, 
probability was thought as having an epistemic nature, representing the uncertainty man 
does have regarding the reality of (the reference of) a linguistic construct, whether stated 
in human common language or in a more abstract language such as formal logic. 
Probability, as an epistemic measure, gives the degree by which man has knowledge, 
episteme in Greek, about truth/falsity of the statement, assuming man knows how truth can 
be eventually revealed. From the other side, probability was thought as having a physical 
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nature, giving a ratio that can be calculated based on the measurements made in the 
physical/phenomenal world. 
The categorization of probability interpretations into epistemological and physical, 
is intended to characterize all the varieties of probability interpretations conceived by many 
intellectuals, based on their most fundamental differentiator. In reality, within the past three 
hundred years, probability as interpreted by each scholar who has focused on the topic, has 
differences relative to the notion conceived by the others. For example, the British 
statistician Irving Good (1972) titled one of his papers “46,656 varieties of Bayesians,” to 
indicate the vast differences between the views of scholars whose work rely on a specific 
kind of probabilities, namely Bayesian probabilities. Nevertheless, the twofold 
classification of probability interpretation, seems to succeed in highlighting the 
fundamental feature that distinguishes conceptions, all other differences aside. 
    The duality of probability interpretation, seems to be the main reason for 
probability to be a contentious notion, giving rise to many different treatises, arguments, 
and debates on the nature of probabilities. These vast differences, as assessed by modern 
philosophers of science, e.g. (Galavotti, 2005), seems irreconcilable, and has resulted in 
compartmentalization of acceptance and the use of each interpretation given the field of 
study, e.g. (Gillies, 2000). The compartmentalization not only has resulted in the technical 
developments of each field wholly relying on a single interpretation, but also in the 
vehement rejection of the other interpretation by some scholars of each field, who are most 
ideologically invested in the interpretation founding their technical work. The battle is not 
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unlike of those apologists embarking on an intellectual crusade to prove the righteousness 
of the religious believes they are advocating.  
The most fundamental challenge regarding probability interpretations regards their 
reconciliation. While current assessments testify on irreconcilability of the two notions, 
one may question the assessment and ask whether the two interpretational perspectives 
could become compatible, and if so, how?  Answering reconcilability questions, may 
become easier by answering the following simpler questions. Could the interpretational 
variations only be nominal and caused by varying labels? If not, and the differences are 
substantial rather than nominal, are there also substantial commonalities between the 
interpretations? If so, how the interpretations could be associated with each other? Could 
these associations indicate a reference to a bigger whole; the elephant in the room? 
 Significance 
My inquiry into the philosophical foundations of probability is expected to make 
advancements along the two directions of cognition and application. In terms of cognition, 
by pursuing the goal of interpretational/perspectival reconciliation, it is expected to provide 
a more coherent interpretational system for the concept of probability. In terms of 
application, by pursuing the goal of expanding the application of epistemic probability, it 
is expected to close the application divide among practitioners of different fields of study. 
Currently, the application of each interpretation of probability is limited to certain fields of 
study. The physical interpretation of probability is more of the interest of physical sciences, 
where the goal is to inquire about community-verifiable characterization of the world. The 
86 
 
epistemological interpretation of probability is more of the interest of social sciences, 
especially economics, where the goal is to inquire about the behavior and the evaluation of 
subjects.   
 Objectives 
The philosophical development I am putting forward pursues two objectives: 
(1) Providing a wholistic view comprising of different interpretations of 
probability. This view is founded on a process-centered notion of causality and 
insists on procedural transparency in evaluating probabilities. 
(2) Introducing a fundamental character common among all interpretation of 
probability. The character, I claim, is the more-to-less nature of relationships, 
and I try to propose ways to account for various such relationships.  
3.2 OBSERVATION, THEORETICAL REASONING, AND LEARNING UNKNOWNS 
 Possible Approaches to Learn Unknowns  
There are things that we do know and there are (many) other things that we do not 
know. Learning is the process through which, by observing specific aspects of the reality, 
condensed in data, and by using our (human) reasoning faculties, we manage to add more 
to what we already knew.  
Two central questions regarding learning are determining how we can use what we 
already know to inform what we currently do not know, as well as determining the 
(relative) weights we have to give to evidence and reasoning in order to conclude a new 
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learning. To answer the aforementioned questions, we can adopt any of the following 
approaches. 
3.2.1.1 Observation 
Observation is the act/ process of sensing a specific character/ aspect of the material 
world and being able to distinguish the state at which the character is. Thus, carrying an 
observation out requires two sets of means; (1) a set of means for sensing the (target) 
character and (2) a set of means to interpret the sensed character by mapping it to a state, 
among all states that character can take. For example, to observe the color (character) of 
an object, a human needs a set of means to receive the sensory signals pertinent to the color, 
as well as a set of means to interpret received signals and to map it to a (mental) 
representation for the state of the character. If the light emitted from an object has a 
wavelength in the range 620 to 740 nanometers, a specific representation (of the color) is 
being formed inside human mind. This mental representation, in the spoken language 
English, is labeled “red.” In the example, the color is a material character/ aspect of the 
world and specific colors, e.g. red, are the (possible) states for that character.  
The observational approach, it seems, is the primary mode of learning among 
biological agent, whereby the agents uses its (sensory) observations to characterize the 
outside world. Humans, along the time, have succeeded in taking the approach beyond the 
levels other biological agents practice it, in terms of (1) the scope, (2) the precision, and 
(3) the communication of the observations. 
In terms of the extent, humans have managed to build a variety of devices that can 
sense/observe aspects of the real-world, which are not sensible by human (built-in) sensory 
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means; thus hugely expand the scope of experimental learning. In terms of the precision, 
humans have managed to standardize the characterization of specific aspects of the world 
such that every human can have the same understanding of the states at which a 
(standardized) characteristics is. Attributes such as length, mass, and time are prime 
examples of aspect, for which humans have managed to establish standards to precisely 
map a specific state of the character to an indicator, (mostly) a number. Standardization of 
observable characters are examples of the application of applied reasoning to mathematical 
modeling. 
In terms of communication, humans have managed to develop new means, other 
than means available to biological agents, for recording and/or communicating their 
observations to other fellow humans. These means can generally be called languages, of 
which spoken and written languages are certain sub-classes. For example, a numerical 
indicator is a description comprehendible for the agents who know pertinent parts of 
elementary mathematical langue. The advent of precise languages, combined with the 
precise (standardized) characterization, enables humans to record and inform the state of 
certain (worldly) character in a system in an “observationally objective” fashion. 
In the (pure) observational/experimental approach to learning, we assert that until 
we make new observations, we take the set of our past observations, as of today, as the 
(sole) representation of the reality. The approach relies on a philosophy whereby 
(empirical) evidence is the only source of knowledge and results in (implicitly) ignoring 
unknowns, as they are yet to be observed and, at the moment, the only way to (humanly) 
perceive their existence is to hypothesize them by the aid of human faculties, other than his 
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observational faculties. Thus, the only way to learn new things is to wait until we observe 
them.  
The observational approach to acquiring (new) knowledge is the method used in 
experimental science. An (epistemological) philosophy that is obsessed with the 
observational mode of learning is called empiricism, in which experience is the (only) 
source of new knowledge. In other words, whatever that is not being observed is not 
considered as knowledge. 
3.2.1.2 Theoretical Reasoning 
Reasoning is the mental process humans consciously use to expand their 
comprehension. Reasoning, it seems, is exclusive to humans and is one of the factors that 
has caused humans to accelerate differentiating themselves from other biological agents 
and to ascend to their superior position on the planet earth. A number of definitions in 
Appendix A.1, provide with further details of my views on various aspects of reasoning, 
as a special mode of thinking, and its symbiotic relation with human civilization. 
In reasoning, an agent manipulates a number of mental constructs/ objects, as input, 
to obtain a number of different constructs, as output. An object of the mind, in its most 
basic form, can represent (some aspect of) a concrete (worldly) object as perceived by 
human senses. In contrast, an abstract (mental) construct represents a thing that does not 
have a physical referent, i.e. it does not refer to an object existing in any specific time 
and/or space. Purely abstract objects are created in thought processes, where worldly 
aspects of a simple abstract object is taken away to create a mental object independent of 
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the world (outside human mind). Prime examples of such abstract constructs are 
mathematical objects, e.g. numbers. 
I separate reasoning into the two class of “abstract” and “applied” reasoning. In an 
abstract reasoning, the mind operates on a set of (pure) abstract objects, arranged in a 
certain way, in order to find the outcomes of that arrangement, themselves other abstract 
objects. The process, can be conducted by any set of (self-consistent) rules including the 
general rules established in symbolic logic, as well as any specific set of rules, called 
axioms, established for an abstract theory. Mathematics is mainly the result of the 
application of (pure) abstract reasoning to (arrangements) of mathematical objects. A 
mathematical arrangement is a structure, in which mathematical objects of different 
groups/set are associated in a certain way; thus, resulting in characteristics of the 
arrangement to take certain states. The processes required for finding the resulting 
characteristics is often referred as “deductive reasoning.” 
While mental constructs subject to (pure) abstract reasoning, as designed, have little 
relationship with the objects of the material world, the aim of applied reasoning is to 
establish analogies between (1) the concrete (aspects of interest) and certain (pure) abstract 
objects, and more importantly between (2) the arrangements of the concrete characteristics 
of interest and the arrangements of abstract objects associated with those concrete objects. 
The process to establish such relationships is generally called (abstract) “modeling” and in 
specific, when the mental representations are mathematical objects, it is called 
“mathematical modeling.” The biggest advantage of, and the motivation for, abstract 
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modeling is that it allows the characteristics of a specific abstract structure to be extended 
to the concrete associates of pertinent abstract objects.  
The first step to mathematical modeling is to associate the (characters of) concrete 
objects of interest to a set of mathematical objects. When mathematical objects are 
numbers, or algebraic variables as an extension of numbers, this step only requires the 
(states of the) concrete characters to be associable/mappable to numbers. While 
(standardized) observable characters, by their design, meet the requirement, e.g. time and 
distance, other characters, as long as they remain observable, can be associated with 
numbers according to any (arbitrary) scheme. 
The second step to mathematical modeling is to associate the arrangements between 
concrete (characters of the) objects of interest to a set of (theoretical) arrangements 
connecting mathematical objects. In contrast to the first step to mathematical modeling, 
which could be resolved by adoption of any assignment scheme, as long as it remains 
unique, the arrangements sought for in the second step are not optional. Adoption of any 
(theoretical) structure among abstract objects as the model of reality can only be true if 
observations made on observable characters exhibit the adopted relationship. The 
processes required for taking this (second) step is often referred as “inductive reasoning.” 
A number of terms defined in Appendix A.1 further elaborate the differences between 
mathematics and mathematical modeling 
The learning through (theoretical) reasoning occurs when both steps of 
(mathematical) modeling, (1) mapping observable (states of) characteristics to (numerical) 
variables and (2) adopting/ inducting functional relationships among variables, observables 
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as well as non-observables, have been taken. New knowledge then comes as a logical/ 
deductive consequence of what we already know, i.e. the adopted functional relationships.  
The theoretical approach to learning relies on a philosophy whereby the real-world 
is deemed to follow the (logical) orders/ structures devised by human minds and takes 
observation as a (sometimes secondary) support to justify the validity of postulated orders. 
This mode of learning is mainly pursued in theoretical science including mathematical 
physics as well as philosophy. 
3.2.1.3 Authoritative Inquiry 
Following the theoretical approach to learn unknowns, if one believes in the truth 
of these (imposed) orders, prediction/ characterization of unknowns look logical, 
reasonable, and natural. By the same token, an easy way to fool oneself into taking a 
(unobserved) character as real, is to postulate a certain structure on the reality and deduct 
that character accordingly.     
This approach heavily relies on imposing/ postulating (logical) structures/ orders 
on the reality, where (states of) certain aspects of the world are (deemed) to be in a 
particular type of relationship. It is such a relationship between knowns and unknowns that 
makes the later a logical consequence of the former, i.e. by considering our current 
knowledge, we can deduct the existence and the character of what we are yet to observe. 
 Challenges for Approaches to Learn Unknowns  
Following the second approach to learn unknowns, if one believes in the truth of 
these (imposed) orders, prediction/ characterization of unknowns looks logical, reasonable, 
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and natural. By the same token, an easy way to fool oneself into taking a (unobserved) 
character as real, is to postulate a certain structure on the reality and deduct that character 
accordingly.     
3.3 PROBABILITY AND ITS INTERPRETATIONS 
The controversies about the concept of probability, is rooted in different 
interpretations of the notion. While the two broad interpretations can be labeled physical 
and epistemological, various combinations of interpretation, function, and structure can 
become the basis for further nominal distinction. Each assigned name, can be perceived as 
the label for a probability kind/type. The distinguished concepts, in relation to the two 
broad interpretations, that may be considered as physical, epistemological, or both. 
Nominal distinction, in addition to functional differentiation, is also aimed at 
conceptual precision; an essential means for preventing cognitive confusion.  Besides, the 
distinction could facilitate conceptual and functional association, elaborating the 
conditions under which, various types may be related, as well as the properties of the 
relationships. Such associations constitute the building blocks of a wholistic 
interpretational perspective, which I aim at developing here. 
The classification of probabilities into types has a long history and scholars have 
proposed diverse kinds and have labeled them according to the functionality or the property 
of the type, or they have used the same label as those of scholars before them. In fact, the 
act of classifying different types of probability is so central to a philosophy of probability 
that Good (1959) believes that probability typology addresses half of the problems in 
philosophy of probability. 
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I introduce three fundamental kinds of probabilities, namely propensity, possibility, 
and credibility. The types, given the long history of probability classifications, are expected 
to be found in the works of past scholars, potentially, each under a variety of names. The 
reason for emphasizing on these types is the belief that the three have the power to explicate 
and include all other types of probability, e.g. Frequentist and Bayesian probabilities. In 
other words, propensity, possibility, and credibility are necessary and sufficient types in 
the process-oriented philosophy of probability, which I am putting forward. 
 Probability as a Means of Representation 
The introduction of the probability types based on a combination of interpretation, 
function, and structure, and distinguishing them by distinct labels, raises the question 
whether we do need the label probability for a purpose other than a reference to a collection 
of more specific concepts? And if we do, what could be the purpose? My suggestion is that 
we define a probability solely as a member of a numeric set, whose values are between 
zero and one and collectively, add up to one. 
My definition portraits probability as an abstract mathematical measure, 
constrained by limitations imposes by a set of axioms such as those suggested by 
Kolmogorov (1933). The definition positions probability as a means of mathematical 
representation, which can be used to represent the specifics of the relationship between an 
object with other objects in any non-mathematical world, e.g. the world of physio-chemical 
processes. In other words, probability can be used to describe mathematical constructs 
build to model non-mathematical phenomena. The concepts that make a probability 
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meaningful within the context it is being applied, have labels such as propensity and 
credibility.  
 Possibility 
The possibility, 𝑷𝒃(𝒚∗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ), of a specific character such as 𝒚∗⃗⃗⃗⃗ , as an outcome of the 
characterization process taking a character such as 𝒙∗⃗⃗⃗⃗ , specified based on criteria 𝑪𝒊, and 
assigning a (different) character based on criteria 𝑪𝒐, is defined as the proportion of the 
number of states, characterized according to criteria  𝑪𝒊, whose character based on criteria 
𝑪𝒐 is 𝒚∗⃗⃗⃗⃗ , relative to the total number of input characters that the process is defined to take, 








Figure 3.1 presents a visual schema of such characterization process. To further 
illustrate the definition of possibility, I provide some examples. Consider a characterization 
process which takes the outcomes of a cartesian production process orderly joining the 
members of the numeric set {𝟎, 𝟏}  with the numeric set {𝟐, 𝟑}, and assigning the sum of 




, as in two of the four input states 𝒚 = 𝟑. In another example, consider a 
(re)characterization process which takes the temperature of objects between 50℉ to 77℉ 
, and delivers their temperature in Celsius. The possibility that the temperature be between 
20℃ to 25℃ is 
𝟏
𝟑




Figure 3.1. a schematic diagram illustrating the process of (re)characterization 
    While the definition of possibility presented in (3-1) has similarities with the 
classic definition of probability, there are also differences between the two measures. The 
most important difference is the directionality of the definition of possibility, which is only 
defined for the output of the characterization process. 
Possibility values for the outputs of a more-to-less process are the relative 
contributions of inputs; i.e. the relative number of inputs associated to every output. 
Possibilities are named such as they only depend on the processual code, i.e. the specifics 
of input-output relation, and are independent of empirical observations. Possibilities may 
also be called logical or structural probabilities, contrasting propensities, which may be 
called physical probabilities or relative frequencies. Propensities for the outcomes of a 
process are due to the combined effects of (a) the propensities for corresponding 
conditions, and (b) the possibilities imposed by the specifics of condition-outcome relation. 
 Propensity 
Propensity of an outcome of a physical process gives the preferential tendency of 
the process to generate the outcome relative to other outcomes of the process. Since the 
quantity characterizes a physical process, its measurement requires empirical observations. 
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The way to measure such tendency is to observe the outcomes of numerous runs of the 
process and to find the proportion of the runs resulting in the target outcome. The number 
of runs that is sufficient for propensity measurements is the number beyond which the 
quotient is less sensitive to variations in the observations. Eq. (3-2) presents the quotient, 
resulting from dividing two observed values, where 𝒏(𝒚∗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ) is the number of outcomes with 
the target character, 𝒚∗⃗⃗⃗⃗ , and 𝒏(?⃗? ) is the total number of outcomes generated by the outcome 








Figure 3.1 presents a schematic diagram illustrating the concept of propensity of an 
outcome of the process. As it can be seen, the propensity of a process to generate a specific 
outcome is related to the propensity of the realization of the input characters, 𝑷𝒑(𝒙∗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ) and 
𝑷𝒑(𝒆∗⃗⃗  ⃗), as well as the possibility of the outcome to be generated by the mathematical 
representation of the process. 
 
Figure 3.2. a schematic diagram illustrating the concept of propensity within the context 




Credibility is the degree an evaluating agent assigns to its evaluation. Figure 3.3 
presents a schematic diagram illustrating the two types of credibility evaluation processes, 
where the top diagram depicts a propensity evaluation process, and the bottom a possibility 
evaluation process. 
 
Figure 3.3. a schematic diagram illustrating the two types of credibility evaluation 
processes; top: propensity evaluation process, down: possibility evaluation process 
Credibilities are imaginary relative weights assigned to (the parameters of) the 
processes, who are hypothesized to deliver the intended outcomes. The parameters of a 
process are the (structural) values that specify the propensity values for the input or the 
output and/or the input-output relation, which determine the possibilities. Credibilities are 
only means to the end of assessing propensities and/or possibilities, whose exact values are 
unknown. The motivation for the use of credibilities are the desire to account for a more 
comprehensive set of possible processes, who might be otherwise ignored in 
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propensity/possibility assessments, due to the lower level of support provided by available 
knowledge (for them). Bayesian priors are prime examples of credibilities. 
3.4 EVALUATING PROBABILITIES 
Evaluating probabilities is centered around using credibilities to evaluate 
propensities and possibilities. 
Since credibilities are imaginary, their values cannot be obtained from empirical 
observations and must be assigned without resorting to empirical justifications. While the 
imaginary nature of credibilities allows subjects to assign credibilies of their own 
preference, their assignment might not be justifiable to others. Alternatively, it is possible 
to establish a set of theoretical assignment rules on purely logical grounds, and to justify 
the designations based on their effects, or lack thereof, on the assessed propensities and/or 
possibilities. Due to their rule abidance, theoretically constructed credibilities may be 
described as objective, even though imaginary and only existing in subjects’ minds. The 
class of credibilities called non-informative are the ones, whose assignment are aimed at 
not informing (certain aspects of) the assessed propensities and/or possibilities. Decision 
Entropy is one such theory, whose aim is not to inform the assessments made within the 
framework of analyzing decisions. The principles of the theory precisely specify the 
assessments, regarding which the credibility assignments must remain neutral. 
 Learning; Conceptual and Perceptual 
My conjecture is that learning (of an agent) can be categorized into two classes of 
perceptual and conceptual. While perceptual learning solely relies on empirical 
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observations, conceptual learning involves both empirical observation and 
conceptualization of structural relationships between neighboring states. Figure 3.4 
presents a schematic diagram, which can assist in illustrating the two types of learning. The 
perceptual learning involves making observations on concurrent values of ?⃗?  and ?⃗? , whose 
results can be tabulated. However, the conceptual learning requires going beyond 
observations and imagining how a specific change in stimuli may result in a change in 
response. 
 
Figure 3.4. a schematic diagram illustrating the two types of learning 
3.5 BAYESIAN ROBOT 
 Historical Background 
The idea of an inferential robot/computer program, which could do Bayesian 
inference by itself, was first put forward by Jaynes (1957) and then refined by himself and 
his followers along the time, e.g. (Tribus, 1969) and (Jaynes, 2003). The robot receives the 
information in the possession of subjects as an input and gives its Bayesian estimate as an 
output, based on the algorithm embedded in its program. The algorithm is written based on 
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a set of desiderata developed to ensure the rationality and the consistency of the inference. 
An example of such desiderata for plausible/probable inference was proposed by the Cox 
(1946 and 1961). 
A consequence of the development of an objective approach to statistical induction 
is that the procedure developed has the potential to be automated and to be run with 
minimal involvement of subjects. Although such objective inference relies on the 
information elicited from subjects, the process of assigning probabilities is done with no 
on-the-fly guidance from the subject. This is sharp contrast with the way most humans 
form their probability judgements when questioned about uncertain quantities (O’Hagan et 
al, 2006). We believe the idea of robot is worthy to be included in the foundations of 
objective Bayesian approaches and we will do so. In addition to existing developments 
regarding the robot, which mainly focuses on the role of information (Tofolli, 2004), we 
will also emphasize on the role of the assumptions required for making an induction. 
 Evaluating Robots; Type A vs Type B 
Robot/machine A is a complex robot with the ability to both perceive the external 
signals, as well as imagining variety of relationships between them. However, the 
mechanics of the evaluation of the robot is murky, and as a result, cannot be 
taught/transferred to other fellow machines of the same type. In the following we aim at 
elaborating on the potential mechanisms, through which this robot may learn.  
Robot/machine B, is a simple robot with as good as of an ability to perceive the 
external signals, relative to robot A, but a simpler imagining apparatus, mainly consisting 
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of mechanically constructed model available to its memory. Although simple, evaluation 
processes used by robot B has the opposite character of robot A, i.e. transparency. This 
allows the robot to transfer the mechanics of its evaluation to other fellow machines of the 
same type. In the following we aim at elaborating on the potential mechanisms, through 
which this robot may learn.    
3.6 PRINCIPLES OF RATIONAL INDUCTION 
In the following, I introduce a number of principles, which I deem essential for a 
rational, consistent, and transparent inductive reasoning. Together, the principles form a 
flexible framework that can act as the conceptual foundation of any axiomatic system to 
be developed upon the framework. 
 Evaluative Orientation Principle 
The orientation principle can be stated as follows: 
• Inductive analysis is a goal-oriented act and must be directed toward 
answering a set of target questions 
A goal-oriented act involves triggering and sustaining a physical process to obtain 
an outcome of certain characteristics. However, the focus of a study aimed at assisting a 
goal-oriented act is on the (set of) characteristics of the outcomes (of the process) that are 
of interest to the purposive agent. 
 Investigative Prioritization Principle 
The prioritization principle can be stated as follows: 
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• Target questions must be prioritized in order to direct the inductive analysis 
to approach questions according to their importance 
The principle insists on theoretical and pragmatical necessity of ordering the 
variables of interest. The ordering becomes important as the unbiased inductive approach 
toward variables higher in the hierarchy inevitable results in informing the variables lower 
in the hierarchy, given the structural/deterministic relationships between the higher and 
lower variables.  
 Explicative Sufficiency Principle 
The explanation principle can be stated as follows: 
• A (limited) number of distinct explanations/ hypotheses must be formulated 
such that each provide definitive answers to target questions   
The explanation principle is aimed at setting the determinacy of the mathematical 
system representing the problem, such that the system does not become indeterminate. 
 Evaluative Inclusion Principle 
The inclusion principle can be stated as follows: 
• When data is limited such that an explanation/hypothesis does not stand out, 
assessments based on (the validity of) different hypotheses must be 
combined in order to form an inclusive/ collective assessment.   
The inclusion principles is a form of adaptation to demands from the inductive 
investigation. When the objectives of inquiry demands the singling out of a possible 
answer, a means must be devised to distinguish such answer from others. 
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 Credibility Conception Principle 
The credibility conception principle can be stated as follows: 
• To form an inclusive assessment, each explanation/ hypothesis must be 
differentiated with a degree of credibility/ plausibility relative to other 
explanations.  
Credibility is a theoretical construct devised to compensate for the lack of 
information. Since credibility does not exist in the real world, (1) there is no true value, for 
a credibility (to be estimated), and (2) no amounts of information, in itself, can give its 
value. Credibility value has to be established given an (arbitrary) definition. 
 Artifact-Reality Division Principle 
The artifact-reality division principle can be stated as follows: 
• Credibility must be defined to explicitly account for (1) what we know, 
observations, and (2) what we arbitrarily devise to reason beyond what we 
know, explanation/ hypothesis, such that the contribution of (1) and (2) in 
the collective assessment be tractable.  
The principle aims at providing methodical transparency and justifiability, such that 
each step of the evaluation be transparent and justifiable. 
 Unbiased Evaluation Principle 
The unbiased evaluation principle can be stated as follows: 
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• Credibility values must not be established such that the inclusive assessment 
favors any of the possible answers to the target questions before 
incorporation of observations. 
The principle aims at highlighting the fact that only observation is allowed to tip 
the outcome of the inductive evaluation toward any of the potential answers. In other 
words, before incorporation of the observations, it is rational not to distribute credence to 
any answer, more than the other. 
 Applications of the Principles 
The following is a list of the application of the aforementioned seven principles 
within the context of a decision, where the following variables are paramount. 
• Right Decision 
• Consequence of an Action (Prospect of an Act) 
• Consequence of an Exploration (Prospect of Learning) 
Inductive analysis will be conducted such that the evaluation does not favor 
possible values of the objective variable, before inclusion of the observations. 
3.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Brief Summary 
The concept of probability from a process-centered perspective is being divided 
into three types of propensity, possibility, and credibility. Credibilities are imaginary 
relative weights assigned to (the parameters of) the processes, who are hypothesized to 
deliver the intended outcomes. Since credibilities are imaginary, their values cannot be 
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obtained from empirical observations and must be assigned without resorting to empirical 
justifications. The class of theoretically-established credibilities called non-informative are 
the ones, whose assignment are aimed at not informing (certain aspects of) the assessed 
propensities and/or possibilities. Decision Entropy is one such theory, whose aim is not to 
inform the assessments made within the framework of analyzing decisions. The principles 
of the theory precisely specify the assessments, regarding which the credibility assignments 
must remain neutral. 
 Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be made based on the contents of this chapter: 
• Unsettled conceptual debates on the nature of probability are due to the 
agglomeration of various quantitative measures, who all share a number of 
mathematical properties, but do have different natures and functionalities. 
• From a process-centered perspective, probability can be divided into three 
types of propensity, possibility, and credibility.  
• Propensity values are relative repetitions of processual outcomes, as they 
have come to realization.  
• Possibility values for the outputs of a more-to-less process are the relative 




• Possibilities are named such as they only depend on the processual code, 
i.e. the specifics of input-output relation, and are independent of empirical 
observations.  
• Possibilities may also be called logical or structural probabilities, 
contrasting propensities, which may be called physical probabilities or 
relative frequencies.  
• Propensities for the outcomes of a process are due to the combined effects 
of (a) the propensities for corresponding conditions, and (b) the possibilities 
imposed by the specifics of condition-outcome relation. 
• Credibilities are imaginary relative weights assigned to (the parameters of) 
the processes, who are hypothesized to deliver the intended outcomes. The 
parameters of a process are the (structural) values that specify the propensity 
values for the input or the output and/or the input-output relation, which 
determine the possibilities.  
• Credibilities are only means to the end of assessing propensities and/or 
possibilities, whose exact values are unknown.  
• The motivation for the use of credibilities are the desire to account for a 
more comprehensive set of possible processes, who might be otherwise 
ignored in propensity/possibility assessments, due to the lower level of 
support provided by available knowledge (for them).  
• Bayesian priors are prime examples of credibilities. 
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• Since credibilities are imaginary, their values cannot be obtained from 
empirical observations and must be assigned without resorting to empirical 
justifications.  
• While the imaginary nature of credibilities allows subjects to assign 
credibilies of their own preference, their assignment might not be justifiable 
to others.  
• It is possible to establish a set of theoretical assignment rules on purely 
logical grounds, and to justify the designations based on their effects, or 
lack thereof, on the assessed propensities and/or possibilities.  
• Theoretically constructed credibilities may be described as objective due to 
their rule abidance, even though they remain imaginary and only existing in 
subjects’ minds.  
• The class of credibilities called non-informative are the ones, whose 
assignment are aimed at not informing (certain aspects of) the assessed 
propensities and/or possibilities.  
• Decision Entropy is a non-informative theory, whose aim is not to inform 
the assessments made within the framework of analyzing decisions. The 
principles of the theory precisely specify the assessments, regarding which 









In the following, I introduce a number of concepts and methods central to the 
development of a theory aimed at objective assessment of uncertainties through the 
assignment of non-informative Bayesian priors.  
 Black Swan Outcomes 
Black Swan is a metaphorical character label for rare but consequential processual 
outcomes, whose occurrence takes humans by surprise as they were deemed impossible. 
The three attributes of a Black Swan Outcome (BSO), according to Taleb (2007), are (a) 
extremely low frequency, (b) extremely high impact, and (c) retrospective predictability 
by humans, where combined extremity of the first two attributes make the BSO 
unpredictable but significant. While lying beyond the range of common experiences make 
rare events unforeseeable, the ensuing unpreparedness makes their occurrence of a BSO 
much more impactful that what it would, if humans had not failed to predict the outcome. 
Taleb (2007) claims that while history is directed and shaped by extreme outliers much 
more than by frequent but expected outcomes, their historical significances are toned down 
due to the human tendency to explain BSOs after their realizations and incorporate their 




Among many BSOs throughout history of the world, a number of contemporary 
extreme outliers with significant impacts on society, economy, and politics in the United 
States include (a) deliberate plane crashes into the twin towers of World Trade Center of 
New York city in Sep 11 2001, (b) the early 2000’s stock market devaluations, collectively 
known as (the burst of) dot-com bubble, resulting from excessive speculative trading of the 
stocks of companies who were offering internet-related products and services, and (c) the 
global financial crisis of 2007-8 due to bursting of housing bubble in the U.S.  
A more enlightening contemporary BSO in the U.S., though less significant in 
terms of its socio-economic impact, was the 1998 collapse of the hedge fund named Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM), which the winners of 1997 Nobel prize in Economics, 
Robert Merton and Myron Scholes, had helped to create. The firm was trading financial 
products called derivatives based on the assessed prices calculated by the mathematical 
model named after the Nobel laureates Black-Scholes-Merton; a model that its developers 
claimed to had reduced, or even eliminated, risk from financial markets by calculating risks 
of losses with decimal place precision. After four years of astonishing returns up to 40%, 
in 1997 LTCM started to make losses due to the effects of Asian financial crisis. A month 
after 1998 default of Russian government on its bonds, LTCM lost about half of its $4 
billion capital; an outcome whose risk was assessed to be (almost) zero by the same model 
that had brought the Nobel prize for the laureates less than a year before. LTCM, whose 
founders were not considering it a hedge fund but a financial technology company, was 
eventually bailed out by the US Federal Reserve to prevent the spread of its collapse across 




were financially and reputationally destroyed by a BSO, deemed improbable by their own 
model!  
The prominence of the term Black Swan in the minds of western intellectuals is 
partly due to the dramatic change in its modern application, compared to its ancient uses. 
Since every observed swan in the old world was white, the assertion “all swans are white” 
was frequently used in illustrative examples of categorial syllogism, to the extent that even 
Aristotle took the color property of white as the necessary condition for swans; i.e. the 
color of a swan’s feathers must be white. Later, the term black swan came to become widely 
cited in ancient philosophical discussions of the concept of impossibility. Nevertheless, the 
observation of black-feathered swans in the newly-discovered continent of Australia in the 
17th century, caused the term black swan to refer to a logical fallacy resulted from the use 
of empirical observations to form a general rule. Since Scottish philosopher David Hume 
(1748) had questioned the rationality of inferring such rules based on uniform past 
experiences, later philosophers including John Stuart Mill (1843) used the term black swan 
within the context of philosophical justification of Induction. In recent times, the term was 
revived by Levantine scholar Nicholas Nasim Taleb (2007), and in reference to the 
realization of a specific subset of the outcomes that violate the uniformity of past 
observations; the seemingly improbable outcomes, whose monstrosity hugely impacts our 
lives. 
4.2 MOTIVATION 
In the following, I declare accounting of Black Swan Outcomes as the main 




informative Bayesian credibilities can be a means of such accounting. So, I declare the 
development of a defensible method for the assignment of Bayesian priors as a theoretical 
motivation for the research. 
 Accounting for Black Swan Outcomes 
The main practical motivation for the theory we are advancing here is to be able to 
account for yet-to-be-realized Black Swan Outcomes (BSO) in the theoretical assessments 
of processual uncertainties. The seemingly non-ending surprise of human kind by a wide 
variety of BSOs throughout history may be explained by the innate tendency to heavily 
rely on our memorable experiences to form cognitions and actions. Our naïve empiricism 
seems to makes us either negligent and/or ignorant; negligent as we may not track and 
accumulate further historical records, and ignorant as we may not account for our 
knowledge deficiencies whether in terms of its extent or its relevance. 
The approach chosen to account for BSO in the assessments of uncertainties must 
relieve us from our natural negligence and ignorance. While tracking historical records and 
accumulating past records ensures that no past observation is ignored, there will be a point 
where all available data is exhausted and the limits of experience is being reached. We 
must note that the only means to go beyond the experience is to use logical reasoning such 
that the resulting assessment be defensible. If so, the assessed probabilities must not be 
taken as empirically-grounded predictions of to-be-observed frequencies, but as rational 
assessments made with the aim of moderating empirically-based expectations by 




 Directing Credible Proportional Induction 
The theoretical motivation for the research is to develop a defensible method for 
directing the assignment of non-informative Bayesian credibilities, in the sense described 
in the previous chapter. Also, the offered method provides with a theoretical means needed 
to fulfil the practical desire of accounting for yet-to-be-realized Black Swan Outcomes. In 
other words, when it comes to extreme outcomes beyond the range of observations, the 
credible proportions assessed by theoretically-established non-informative Bayesian priors 
reflect the consideration of unobserved possibilities. 
Philosophically, the theory we are advancing takes Hume’s (1748) position 
regarding the legitimacy of inductive inference (from observed to unobserved) as a 
principle, and views the assumption that future will be the same as the past (processual 
uniformity along the time), as rationally unjustified. Besides, we propose that the so-called 
uniformity assumption is likely to result in neglecting or ignoring Black Swan Outcomes, 
which are often non-existent in historical records. 
To relax the blinding uniformity assumption, two limiting cases of stationary and 
evolving processes are conceivable regarding the specifics of the processual knowledge we 
are lacking. While the parameters of a stationary process remain unchanged along the time, 
available observations only inform the parameters within the range of historical records 
and beyond, the (values of the) parameters must be assessed without reliance on 
observations. In contrast, we may have a process whose past parameters are completely 
known to us, but we do not know whether the process has started to evolve and to take 




assess a target process and we have a complete knowledge of an analogous process, whose 
similarities makes the existence of a relation between processes plausible.    
4.3 DECISION ENTROPY THEORY 
 General Description of the Theory 
Decision Entropy Theory (DET) is a computational machinery aimed at assessing 
unknown aspects of a process in the light of the available information, where sought-for 
aspects depend on the processual parameters; (structural) values specifying collective or 
relative individual features of processual input and/or output and/or the (deterministic) 
input-output relation. The theory is intended to be objective and defensible in the sense 
described in Chapters 2, and 3, meaning that (a) its assessment procedures are transparent 
and imitable and (b) the constraints specifying the process are set in compliance with a set 
of intuitively logical guiding principles.  
The theory assigns non-informative Bayesian priors to sets of possibilities, 
representing the aspects of the process that are unknown to us. The priors are assigned to 
possibilities by considering a hierarchy of variables and such that prior credibilities 
minimally inform the variables, whose exact values are the subjects of the inductive 
inquiry. The adopted measure for the information contained in a distribution is Shannon’s 
entropy, where the minimally informative distribution is the one with the maximum 
entropy. In the simplest case of the hierarchy composed of a single variable, whose only 




 Principles of the Theory 
The following three principles specify the hierarchy of variables, as the targets of 
the inquiry, and elaborate the distributions that are minimally informative:   
1. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, 
then a selected alternative is equally probable to be or not to be the preferred alternative. 
2. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, 
then the possible differences in preference between a selected alternative and the preferred 
alternative are equally probable. 
3. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, 
then the possibilities of learning with new information about the selected alternative 
compared to the preferred alternative are equally probable. 
The mathematical formulations of the axioms corresponding the three principles 
are presented in Eqs. (4-1), (4-2), and (4-3), respectively. A complete description of the 
theory including its mathematical formulation is being presented in Appendix B. 
 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙 (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒| 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
= −𝑃(𝐴𝑖 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
× 𝑙𝑛[𝑃(𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑|𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)]
− 𝑃(𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
× 𝑙𝑛[𝑃(𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ |𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)] − ln(2)
= − {𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 |𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]
× 𝑙𝑛{2𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0|𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}
+ {1 − 𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}






𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙 (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙| 𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∩ 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
= ∑
−𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = (Δ𝑢i)𝑝|𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∩ 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]





𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = (Δ𝑢i)𝑝|𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∩ 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]
× 𝑙𝑛{nΔ𝑢i<0𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = (Δ𝑢i)𝑝|𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑







𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙 (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛|𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) =
= − {𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]
× ln {2𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}
+ {1 − 𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}
× ln {2 {1 − 𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}}}
+ {− ∑
𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= (vi)𝑞| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]
× ln {nvi>0𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴




× {1 − 𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]} 
 
 (4-3) 
4.3.2.1 Evolutions of DET 
While the general objectives and the fundamental measures underlying the theory 
of Decision Entropy have remained unchanged, its principles, which specify the hierarchy 
of variables, have evolved along the time. For example, the applications presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6 were conducted at the time when theoretical principles were defined in 
terms of the concept of utility difference and the decisions between multiple alternatives 
were made based on the exhaustive collection of pair-wise decisions. The current version 
of the theory relies on the conception of information potential, which was first introduced 




effect of information for each decision outcome is the difference between the utility value 
of selected alternative and the maximum utility value. The mathematical formulation of 
information potential, labeled as ∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) by (Mostofi, 2018), is presented in 
Eq. (4-4): 
 ∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) − max [∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖] (4-4) 
Where 
∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0     𝑖𝑓  𝐴𝑗 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) < 0     𝑖𝑓  𝐴𝑗  𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 Implementations of DET 
The theory of decision entropy has been implemented to assess the uncertainties in 
a variety of practical engineering problems within the past years. Min (2008) applied the 
theory to a number of petroleum engineering problems, where parameters characterizing 
production, transmissibility, and spatial variability of an oil reservoir were uncertain.  
Figure 4.1 compares the Value of Perfect Information for a production unit obtained from 
assessments made by the proposed theory with those from a generic assessment. 
Decision Entropy Theory has also been applied to assess the risk of a number of 
natural hazards. While Mostofi (2018) provided a general assessment of uncertainties for 
landslides, as complicated multi-hazard processes, Mostofi et al. (2019) conducted a case 
study for the catastrophic landslide of March 2014 in Oso, Washington and concluded that 
if the cost of prohibiting the development in the region for the next century becomes less 




risk and to prohibit civil developments.  For the case, when the alternative decision of 
accepting the risk is preferred, Figure 4.2 presents the updated assessments of the 
parameters of renewal model describing the occurrence of characteristic landslides 
(Mostofi et al., 2019) 
 
Figure 4.1. Variation of the value of perfect information (VPI) with well cost for an 
example production unit (Min, 2008) 
 
Figure 4.2. Informed assessments of the parameters describing the occurrence of 




Decision Entropy Theory has also been used to assess the effect of natural hazards 
on engineering structures. Feng et al. (2019) have evaluated the rehabilitation decision for 
a rockfill dam in Norway, where the overtopping of water in the dam reservoir is uncertain. 
It has been demonstrated that a decrease in the amount of available information and/or an 
increase in the cost of failure relative to the cost of rehabilitation results in an increase in 
the value of perfect information about the hazard curve increases (Feng et al. 2019).   Figure 
4.3 demonstrates the changes in expected normalized information potential for different 
normalized rockfill dam failure cost.  
 
Figure 4.3. Expected normalized information potential for different normalized rockfill 




4.4 EVALUATING THE OBJECTIVITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND DEFENSIBILITY OF 
DET 
An objective of the research was to evaluate whether the assessments of DET can 
be characterized as objective, transparent, and defensible. The comparison between the 
three principles of DET, as stated in 4.3.2, with the seven general principles, stated in 
Chapter 3, reveals that DET is in compliance with the more fundamental principles for 
objective assessment of probabilities. Thus, we can conclude that DET leads to assessments 
that are objective, transparent, and defensible. The details of the compliance are as follows: 
 Evaluative Orientation Principle 
By considering the following statement of the principle of evaluative orientation: 
• Inductive analysis is a goal-oriented act and must be directed toward 
answering a set of target questions 
We can conclude that DET satisfies “Evaluative Orientation,” as it takes inductive 
analysis to be a goal-oriented act and directs the assessment toward answering a set of 
target questions. 
 Investigative Prioritization Principle 
By considering the following statement of the principle of investigative 
prioritization: 
• Target questions must be prioritized in order to direct the inductive analysis 




We may conclude that DET performs “Investigative Prioritization,” as it prioritized 
the questions according to their importance to the investigation..  
 Explicative Sufficiency Principle 
Based on the following explanation of the principle: 
• A (limited) number of distinct explanations/ hypotheses must be formulated 
such that each provide definitive answers to target questions   
We may conclude that DET is Explicatively Sufficient, as it designates a number 
of distinct processual explanations, such that each provide definitive answers to the target 
questions. 
 Evaluative Inclusion Principle 
By considering the statement of the inclusion principle as below: 
• When data is limited such that an explanation/hypothesis does not stand out, 
assessments based on (the validity of) different hypotheses must be 
combined in order to form an inclusive/ collective assessment.   
We may conclude that DET is evaluatively inclusive, as it allows the formation of 
a hybrid and inclusive explanation by considering and combining collection of 
explanations. 
 Credibility Conception Principle 




• To form an inclusive assessment, each explanation/ hypothesis must be 
differentiated with a degree of credibility/ plausibility relative to other 
explanations.  
DET is based on credibility conception, as it uses credibility values to form an 
inclusive assessment, and to differentiates various explanations with a degree of 
plausibility relative to other explanations. 
 Artifact-Reality Division Principle 
By taking into account the statement of the artifact-reality division principle: 
• Credibility must be defined to explicitly account for (1) what we know, 
observations, and (2) what we arbitrarily devise to reason beyond what we 
know, explanation/ hypothesis, such that the contribution of (1) and (2) in 
the collective assessment be tractable.  
We may conclude that DET divides artifacts from reality, as its assigned 
credibilities explicitly account for (1) what we know, observations, and (2) what we 
arbitrarily devise to reason beyond what we know, explanation/ hypothesis, such that the 
contribution of (1) and (2) in the collective assessment is tractable. 
 Unbiased Evaluation Principle 
According to the following statement of the unbiased evaluation principle: 
• Credibility values must not be established such that the inclusive assessment 
favors any of the possible answers to the target questions before 




We may conclude that DET provides with unbiased evaluations, as its assigned 
credibility values are not such that the inclusive assessment favors any of the possible 
answers to the target questions, before incorporation of observations. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
A Black Swan is an infrequent but consequential processual outcome, whose 
realization may even become more impactful due to the lack of preparation for a deemed 
improbable event. The study of an example Black Swan, the 1998 failure of the financial 
derivative trading firm named Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), reveals that (a) 
how our most elaborate and highly praised frequency models, which are devised to describe 
and predict processual variations, can fail to account for unprecedented outcomes, and (b) 
how our confidence and reliance on such models, often justified by their success in 
addressing frequent outcomes, can result in unforeseen colossal consequences. 
Accounting for Black Swan Outcomes (BSO) is declared to be the practical 
motivation of the research and offering a defensible procedure for assigning non-
informative Bayesian credebilities is declared to be the theoretical motivation, which 
ultimately serves the practical motivation. The failure to contemplate Black Swan 
Outcomes (BSO) is attributed to our naïve empirical approach in making processual 
assessments, resulting in us neglecting extreme events of the past by not conducting 
through historical investigations, or ignoring the realization of unprecedented events in the 
future by (completely) matching the assessment with historical records. While the former 




addressed by conceiving a future (trend) different from the past and justifying the 
conception on (purely) theoretical grounds. 
A (set of) theoretical means with the potential to account for yet-to-be-realized 
BSOs are non-informative Bayesian priors, which provide with assessments of processual 
tendencies before incorporating (past) realizations. Nevertheless, using Bayesian approach 
faces conceptual and methodical challenges. Conceptually, the fact that fundamental 
questions of “what Bayesian probabilities are” and “whether they represented 
(observationally) measurable quantities” still do not have satisfactory answers, have given 
the opponents reasons to question and reject the Bayesian approach. Methodically, the fact 
that there is no consensus on the assignment of Bayesian probabilities for a specific 
problem given certain observations, has forced analysts to make an uncomfortable choice 
among priors and to legitimize their choice either by portraying it as a (direct) 
representation of the (historical) data, or by downplaying its effects on the final assessment. 
This research tries to address both conceptual and methodical challenges facing the 
Bayesian approach. While Chapters 2 and 3 are aimed at developing a philosophical 
framework to provide with conceptual clarity and precision, this chapter is aimed at 
introducing a computational theory to defensibly and transparently assign exact values to 
Bayesian probabilities for specific problems with certain available information. 
A computational apparatus, Decision Entropy Theory (DET), is being introduced 
to assess unknown aspects of a process in an objective and defensible manner, in the sense 
described in Chapters 2 and 3, meaning that (a) its assessment procedures are transparent 




of intuitively logical guiding principles. DET considers a hierarchy of variables and assigns 
non-informative Bayesian priors to minimally inform the variables, whose exact values are 
the subjects of the inductive inquiry. Since Shannon’s entropy is the adopted measure of 
information, the least informative set of distributions are those with the highest entropy 
values. According to the three principles of DET, (I) “decision outcome,” (II) “difference 
in preference,” and (III) “learning potential/information value,” constitute the hierarchy of 
variables, which assigned priors must minimally inform. For risky decisions among a 
number of distinct alternatives, decision outcome is a categorial variable. 
To evaluate objectivity, transparency, and defensibility of DET assessments, a 
comparison is being made between the three principles of DET, stated in this chapter and 
the seven general principles, stated in Chapter 3, namely (I) Evaluative Orientation, (II) 
Investigative Prioritization, (III) Explicative Sufficiency, (IV) Evaluative Inclusion, (V) 
Credibility Conception, (VI) Artifact-Reality Division, (VII) Unbiased Evaluation. Since 
we found DET is in compliance with the more fundamental principles for objective 
assessment of probabilities, we can conclude that DET delivers assessments that are 






 Assessing Value of Test Wells in Developing an 
Unconventional Play 
 
This chapter presents the research material published in the article (Habibi et al, 2014), 
which aims at providing inductive answers to questions related to proportion of object 
with certain characteristics, namely economic profitability.  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Unconventional plays are production opportunities with the potential for 
considerable uncertainty in production and economics. While trying to reduce production 
uncertainty with well tests may be valuable, there is a tradeoff between the quantity and 
quality of the information and its potential to improve development decisions. This paper 
proposes a new approach to represent uncertainty in an objective and defensible way, 
such that rare but important possibilities are not neglected in making decisions. This 
approach is called Decision Entropy Theory. 
The motivation to develop Decision Entropy Theory is to account for the 
possibility of events outside our range of experience. Probabilities for possibilities 
beyond our experience cannot be assessed via statistics. Taleb (2007) refers to these 
possibilities as “Black Swan” events: “Before the discovery of Australia, people in the 
Old World were convinced that all swans were white, an unassailable belief as it seemed 
completely confirmed by empirical evidence… [The sighting of the first black swan] 
illustrates a severe limitation to our learning from observations or experience and the 





derived from millennia of confirmatory sightings of millions of white swans.” The United 
States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, referred to these possibilities “unknown 
unknowns” in a famous press conference (DOD 2002): “There are known knowns. These 
are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are 
things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are 
things we don't know we don't know.” Ten years ago, no one would have predicted that 
the United States would be contemplating exporting oil in 2014 because this possibility 
was beyond our range of experience at that time. 
In the following, we will describe Decision Entropy Theory and illustrate its 
application and what can be learned from this theory in assessing the value of test wells 
in an unconventional play.  
5.2 DECISION ENTROPY THEORY 
Decision Entropy Theory is developed from three premises (axioms) that describe 
the case of no information or maximum uncertainty in making a decision between two 
alternatives. 
Axiom 1: An alternative compared to another alternative is equally probable to be 
preferred or not to be preferred. 
Axiom 2: The possible gains or losses for one alternative compared to another 
alternative are equally probable. 
Axiom 3: The possibilities of learning about the preference of one alternative 





This theory characterizes uncertainty in making a decision; the case of maximum 
uncertainty corresponds to the maximum entropy for the possible outcomes of the 
decision. Therefore, the starting point for assessing probabilities, i.e., the non-informative 
prior probabilities of possibilities before information is included, depends on the decision 
at hand. Mathematical details laying out the development of the theory can be found in 
Gilbert et al. (2012). This paper will focus on the practical implications of this theory to 
the development of unconventional resources. 
5.3 GO - NO GO DECISION 
Consider a generic decision about whether or not to develop a play with unconventional 
resources (Figure 5.1). The profit for the play (p) can be calculated using Eq. (5-1) where 
c is the cost of developing the play, f is the frequency of productive (“good”) wells in the 
development, r/c is the return on investment ratio for a good well, and there is no return 
on investment for bad wells. The frequency of good wells in the play is uncertain and 
denoted as a random variable, F. 
 






Figure 5.1. Decision tree for a development decision 
Figure 5.2 shows how the non-informative prior probability distribution for the 
frequency of good wells is established based on Axioms 1 and 2 of Decision Entropy 
Theory. The probabilities that different outcomes of the decision will be realized are set 
such that there is a probability of 50 percent that the decision to develop the play will be 
correct and an equal probability for different possible net profits if the decision is or is 
not correct (Figure 5.2). This probability distribution is then mapped onto the probability 







Figure 5.2. non-informative prior probability distribution for profit (p) using Decision 
Entropy Theory; Top: Applying axiom (1) to decision alternatives, Bottom: Applying 







Figure 5.3. Establishing non-informative prior for frequency of good wells using 
Decision Entropy Theory; Top: relating profit (p) to frequency of good wells, Bottom: 





The non-informative prior probability distribution for the frequency of good wells 
depends on the specifics of the decision, specifically the return-on-investment ratio r/c 
for good wells since the break-even frequency of good wells for the play is equal to 𝑓 ∗=
1/(𝑟/𝑐). Figure 5.4 illustrates non-informative prior probability distributions for 
different break-even frequencies of good wells. 
 
Figure 5.4. Establishing non-informative prior for frequency of good wells 
The non-informative prior probability distribution can be used to make a decision 
about whether or not to develop the play in the event that no information is available on 
the frequency of good wells. While having no information is not necessarily a practical 
case (i.e. in most cases some information is available), it provides a limiting case as 





[(𝑟/𝑐)𝐸(𝑓) − 1], versus the return-on-investment ratio for good wells for the case of no 
information about the frequency of good wells.  
 
Figure 5.5. Establishing non-informative prior for frequency of good wells 
Several alternatives for establishing non-informative prior probability 
distributions have been proposed over the years. Information theorists, such as Jaynes 
(1957) and Tribus (1967), propose that a uniform distribution for the frequency of good 
wells is a non-informative probability distribution because it maximizes the entropy for 





definition of the “variable” for which to maximize the entropy. For example, the non-
informative prior probability distribution is different if you maximize the entropy of the 
logarithm of the frequency or the inverse of the frequency. Since Decision Entropy 
Theory maximizes the entropy in the decision rather than that in individual variables that 
affect the decision in different ways, it provides a consistent result for a particular 
decision. Bayesian decision analysts, such as Luce and Raiffa (1957), propose that there 
is always some information and therefore not a practical need for a non-informative prior 
probability distribution. The challenge with this approach is that it does not address most 
realistic situations where the available information is limited (as it always is) and does 
not allow for possibilities that have not been observed (i.e.  the possibility of “Black 
Swans.”) Classical statisticians, such as Fisher (1935), propose that there is no defensible 
basis for establishing a non-informative prior probability distribution, meaning that 
probabilities can only be assessed when data are available. The challenge with this 
approach is that it is not practical; there is constantly a need to make decisions where we 
do not have “enough” relevant data because we are doing something new, such as with 
unconventional resources. 
For comparison, Figure 5.5 includes the resulting expected profit of developing 
the play if a uniform distribution is assumed for the non-informative prior probability 
distribution of the frequency of good wells, regardless of the decision (i.e., regardless of 
the return-on-investment ratio for a good well). The threshold for obtaining a positive 
expected profit is the same with both approaches; a return-on-investment ratio greater 





profit with increasing return-on-investment ratio is smaller when applying Decision 
Entropy Theory (Figure 5.5). For example, if the cost of developing the play is 
$100,000,000 and the return-on-investment ratio for good wells is 2.5, then the expected 
profit for the play is $12,500,000 with Decision Entropy Theory and $25,000,000 with a 
uniform prior distribution assumed for the frequency of good wells.  Decision Entropy 
Theory pulls the expected profit toward zero by maintaining a 50-50 probability that the 
play alternative will be preferred with any return-on-investment ratio for good wells 
(Figure 5.4). 
5.4 VALUE OF TEST WELLS 
A decision tree to assess the value of test wells is shown in Figure 5.6. We will 
assume that the test wells are representative of the wells in the play and that results 
between test wells are independent. The outcome of a test well program with n wells will 
be the number of good wells, x. The likelihood of such outcome can be calculated using 
binomial theorem. For any possible outcome (value of x) with a test program of n wells, 
the probability distribution for the frequency of good wells is updated with Bayes’ 
Theorem: 
 




𝑥! (𝑛 − 𝑥)!
] 𝑓𝑖
𝑥(1 − 𝑓𝑖)
𝑛−𝑥} 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓𝑖)
∑ {[
𝑛!
𝑥! (𝑛 − 𝑥)!
] 𝑓𝑖







Where 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓𝑖|𝑥 out of 𝑛 good wells) is the updated probability that the 
frequency is equal to a particular value and 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓𝑖) is the prior probability for the 
frequency. An example of the prior and updated probability distributions for the 
frequency of good wells is shown in Figure 5.7 for one possible outcome of a well test 
program. 
 








Figure 5.7. Probability distributions of frequency of good wells in a play with r/c = 5; 
Top: Prior distribution, Bottom: Posterior distribution from Decision Entropy Theory 





A limiting case for information is perfect information or an infinite number of test 
wells. The value of perfect information about the frequency of good wells is shown in 
Figure 8 as a function of the return-on-investment ratio for good wells in Figure 8. To 
facilitate showing a range of possibilities, the inverse of the return-on-investment ratio 
1/(𝑟/𝑐), which is the break-even frequency for good wells, is used. To generalize the 
results, the value of perfect information is normalized by the maximum possible revenue 
for all good wells, 𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥. The value of perfect information is the greatest when the break-
even frequency is near 0.5 or the return-on-investment ratio is near 2. Information about 
the frequency of good wells is of greatest value in this case because the decision 
alternatives are balanced (the expected profit for developing the play equals zero – Figure 
5.5) and there is the greatest potential for information to tip the decision either way. 
 
Figure 5.8. Value of perfect information for non-informative prior probability 
distributions for frequency of good wells in play based on Decision Entropy Theory 





For comparison purposes, Figure 5.8 also shows the value of perfect information 
if a uniform distribution is assumed for the non-informative prior probability distribution 
of the frequency of good wells. The value of perfect information can be significantly 
greater when applying Decision Entropy Theory than when assuming a uniform prior 
probability distribution for the frequency of good wells. For example, if the return-on-
investment ratio for good wells is equal to three (or the break-even frequency is 1/3) for a 
development costing $100,000,000, then the value of perfect information from a well test 
program is $24,000,000 with Decision Entropy Theory and $16,000,000 with a uniform 
prior probability distribution. This result reflects maximizing the entropy in the decision 
outcomes with Decision Entropy Theory; there is more potential to learn with 
information when entropy in the decision outcomes is greatest at the outset. 
 






The value of information for a test program with a finite number of wells is 
shown in Figure 5.9. In some cases, multiple test wells are needed before any value is 
realized because too few wells will not be enough to change the preferred decision 
alternative even if all of them produce the same outcome. These results further highlight 
how the value of information is affected by the prior probability distribution for the 
frequency of good wells. For example, if the return-on-investment ratio for good wells is 
equal to 1.05, there is a positive value associated with drilling 10 test wells with Decision 
Entropy Theory but no value with a uniform prior probability distribution for the 
frequency of good wells (Figure 5.9). The difference between the two approaches is most 
pronounced in the extremes where the break-even frequency is either very small (a high 
return-on-investment ratio) or very large (a small return-on-investment ratio). These 
cases represent the “Black Swan” types of events, such as a play with a small return-on-
investment ratio that turns out to be profitable because there is a high frequency of good 
wells or a play with a large return-on-investment ratio that turns out to be not profitable 
because there is a small frequency of good wells. Therefore, this example demonstrates 
how Decision Entropy Theory might change the perspective of a decision-maker to 
obtain more information before walking away from a play or committing to a play. 
5.5 RELEVANCY OF INFORMATION FROM ANALOGOUS FIELDS 
The decision about whether or not to develop a new play will typically be 
informed by historical information from analogous plays. Consider a case where there is 
a Field A that may have the same frequency of good wells as in the play that is being 





frequencies are the same until Field B is completely developed. A decision tree to assess 
the value of test wells in the new play is shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 5.10. Decision tree for evaluating the value of information obtained from play B 
The prior probability distribution for the frequency of wells in Field B without 
any information is the same (Figure 5.2 and 4.3). This prior probability distribution will 
be updated based on the information from Field A through Bayes’ Theorem as follows: 
 
𝑃(𝐹𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵𝑖|x𝐴 out of n𝐴 good wells in Field A)
=
{
[P(x𝐴/n𝐴|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 = 𝐵)𝑃(𝐹𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵𝑖)𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐵)] +
[P(x𝐴/n𝐴|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 ≠ 𝐵)𝑃(𝐹𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵𝑖)𝑃(𝐴 ≠ 𝐵)]
}
∑ {
[P(x𝐴/n𝐴|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 = 𝐵)𝑃(𝐹𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵𝑖)𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐵)] +




where 𝑥𝐴 is the number of good wells out of 𝑛𝐴 total wells in Field A, 𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐵) 





frequencies of good wells in the two fields are the same, and 𝑃(𝐴 ≠ 𝐵) = 1 − 𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐵) 
is the prior probability that the new field is different than the old field. If we assume the 
results between wells in each play are independent, then the likelihood of obtaining the 
set of data from Field A is 
 
𝑃(x𝐴 / n𝐴|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 = 𝐵) = 𝑃(x𝐴 / n𝐴|f𝐴 = f𝐵𝑖)
= {[
n!







𝑃(x𝐴 / n𝐴|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 ≠ 𝐵)
= ∑ {[
n𝐴!
x𝐴! (n𝐴 − x𝐴!)
] f𝐴𝑗
𝑥𝐴  (1 − 𝑓𝐴𝑗)
𝑛𝐴−𝑥𝐴
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝐴𝑗≠𝑓𝐵𝑖
×  𝑃(𝐹𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴𝑗|𝐴 ≠ 𝐵)} (5-5) 
Where 𝑃(𝐹𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴𝑗|𝐴 ≠ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐹𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴𝑗|𝐴 = 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐹𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴𝑗) since the prior 
probability for the frequency in Field A does not depend on whether Fields A and B are 
the same (i.e., the prior probability of obtaining a particular set of data from Field A is the 
same whether or not Fields A and B are the same and the probability of obtaining a 
particular set of data from Field A does not depend on the frequency in Field B if the two 
fields are different). 
The prior probability that the two fields are the same is established based on 





from Field A; if the two fields are different, then we cannot learn from Field A. Setting 
𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐵) = 1/2  makes these two possibilities equally probable. 
If 𝑛𝐵 test wells are drilled in Field B, then the updated probability for the 
frequency of good wells in Field B is obtained from Bayes’ Theorem as follows: 
 
𝑃 (𝐹𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵𝑖|
x𝐴 out of n𝐴 good wells in Field A




[P(x𝐴/n𝐴, x𝐵/n𝐵|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 = 𝐵)𝑃(𝐹𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵𝑖)𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐵)] +
[P(x𝐴 / n𝐴, x𝐵/n𝐵|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 ≠ 𝐵)𝑃(𝐹𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵𝑖)𝑃(𝐴 ≠ 𝐵)]
}
∑ {
[P(x𝐴 / n𝐴, x𝐵/n𝐵|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 = 𝐵)𝑃(𝐹𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵𝑖)𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐵)] +




where the likelihood of obtaining the combined set of data if the two fields are the 
same is 
 
𝑃(x𝐴/n𝐴, x𝐵/n𝐵|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 = 𝐵)
= {[
n𝐴!
x𝐴! (n𝐴 − x𝐴!)
] f𝐴𝑗





x𝐵! (n𝐵 − x𝐵!)
] f𝐵𝑖
𝑥𝐵  (1 − 𝑓𝐵𝑖)
𝑛𝐵−𝑥𝐵  } 
(5-7) 
and the likelihood of obtaining the individual data sets for each field if the two 
fields are different is 
 
𝑃(x𝐴/n𝐴, x𝐵/n𝐵|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 ≠ 𝐵)
= P(x𝐴/n𝐴|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 ≠ 𝐵)
× {[
n𝐵!
x𝐵! (n𝐵 − x𝐵!)
] f𝐵𝑖
𝑥𝐵  (1 − 𝑓𝐵𝑖)






Figure 5.11 shows the value of perfect information about the frequency of good 
wells in the new play (Field B) versus the break-even frequency for an example case with 
a large quantity of data from an analogous field (Field A). The data from Field A 
comprise 25 good wells in a field of 100 total wells. 
 
Figure 5.11. Value of perfect information about frequency for new play Field B versus 
the break-even frequency for Field B for different degrees of relevancy of data from 
analog Field A 
If the data from analogous Field A are relevant, or 𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐵) = 1, then frequency 
of good wells in the new play Field B is very unlikely to be significantly different than 
25/100 or 0.25 and there is essentially no value from additional information in the new 
play because the new data re not likely to change the development decision. Decision 
Entropy Theory, 𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐵) = 1/2 , strikes a balance between relying entirely on the 





5.11). This balance is particularly significant for cases where the new data from Field B 
contradict the analogous data with frequencies that are significantly greater than that from 
Field A (0.25). Decision Entropy Theory incorporates the previous experience while 
keeping the door open for possibilities that the new field will be something different than 
previous experience. 
Figure 5.13 shows examples of the prior and updated probability distributions for 
the frequency of good wells in Field B after a number of test wells have been drilled in 
Field B for different results. These results demonstrate how the information from the 
analogous Field A takes on greater weight when the information from play Field B is 
consistent, while it takes on less weight when the information from Field B is 
inconsistent. To emphasize this point, the updated probability that the two fields are the 
same is included in Figure 5.13; this probability is obtained from Bayes’ Theorem as 
follows 
 
𝑃 (𝐴 = 𝐵|
x𝐴 out of n𝐴 good wells in Field A
x𝐵 out of n𝐵 good wells in Field B
)
=
∑ P(x𝐴/n𝐴, x𝐵/n𝐵|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 = 𝐵)𝑃(𝐹𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵𝑖)𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐵)𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝐵𝑖
∑ {
[P(x𝐴 / n𝐴, x𝐵/n𝐵|f𝐵𝑖 ∩ 𝐴 = 𝐵)𝑃(𝐹𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵𝑖)𝑃(𝐴 = 𝐵)] +




In the case when there are numerous data from Field B that are inconsistent with 
those from Field A (e.g., the lower left plot in Figure 5.13 where 50 of 100 wells in Field 
B are good but 25 of 100 wells in Field A were good), the updated probability that the 
fields are the same is reduced significantly and the data from Field A play very little role 







Figure 5.12. Distribution for frequency of good wells updated with data from analog 
Field A and from play Field B; Top: Prior distribution from analog data alone; Bottom: 
Posterior distribution with small number of test wells from play and results that are 









Figure 5.13. Distribution for frequency of good wells updated with data from analog 
Field A and from play Field B; Top: Posterior distribution with larger number of test 
wells from play and results that are not consistent with the analog; Bottom: Posterior 
distribution with equal number of wells from play as from analog and results that are not 





Figure 5.14 shows examples of the value of information versus the number of test 
wells in Field B. This value depends on the break-even frequency of good wells for Field 
B and the available data from Field A. 
 
Figure 5.14. Value of information versus number of test wells in plays with different 
return-on-investment ratios 
5.6 DISCUSSION 
A practical principle arising from Decision Entropy Theory is that it is helpful to 
consider a decision from the top-down concerning the possibilities of preferring one 
decision alternative to another, also the possible gains or losses associated with each 
alternative. In this way, the set of possibilities in a decision is well defined and not 
constrained by experience. We will either prefer one alternative to another or not. It is not 





the decision that lead to one alternative being preferred. In this way, we can 
accommodate possibilities that are beyond our experience. 
The value of a top-down perspective is illustrated in Figure 5.15. The profit for an 
unconventional play with gas wells is shown in Figure 5.15 as a function of the median 
value for the initial well production and a normalized metric for the commodity price of 
natural gas. The combinations of well performance and gas price leading to a profitable 
play are colored green, while those leading to an unprofitable play are colored red. Figure 
14b shows the joint prior probability distribution for initial production and normalized 
gas price obtained from Decision Entropy Theory. The ridge in this joint distribution 
corresponds to the break-even combinations of these variables. The non-uniform shape of 
the prior joint probability distribution for initial well production and gas price reflects the 
non-linear relationship between these variables and the decision outcome. For example, 
the profit for the play reaches an asymptote as the median initial production rate increases 
because the potential profits become constrained by the distribution system and market 
demand. Possibilities for relatively high gas prices beyond experience are captured in this 
prior probability distribution without having to develop and assess probabilities for 







Figure 5.15. Example of establishing non-informative prior probability distribution with 





Another practical principle arising from Decision Entropy Theory is to be careful 
with the starting point in assessing probabilities for the input variables in a decision. In 
theory, the prior state should represent the case of having no information; information can 
then be used to update this prior state via Bayes’ theorem. One reasonably common 
approach of maximizing uncertainty in the input variables, i.e., maximizing the entropy 
of their probability distribution, is not rational, consistent or even practical. It is not 
rational because different variables affect a decision in different ways. Journel and 
Deutsch (1993) demonstrate the lack of rationality very clearly with the spatial variability 
of permeability in a reservoir: the maximum entropy in the probability distribution for the 
permeability field (i.e., lots of randomness with very little spatial structure or correlation 
in extreme high or low permeabilities) produces relatively small variation and therefore 
uncertainty in well production across the field, while little entropy in the probability 
distribution for the permeability field (i.e., lots of structure with channels of high 
permeabilties and zones of low permeabilities) produces relatively large uncertainty in 
well production. This approach of uniform prior probability distributions for input 
variables is inconsistent; a uniform probability distribution for the permeability is 
different than one for the logarithm of permeability. This approach also is not practical 
when dealing with multiple input variables; if we extended the example in this paper to 
include three possible outcomes for the wells, “good, mediocre and bad,” then a uniform 
probability distribution for one of these frequencies precludes a uniform probability 





how a uniform prior probability distribution can undervalue information (e.g., Figure 5.8 
and Figure 5.9). 
The examples presented in this paper were highly simplified to be clear. The 
examples would be more realistic if there were: 
• More than two possible outcomes for each well, such as a range of 
cumulative production rates; 
• Uncertainty in the investment cost and return; 
• Different and multiple types of information about reservoir productivity, 
such as exploration data and short-term and localized well tests as well as production well 
data; 
• Spatial and temporal correlations between wells, such as sweet spots or 
learning curves; and 
• More than two possible cases of analog data being relevant or not, such as 
accommodating different correlative strengths between the analog data and the new field. 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Unconventional plays have considerable uncertainty in production and 
economics. This paper proposes Decision Entropy Theory to represent uncertainty in an 
objective and defensible way, such that rare but important possibilities are not neglected 





decision; the case of maximum uncertainty corresponds to the maximum entropy for the 
possible outcomes of the decision. 
The theory is applied to assessing the value of information from test wells for an 
unconventional play. The decision to develop a play is posed in terms of the the cost of 
development, the ratio of the return-on-investment for productive (“good”) wells in the 
play, and the uncertain frequency of good wells in the play. Results for the value of tests 
wells are obtained and provided graphically in non-dimensional relationships for a 
variety of cases, including a finite and infinite number of test wells and incorporating 
data from an analogous play. The following conclusions are drawn from this application: 
1. The probability distribution for the uncertain frequency of productive 
wells is important both for deciding whether or not to develop a play and for the value of 
information from test wells.  
2. It is unreasonable to assume that the probability distribution for the 
frequency of productive wells can be established based entirely on experience because 
that precludes the possibility of events beyond our experience, which can be particularly 
important with unconventional plays. 
3. The value of test wells is enhanced when leaving open the possibilities for 
profit on a play with a small return-on-investment ratio and the possibility for loss on a 





4. There is a balance between relying entirely on historical data from 
analogous plays versus not relying on them at all. Within this balance, information for 
test wells at a new play can be combined with information from analogous plays to 
inform the decision about developing the new play. 
5. The value test of wells at a new play depends on the break-even frequency 
of good wells in the play; in the case of no information, this value is a maximum when 
the break-even frequency is 50 percent. 






 Achieving Reliability in the Face of Extreme Uncertainty 
 
This chapter presents the research material published in 5APSSRA, Symposium on 
Structural Reliability and its Applications, which aims at providing a theoretical approach 
for recommending a rate of occurrence of a natural hazard for designing a structure to 
reliably withstand the recommended magnitude of the hazard. The article is the first 
published document, in which we label the collection of axioms we have used in our 
analysis “Decision Entropy Theory.”   
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Extreme uncertainty is the possibility of events that are beyond the range of 
experience. In probabilistic terms, it is the possibility of an event that is considered 
extremely unlikely or even impossible in establishing the sample space of possibilities. 
In the popular literature, Taleb (2007) refers to possibilities of extreme 
uncertainty as “Black Swan” events: “Before the discovery of Australia, people in the Old 
World were convinced that all swans were white, an unassailable belief as it seemed 
completely confirmed by empirical evidence… [The sighting of the first black swan] 
illustrates a severe limitation to our learning from observations or experience and the 
fragility of our knowledge. One single observation can invalidate a general statement 
derived from millennia of confirmatory sightings of millions of white swans.” The United 
States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, referred to extreme uncertainty as 




Iraq (DOD 2002): “There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. 
There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. 
But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know.” 
The world is filled with recent examples of extreme uncertainty. The storm surge 
in 2005 during Hurricane Katrina was almost 50-percent larger than the maximum storm 
surge that had ever been recorded along the Gulf Coast of the United States, it was well 
above the “extreme” conditions that were used to design the levee system, and it resulted 
in nearly 2,000 deaths. The magnitude of the 2011 Japanese earthquake was larger than 
anything in the historical record for that region, it was larger than what was expected to 
be the maximum possible, and it resulted in nearly 20,000 deaths. The 2008 banking 
crisis in the United States was unprecedented, it was well outside the range of 
possibilities considered in public policy, and it resulted in the worst economic conditions 
in the United States since the 1930’s. 
A specific example of extreme uncertainty is illustrated in Figure 6.1. For the first 
50 years of offshore energy production in the Gulf of Mexico, from approximately 1950 
to 2003, the largest hurricane waves impacting the offshore facilities were less than 26 m. 
Based on these data, the “100-year” design wave height was about 22 m. Then, five 
major hurricanes occurred between 2004 and 2008, and four of them had wave heights 
greater than the largest height that had ever occurred before (Figure 6.1). The impact of 
these unprecedented hurricanes was extensive. Figure 6.2 shows how five times as many 
offshore structures were destroyed in the past five years as in the entire previous history 




new “100-year” wave height is now over 26 m (Figure 6.1). Since the force on a fixed 
offshore structure is approximately proportional to the square of the wave height, the new 
“100-year” loads are nearly 50-percent greater than before based on just five years-worth 
of data. 
 





































Figure 6.2. Impact of hurricanes on energy production facilities in Gulf of Mexico 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a mathematical theory, Decision Entropy 
Theory, as a logical and defensible means to address extreme uncertainty. The basis for 
the theory is first described, and then an illustrative example is presented to demonstrate 
its use and significance. 
plays are production opportunities with the potential for considerable uncertainty 
in production and economics. While trying to reduce production uncertainty with well 
tests may be valuable, there is a tradeoff between the quantity and quality of the 
information and its potential to improve development decisions. This paper proposes a 
new approach to represent uncertainty in an objective and defensible way, such that rare 
but important possibilities are not neglected in making decisions. This approach is called 




































6.2 DEFINITION OF PROBLEM 
The motivation for developing Decision Entropy Theory is that it is impossible to 
construct a sample space (the set of all possibilities) without knowing the set of all 
possibilities. That is, we cannot explicitly account for a black swan if we do not know it 
is possible. To demonstrate mathematically, consider an event of interest, F = failure of a 
civil engineering system, and an initial or prior sample space S that contains the set of all 
possible loading conditions on our system based on our experience. Let’s say that 
subsequently a loading condition, E, occurs that is outside our prior sample space because 
it was outside our base of experience (Figure 6.3). There are two implications of this 







, which is nonsensical since E has occurred. Second, the 
probability of failure would have been under assessed if 𝑃(𝐹|𝑆) < 𝑃(𝐹|𝐸) (Figure 6.3). 
 








The prior sample space can be updated with available information, denoted the 







where 𝑃(𝐼|𝐸𝑆) is the likelihood of observing the available information given E 
and 𝑃(𝐸|𝑆) is the prior probability of the event E. The prior probability of the event E is 
not conditioned on information. While these probabilities are non-informative, they are 
important because they affect the updated probabilities as information is incorporated. 
To demonstrate the significance of prior probabilities, consider assessing the 
annual frequency that the wave height will exceed 30 m based on the data in Figure 6.1. 
If wave height exceedances follow a Poisson Process, then the likelihood of observing the 
available information (no exceedances in the past 60 years) is shown as a function of the 
mean rate of occurrence, 30, in Figure 6.4. Two alternative prior probability distributions 
for 30 are shown in Figure 6.5: a uniform distribution for 30 from zero to infinity (a 
diffuse prior) and a uniform distribution for log (30) from zero to infinity. Figure 6.6 
shows the significance of the prior probability distribution in the updated or posterior 
probability distribution; two very different decisions might result from one versus the 





Figure 6.4. Likelihood function for mean occurrence rate of maximum wave height 
exceeding 30 m given no occurrences in 60 years 
 
Figure 6.5. Alternative prior probability density functions for mean occurrence rate of 








































There is no theoretical, consistent and rational basis for either of the assumed 
prior probability distributions in Fig. 5 (e.g., Keynes 1921). Information theorists, such as 
Jaynes (1957), argue that the uniform distribution for 30 maximizes the entropy for this 
variable. However, that argument does not address why we would maximize the entropy 
of 30 versus log(30), since the mean occurrence rate varies over many orders of 
magnitude and the probability of no occurrences in an interval t is 𝑒−𝜈30𝑡. Bayesian 
decision analysts, such as Luce and Raiffa (1957), argue that there is always some 
information, so the starting point in Bayes’ theorem is a subjective prior probability 
distribution that implicitly contains some information. However, that argument does not 
address that our “information” is limited and may inadvertently neglect the Black Swan. 
Classical statisticians, such as Fisher (1935), argue that there is no defensible basis for a 
non-informative prior, that Bayes’ theorem is not of practical use, and that we can only 
establish the likelihood function and not the updated probability distribution for 30. 
However, that argument is not helpful because information about the probabilities for 





Figure 6.6. Alternative updated cumulative distribution functions for mean occurrence 
rate of maximum wave height exceeding 30 m given no occurrences in 60 years 
6.3 DECISION ENTROPY THEORY 
The objective of Decision Entropy Theory is to establish a prior sample space that 
is inclusive of all possibilities and reflects non-informative probabilities. 
 Set of all Possibilities 
An inclusive prior sample space, S, is obtained in Decision Entropy Theory by 
characterizing it with respect to a decision and the possible outcomes from that decision. 
In this way, the set of all possibilities is known a priori. For a decision problem with two 







































1) The decision can be right or it can be wrong. If decision alternative A1 is selected 
and compared to another alternative that could have been selected, A2, then there 
are two possibilities: either A1 is preferred to A2 (𝐴1  ≻  𝐴2) or A1 is not preferred 
to A2 (𝐴1  ≼  𝐴2). 
2) If a decision alternative is selected, a particular value of utility can be gained or 
lost in comparison to having selected another alternative. If A1 is selected and 
preferred to A2, then all possible positive values of utility difference between A1 
and A2, Δ𝑢1,2 where Δ𝑢1,2 > 0, characterize the set of possibilities in this subset 
of the sample space. Likewise, if A1 is selected and not preferred to A2, then all 
possible non-positive values of utility difference between A1 and A2, Δ𝑢1,2 where 
Δ𝑢1,2 ≤ 0, characterize the set of possibilities in this subset of the sample space. 
 Non-Informative Probabilities 
Non-informative probabilities for a decision comparing two alternatives, A1 and 
A2, are established in Decision Entropy Theory from two axioms that characterize the 
case of “no information:” 
1) The selected alternative is equally probable to be preferred or not compared to 
another alternative: 𝑃(𝐴1 ≻ 𝐴2) = 𝑃(𝐴𝑖 ≼ 𝐴𝑗) = 1 2⁄ . 
2) If the selected alternative is preferred to another alternative, the possible gains in 
utility are equally probable: 𝑃(Δ𝑢1,2|𝐴1  ≻  𝐴2) = 1 nΔ𝑢1,2|𝐴1≻𝐴2⁄ , where 




Likewise, if the selected alternative is not preferred to another alternative, the 
possible non-gains in utility are equally probable: 
𝑃(Δ𝑢1,2|𝐴1  ≼  𝐴2) = 1 nΔ𝑢1,2|𝐴1≼𝐴2⁄   where nΔ𝑢1,2|𝐴1≼𝐴2 are the number of 
possible values for Δ𝑢1,2 where Δ𝑢1,2 ≤ 0. 
These axioms maximize the entropy for the possible states of a decision, meaning 
that a lack of information is equivalent to an equal or uniform probability of realizing any 
possible decision outcome. 
 Implementation of Utility Theory  
Decision Entropy Theory establishes non-informative prior probabilities for 
differences in utility between possible decision alternatives, 𝑃(Δ𝑢1,2). The expected 
utility difference between the alternatives is calculated as follows: 
 




where nΔ𝑢1,2 = nΔ𝑢1,2|𝐴1≻𝐴𝑗2+nΔ𝑢1,2|𝐴1≼𝐴2. Following Utility Theory, the decision 
alternative that is preferred will have the largest expected utility difference [note that 
𝐸(Δ𝑢1,2) =  −𝐸(Δ𝑢2,1). For a decision with nA alternatives, preference is measured by 
the expected utility difference between each alternative and all other possible 
alternatives: 
 








where 𝐸(Δ𝑢i,i) =  0. The preferred Alternative i has the largest value of 
𝐸(Δ𝑢i,all j). 
6.4 RELIABILITY-BASED DESIGN EXAMPLE 
The current design basis for offshore platforms in the Gulf of Mexico is in 
question given the recent data from hurricanes (Figure 6.1). The maximum wave height 
used for design is designated hD. The platforms are designed with a factor of safety of 
1.5. Since the load is approximately proportional to the square of the wave height, the 
capacity of the platform corresponds to a wave height that is √1.5 times the design value. 
For simplicity, it will be assumed that failure will occur if the maximum wave height 
exceeds the ultimate design capacity, ℎ > √1.5ℎ𝐷, where √1.5ℎ𝐷 will be referred to as 
the ultimate design capacity wave height. The average annual cost for operating a 
platform, 𝐶(ℎ𝐷), is simplistically given by the following: 
 
𝐶(ℎ𝐷) = 𝐶𝐼(ℎ𝐷) + (1 − 𝑒
−𝜈𝐷)𝐶𝐹 (6-4) 
where 𝐶𝐼(ℎ𝐷) is the annualized implementation cost, 𝐶𝐹 is the cost if the 
maximum wave height exceeds the capacity, and 𝜈𝐷 is the annual rate that the wave 
height will exceed the ultimate design capacity, i.e., the annual rate for ℎ > √1.5ℎ𝐷. 
A decision tree for this problem is shown in Figure 6.7. The annualized 
implementation cost is assumed proportional to the design load or to the square of the 
design wave height, 𝐶𝐼(ℎ𝐷) ∝ ℎ𝐷
2 . The existing state of practice corresponds to a design 




cost of any alternative design capacity wave height can then be normalized by the 














The utility for each alternative ultimate design capacity wave height is set equal to 





Figure 6.7. Decision tree comparing alternatives for design wave heights 
 Non-Informative Sample Space for Wave Heights 
The non-informative sample space for wave heights, specifically the annual rate 
that the ultimate capacity wave height will be exceeded or 𝜈𝐷, will depend on the 
decision alternatives being compared. Consider a comparison between maintaining the 
existing practice, ℎ𝐷1 = ℎ𝐷∗ = 22 𝑚, versus increasing the design wave height to 26 m, 


















Figure 6.8. Difference in utility values for two alternative design wave heights, hD1 = 22 
m and hD2 = 26 m, versus the annual frequencies that the platform capacity is exceeded 
for each design wave height 
There are several important features in Figure 6.8. First, combinations where 𝜈𝐷2 
is greater than 𝜈𝐷1 are not possible since ℎ𝐷2 > ℎ𝐷1. Second, the combinations of 
(𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2) where the utility difference is greater than zero are combinations for which 
design wave height ℎ𝐷1 is preferred to ℎ𝐷2, while combinations of (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2) where the 
utility difference is less than or equal to zero are combinations for which  ℎ𝐷1 is not 
preferred to ℎ𝐷2. Third, the utility difference approaches asymptotic values at the corners: 






























Figure 6.9. Non-informative sample space for utility differences in decision between two 
alternative design wave heights, hD1 = 22 m and hD2 = 26 m 
The non-informative sample space for all possible combinations of (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2) is 
constructed following the axioms of Decision Entropy Theory such that the probability 
that an alternative will be preferred is equal (50 percent for each alternative) and the 
possible values for the utility differences are equally probable (Figure 6.9). The resulting 
sample space is shown in Figure 10. Due to the complexity of the relationship between 
utility difference and (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2), the non-informative prior probabilities were calculated 
by discretizing (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2) into small areas. This non-informative sample space reflects 
the joint utility function versus (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2) (Figure 6.8) in that there is a ridge dividing the 
combinations of (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2) where one alternative would be preferred over the other 
(Figure 6.10) and the slope of the prior is inversely proportional to the slope of the utility 





































there are plateaus in the utility difference versus (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2) (Figure 6.10). The non-
informative prior probability distribution is not uniform and it contains complex, high-
order relationships between 𝜈𝐷1 and 𝜈𝐷2. 
 
Figure 6.10. Non-informative sample space (prior probability distribution) for annual 
frequencies that the platform capacity is exceeded, (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2), in decision between two 
alternative design wave heights, hD1 = 22 m and hD2 = 26 m 
 Updated Sample Space with Historical Wave Height Data 
The likelihood function for combinations of (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2) is shown in Figure 6.11 
based on the 60-year long historical record (Figure 6.1). This likelihood function is 




a mean occurrence rate of 𝜈𝐷1 and 𝜈𝐷2, respectively, and that the events of exceeding ℎ𝐷2 
given that ℎ𝐷1 has been exceeded are independent: 
 
𝑃(𝑥1 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝐷1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥2 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝐷2 𝑖𝑛 60 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠)
≅ [
60!






𝑥2! (𝑥1 − 𝑥2)!
𝜈2
𝑥2(1 − 𝜈𝐷2)
𝑥1−𝑥2]        𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝐷1
< ℎ𝐷2 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜈𝐷2 ≤ 𝜈𝐷1 
(6-6) 
where this approximation is most reasonable for small values of 𝜈𝐷1 and 𝜈𝐷2, less 
than about 0.1 per year. 
 
Figure 6.11. Likelihood function for combinations of (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2) based on historical 





Figure 6.12. Updated sample space (posterior probability distribution) for annual 
frequencies that the platform capacity is exceeded, (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2), given historical data in 
decision between two alternative design wave heights, hD1 = 22 m and hD2 = 26 m. 
The updated sample space (posterior probability distribution) for all possible 
combinations of (𝜈𝐷1, 𝜈𝐷2) given the historical data, obtained through Bayes’ theorem, 
Eq. (6-1), is shown in Figure 6.12. This updated distribution reflects both the non-
informative prior sample space (Figure 6.10) as well as the historical data (Figure 6.11). 
The ridge in the prior probability distribution dividing the regions where one alternative 
is preferred over the other is still clearly visible in the posterior probability distribution 
(Figure 6.12). In addition, the posterior probability distribution emphasizes the 
possibilities where the rate of exceedance for the conventional design, 𝜈𝐷1, is similar to 




and possibilities where 𝜈𝐷1 is substantially larger than 𝜈𝐷2 (in which case the alternative 
design is preferred).  
For the updated sample space (Figure 6.12), the expected utility difference 
between hD1 = 22 m and hD2 = 26 m is +0.05, indicating that the ultimate design capacity 
wave height of 22 m is preferred compared to the ultimate design capacity wave height of 




 Results of Decision Analysis for Design Wave Height 
The expected utility differences between the standard of practice, hD1 = 22 m, and 
a variety of alternatives for hD2 are shown for different normalized failure costs in Figure 
6.13. Note that each possible combination of a failure cost and an alternative design wave 
height corresponds to a different prior sample space for of 𝜈𝐷1 and 𝜈𝐷2 (e.g., Figure 6.10 
shows it for 
𝐶𝐹
𝐶𝐼(ℎ𝐷∗)
= 20 and hD2=26 m). When the expected utility difference between 
the standard of practice and an alternative design is positive, the standard of practice is 
preferred; when the expected utility difference is negative, the alternative is preferred. 
The shapes of the curves for expected utility difference versus the alternative design 
wave height reflect the effect of the historical data; the numbers of historical events 
where different design ultimate capacity wave heights have been exceeded, , ℎ >





Figure 6.13. Expected utility difference for standard of practice (hD1 = 22 m) compared to 
a range of alternative values for the ultimate design capacity wave height, hD2. 
For a small failure cost, 
𝐶𝐹
𝐶𝐼(ℎ𝐷∗)
= 0.01, the alternative with the lower 
implementation cost is always preferred because the expected cost of failure is negligible 
for all alternatives (i.e., the expected utility difference is negative for ℎ𝐷2 < ℎ𝐷1 and 
positive for ℎ𝐷2 > ℎ𝐷1 in  Figure 6.13). For the larger costs of failure, 
𝐶𝐹
𝐶𝐼(ℎ𝐷∗)
= 20 and 
𝐶𝐹
𝐶𝐼(ℎ𝐷∗)
= 40, the standard of practice is preferred to alternatives with lower design wave 
heights from 20 to 22 m, while the alternative design wave heights greater than the 
standard are preferred up to a point (Figure 6.13) due to the contribution of the risk of 
failure to the expected utility. However, as the alternative design wave height continues 




practice is preferred to the alternative due to the increasing cost of implementation for 
higher design wave heights. This threshold corresponds to an alternative design wave 
height of about 25 m for 
𝐶𝐹
𝐶𝐼(ℎ𝐷∗)






Figure 6.14. Comparison of results from Decision Entropy theory with those from a 
statistical extrapolation of the historical data. 
The results from Decision Entropy Theory are compared in Figure 6.14 with those 
from a statistical extrapolation of the historical data (i.e., estimating 𝜈𝐷 as a function of 
√1.5ℎ𝐷 from the trend-line in Figure 6.1). The two approaches give significantly 
different results for this cost ratio, 
𝐶𝐹
𝐶𝐼(ℎ𝐷∗)
= 20. Decision Entropy Theory leads to using a 




preferred for 22 𝑚 < ℎ𝐷2 < 25 𝑚), while a statistical extrapolation of the data leads to 
the opposite conclusion (Figure 6.14). Therefore, in this particular example, the 
establishment of a non-informative prior probability distribution for the mean occurrence 
rates of wave heights using Decision Entropy Theory puts greater emphasis on the 
possibility of large waves (e.g., see Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.12) that have not (yet) 
occurred in the historical record and results in a more conservative design decision. Note 
that the two approaches will ultimately lead the same result when an infinite amount of 
data is available to estimate wave height frequencies. 
In order to identify the optimal value for the ultimate design capacity wave height, 
all of the various alternatives (including and excluding the standard of practice) are 
compared in a pair-wise fashion, see Eq. (6-3). The results for this design example 
indicate that for large costs of failure, 
𝐶𝐹
𝐶𝐼(ℎ𝐷∗)
 greater than about 50, the preferred value for 
the ultimate design wave height is just above 24 m or about 2 m greater than the standard 
of practice. The significance of 24 m is that it corresponds to an ultimate capacity wave 
height of √1.5(24 𝑚) = 29.5 𝑚, which is the largest event that has occurred in the 
historical record (see Figure 6.1). This result highlights the importance of an adaptable 
design approach in the face of extreme uncertainty. The preferred design wave height is 
sensitive to the historical data because it is governed by the largest observed wave height, 
meaning that the preferred design wave height will change with time and should not be 
considered as a static value in design codes. In addition, existing structures designed 
using lower wave heights may need to be upgraded over their design lives to increase 





Decision Entropy Theory is proposed here as a logical and defensible means to 
address extreme uncertainty, the possibility of events that are beyond the range of 
experience. The proposed theory provides a basis to establish a non-informative prior 
sample space for uncertain variables in a decision. In the non-informative prior sample 
space, there is an equal probability of being right or wrong in making a decision, and 
there is an equal probability of realizing the range of possible losses or gains from that 
decision. This non-informative sample space is then updated with any available 
information through Bayes’ theorem. 
An illustrative example for selecting the appropriate design wave height for 
offshore structures highlights the following points: 
• The prior sample space depends on the decision, meaning that the importance of 
extreme uncertainty depends on its consequences to the decision and the 
availability of feasible decision alternatives to compensate for these 
consequences. 
• The prior sample space emphasizes the possibilities that distinguish two 
alternatives from one another, such as differences in the mean occurrence rates for 
the wave heights that will cause failure for different design alternatives. 
• The prior sample space can affect a design decision, even when substantive data 
are available to inform (update) this sample space. In this example, a statistical 




conservative decision than is obtained by incorporating these data within the 
context provided by Decision Entropy Theory. 
• Adaptability is a key principle in achieving reliability in the face of extreme 
uncertainty. This example demonstrates that the optimal value for the design wave 
height can be sensitive to the available data, meaning that design codes and design 







 Conclusions and Suggestions 
 
After presenting the conclusions from the work, a set of suggestions are being 
offered to further develop the investigated topics in the future. 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS  
The following summarizes the outcomes of the study in relation to the intended 
objectives of the investigation, as described in the introduction to the dissertation. 
 Philosophical Foundations of Probability 
The first objective of the study was to establish the philosophical grounds for the 
probabilistic computational theory under development, and to provide the theory with 
clear and precise conceptual foundations. The importance of conceptual foundations is 
due to the irreconcilable divergences among opposing assessment methods, who all use 
measures termed as probability, but in different senses. Clarifying the sense of probability 
in a procedure not only makes the method more meaningful to its users, but more relevant 
and beneficial to theoreticians of other procedures, who may then see the method as 
plausible and incorporate the procedure and/or its technical innovations in their own 
developments. 
The review and the evaluation of the existing philosophical positions regarding 
probability revealed that while philosophers have been able to develop a number of 
senses for the term probability, they have not succeeded in presenting a comprehensive 




probabilistic methods without compromising consistency and meaningfulness. Since 
various probability interpretations, including classic, frequency, propensity, logical, and 
subjective, have remained unconnected, many users who apply procedures developed by 
various schools of thought, usually do so in an instrumentalist approach and without 
considerations for the consistency of the senses implicit in those methods. 
To present a comprehensive sense for the concept of probability, I embarked in a 
philosophical inquiry aimed at finding a more fundamental concept that can connect the 
diverging senses. While the sought-for concept may not yield a univocal definition of 
probability, it may clarify the commonalities and the differences among various senses in 
its own terms. As a result of the inquiry, I came to find “process” as the most 
fundamental concept, which can play the desired role of conceptual integration by seeing 
the senses of probability from a process-centered perspective.  
I divided probability senses into three types of propensity, possibility, and 
credibility, and gave a process-centered definition for each type. While propensity and 
possibility values make empirically-refutable assertions about certain natures of a 
process, as observed or postulated to be so, credibility values are (means for) assessment 
of the first two, and result from a humanly devised inductive process, established to 
reflect our lack of knowledge. I distinguished Bayesian priors as prime examples of 
credibilities. 
As the focus of the probabilistic computational theory under development is 
Bayesian priors, I directed the investigation toward the nature and the character of 




and non-perceivable, I concluded that no subjective credibility assignment can be refuted 
by empirical observations. Nevertheless, I warned that credibilities assigned by a subject 
might not be acceptable to others and if the aim of the induction is to provide with 
admissible assessments, the subject must use an agreed-upon assessment process 
including approved credibilities. 
 Philosophical Foundations of Objective Mathematical Assessment of Actions 
While the study was not originally aimed at developing a general epistemological 
theory that elaborates on the subjects of human understanding, along the natural 
progression of my inquiry, I came to the conclusion that it is very difficult to establish 
clear and precise philosophical foundations for probability without addressing a suite of 
concepts more fundamental to human understanding. To explain the philosophers’ failure 
to clarify the concept of probability, attested by declarations such as Bertrand Russell’s 
“Probability is the most important concept in modern science, especially as nobody has 
the slightest notion what it means,” I entertained the possibility that the failure might be 
due to the absence of a more general philosophical theory. If philosophers could see the 
subjects of human knowledge from a different perspective, they could also see specific 
concepts such is probability differently. 
My efforts to develop a new epistemological perspective was centered around the 
concept of process, which I had found to be of immense explanatory power but not much 
of recognition among philosophers. The explicative reliance on the process concept 




philosophy, and provided support for my hypothesis that process can be the central pillar 
of a philosophical perspective. Due to the role of the process, I labeled the perspective 
Philosophical processualism, and I aimed it at advancing the foundations of mathematics, 
as it is being applied to assist human cognition and action. To highlight the role of math 
in action, and to distinguish it from its general application to non-mathematical problems, 
I collectively labeled such uses as pragmatic mathematics, and I defined the collection as 
a system of linguistically manifested mental constructs aimed at guiding purposive 
actions with precision. 
By analyzing the fundamental contents of human mind, percepts and concepts, 
through the lenses of processes, I came to oppose the common Platonist position in 
cognition and in the philosophy of mathematics, which takes concepts in general, and 
mathematical concepts in specific, to be abstract non-spaciotemporal entities that are 
directly accessible to human minds in an objective and absolute manner. I proposed that a 
process-centered ontology of concepts puts them inside the mind and sees their formation 
only attainable through earthly spaciotemporal processes. 
I developed a processual answer toward the metaphysical problem of universals, 
as I see it central to both science and mathematics, where science aims at finding 
relationships among universal entities (in either categories of objects and properties), and 
math aims at describing the presumed relationships in terms of imaginary mental entities. 
I explained the relationship between the instances of a universal, by introducing the 
concept of processual code, as the container of information on the specifics of objects 




exemplification of the universal phenomena. I also declared that ignoring the process 
underlying a universal and taking instances as mere observations results in a nominalist 
account, where the universal is just a name to a set. I attributed the nominalist denial of 
universals on their exclusive reliance on experiencing-organizing mind rather than 
questioning-hypothesizing mind. By highlighting the role of the mind in recognition of 
universals, I extended the concept of the code to percepts and saw them as outcomes of a 
joint two-world process, one outside the mind in the world and the other inside the mind. 
The processual perspective on percepts turned out to be in opposition of both Aristotelian 
realists, who believe that types are out there in the world independent of our minds, and 
conceptualists, who believed that universals do not exist outside of the perceiving mind. 
Since the processual ontology of concepts, including the mathematical ones, takes 
them to be spaciotemporal, it cannot take conceptual objectivity as default and has to 
elaborate if and when the objectivity is present. To specify the conditions, I developed the 
processual perspective toward the manifestation of concepts, especially through linguistic 
descriptions. On the platform of manifestation, I offered a communal verification-based 
account of conceptual objectivity, in which a conceived entity by members of a 
community is considered to be objective, if the subjects consistently deliver similar 
manifestations of the concept in any number of agreed-upon verification processes. 
Last but not least, I presented a processual account of a few fundamental 
mathematical concepts including numbers, sets, and infinity, and also presented and 
discussed the hypothesis that mathematical entities are grounded in both human percepts 




probability as applied to processes, I declared the extensional definition, as the collection 
of its tokens, imprecise. Since the infinite set containing yet-to-be-generated tokens lacks 
accessibility due to the inclusion of entities without spaciotemporal specification, I 
suggested that tie define an infinite set to the processual code that can generate its tokens.    
 Principles for Objective Assessment of Unknown Probabilities 
Another objective for the research was to define the philosophical and logical 
foundations within which, the characters “objective, transparent, and defensible” can be 
clarified or even defined for Bayesian priors. Based on the results of the inquiry 
presented in 7.1.1, I classified Bayesian probabilities as credibilties; a set of imaginary 
values assigned by the evaluating subject as a means of coming up with an assessment of 
the unknown outcome of a process. Due to imaginary nature of Bayesian priors, I 
declared that subjects can assign any set of self-consistent values as priors without being 
refuted by experiments. Nevertheless, feasibility does not bring legitimacy, and when the 
subject’s goal from assessing the uncertainty is to deliver evaluations that are admissible 
to others, he must use an agreed-upon assessment process using authorized credibility 
values. 
The concept of objectivity for imaginary entities were investigated in 7.1.2, and 
resulted in a general definition, where objectivity is tied to the verifiability of the entity’s 
manifestation in accordance with a set of established processes. So, objectivity can be 
considered to be transparency plus community acceptance. In mathematical terms, 




assignment process. Simply put, an objective set of credibility values is the one assigned 
with a perceptually transparent formulation.  
Defensibility is another characteristic that along with transparency, can assist an 
imaginary entity to be considered objective by a community. While transparency is a 
necessary condition for the objectivity of an imaginary entity, it is not sufficient and must 
be accompanied with community acceptance. Although any agreed-upon communal rule 
does have a contractual nature, which is independent of the justifications supporting it, 
the presence of justification is a crucial factor in making the procedure defensible, if the 
community is deciding to adopt any of proposed process as the rule. 
I proposed a set of theoretical principles to evaluate the defensibility of an 
inductive system. While the assertions are presented as principles and are accepted 
without relying on other assertions, they are consistent with a presumably common 
reasoning system among humans, which way may come to label as intuitive logic. The 
seven principles are named as (I) Evaluative Orientation, (II) Investigative Prioritization, 
(III) Explicative Sufficiency, (IV) Evaluative Inclusion, (V) Credibility Conception, (VI) 
Artifact-Reality Division, and (VII) Unbiased Evaluation. 
 Theoretical Decision-Based Assignment of Bayesian Probabilities 
Decision Entropy Theory (DET) is being offered as a computational machinery 
aimed at assessing unknown aspects of a process in the light of the available information, 
where sought-for aspects depend on the processual parameters; (structural) values 




and/or the (deterministic) input-output relation. The theory is intended to be objective and 
defensible in the sense described in 7.1.2 and 7.1.3, meaning that (a) its assessment 
procedures are transparent and imitable and (b) the constraints specifying the process are 
set in compliance with a set of intuitively logical guiding principles.  
The theory assigns non-informative Bayesian priors to sets of possibilities, 
representing the aspects of the process that are unknown to us. The priors are assigned to 
possibilities by considering a hierarchy of variables and such that prior credibilities 
minimally inform the variables, whose exact values are the subjects of the inductive 
inquiry. The adopted measure for the information contained in a distribution is Shannon’s 
entropy, where the minimally informative distribution is the one with the maximum 
entropy. In the simplest case of the hierarchy composed of a single variable, whose only 
constraint is its boundaries, the uniform distribution is the one with the maximum 
entropy. 
The following principles specify the hierarchy of variables, as the targets of the 
inquiry, and elaborate the distributions that are minimally informative:   
1. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, 
then a selected alternative is equally probable to be or not to be the preferred alternative. 
2. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, 
then the possible differences in preference between a selected alternative and the 




3. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, 
then the possibilities of learning with new information about the selected alternative 
compared to the preferred alternative are equally probable. 
 Implications for the Application of the Theory to Practical Problems 
Another objective for the research was to identify the practical consequences of 
applying the theory of Decision Entropy. To do so, the following two examples from 
engineering practice were being worked out:  
(a) selecting the appropriate design wave height for offshore structures, and  
(b) assessing the value of test wells before committing to developing a 
hydrocarbon resource play.  
Application of DET to example problems highlighted that the theory results in a 
rational design, as it prioritizes answering to the questions that matter more to the 
engineering design. Since the main goal of the design is to find the specifics of the 
engineering system that can provide the intended service with the minimum life-cycle 
cost under the to-be-encountered environmental conditions, systemic variables are the 
most important ones, followed by cost variables, and eventually the environmental 
variables. By considering design objectives, DET prioritizes learning about the systemic 
variables over the cost variables over the environmental variables, and tries to inform the 
systemic variables the least, and then the cost variables, and the last the environmental 




starts with a biased design recommendation due to prioritizing the environmental 
conditions that matter least to the design. 
The example applications also illustrated the adaptability of credibility-based 
inductive methods and the justifiability of DET, in accounting for the situations, in which 
the available information is not only partial, but also dubious. For example, when the 
information is gathered from the analogous processes who share some features with the 
target process, but also have some irreconcilable differences, the assessment procedure 
must determine whether and how to consider the data from analogs. While Credibility-
based procedures are able to incorporate the dubious date into the assessment by 
assigning a degree of credence, they face the obstacle of defending their assigned value, 
as credibilities are imaginary by nature and cannot be justified on empirical ground. 
Nonetheless, DET can both assign a degree of credence, as well as defending its 
assignment based on principles grounded in intuitive logic.  
 Evaluation of the Compliance of the Decision-Based Theory with Established 
Principles 
The final objective of the research was to evaluate whether the assessments of 
DET can be characterized as objective, transparent, and defensible. The comparison 
between the three principles of DET, stated in 7.1.3, with the seven general principles, 
stated in 7.1.4, reveals that DET is in compliance with the more fundamental principles 
for objective assessment of probabilities. Thus, we can conclude that DET leads to 




The details of the compliance are as follows: (I) DET satisfies “Evaluative 
Orientation,” as it takes inductive analysis to be a goal-oriented act and directs the 
assessment toward answering a set of target questions. (II) DET performs “Investigative 
Prioritization,” as it prioritized the questions according to their importance to the 
investigation. (III) DET is Explicatively Sufficient, as it designates a number of distinct 
processual explanations, such that each provide definitive answers to the target questions. 
(IV) DET is evaluatively inclusive, as it allows the formation of a hybrid and inclusive 
explanation by considering and combining collection of explanations. (V) DET is based 
on credibility conception, as it uses credibility values to form an inclusive assessment, 
and to differentiates various explanations with a degree of plausibility relative to other 
explanations. (VI) DET divides artifacts from reality, as its assigned credibilities 
explicitly account for (1) what we know, observations, and (2) what we arbitrarily devise 
to reason beyond what we know, explanation/ hypothesis, such that the contribution of 
(1) and (2) in the collective assessment is tractable. (VII) Finally, DET provides with 
unbiased evaluations, as its assigned credibility values are not such that the inclusive 
assessment favors any of the possible answers to the target questions, before 
incorporation of observations. 
7.2 SUGGESTIONS 
The following suggestions are being offered to advance the developments 




 Developing Objective Methods to Incorporate Subjective Experts’ Opinion   
An objective method, in the sense described in the dissertation, can be developed 
to capture the subjective opinion of experts regarding the variability of the outcome of a 
process, within the framework of the Bayesian approach. Since we have already reserved 
one of the two components of the framework, namely Bayesian priors, to account for our 
ignorance regarding the hierarchy of variables we intend to assess, we must use the 
remaining component, namely the likelihood function, to capture all kinds of information 
including opinions expressed by experts. While the information obtained from empirical 
observations can be represented by means of standard frequency functions, no standard 
method currently exists for reflecting experts’ opinion in likelihood function. The 
challenge will be to develop norms to grant precision to subjective opinions, which by 
nature are vague and imprecise.     
 Illustrating Probability Interpretations by Examples 
The proposed collective sufficiency of the three interpretations of probability, 
namely possibility, propensity, and credibility can be illustrated through a number of 
examples. The exemplary works not only demonstrates the practicality of the developed 
theoretical methods in accounting for all available knowledge in every possible format, 
but also the sufficiency of the offered set of interpretations in making sense of the 
quantities incoming to and outcoming from the assessment process. In addition, examples 




fact that all numeric measures of uncertainty can be interpreted based on the highlighted 
types. 
 Reevaluating the Multi-alternative Decisions using Information Potential 
Since Decision Entropy Theory has evolved since the time the examples in the 
dissertation has been worked out, especially in regards to analyzing multiple alternative 
decisions and assessing the value of information, it is desirable to evaluate whether the 
theoretical evolutions do influence the results of the analyses. In specific, it is 
recommended that the assessments presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of the dissertation, 
which are based on the concept of the utility difference and the method of integrating 
pairwise assessments, reworked based on the new concept of information potential and 
the method of reference alternative. 
 Evaluating the Conditions for Increasing the Community Acceptance of DET 
It is recommended to find out the conditions under which the theory of decision 
entropy may gain communitywide acceptance. A reason for the latency of the acceptance 
conditions is the fundamental nature of DET, which places it beyond the territory of 
applied statistics and at the core of every discipline where consequential risky decisions 
ought to be made based on limited data. In other words, since there is no established 
community for the kind of discourse Decision Entropy Theory presents, a strategy must 






APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Definition of a term provides a description elaborating the meaning, nature, and scope for 
the word/phrase in a formal fashion. Since the use of technical terms are inevitable in any 
theoretical development, providing with a glossary of relevant terms immensely facilitates the 
communication of arguments and results. Below, are a number of fundamental definitions that I 
believe are essential to the developments in this dissertation. 
The importance of definitions to philosophy is such that some philosophers believe that the 
core of a subjects ought to be found in its definitions (Baggini and Fossi, 2010). Historically, many 
significant philosophical questions in the form of “what is concept x?” were posed due to the lack 
of a clear definition and it has been the quest to find answers to such questions that eventually has 
resulted in providing a definition for that concept. Such processes imply that a definition for a 
(core) concept of a subject matter can only be written after (a full) investigation of the subject, 
when the investigator has reached the level of mastery. 
The glossary is arranged in two section. While the first section gives definitions of various 
terms, independent of their pertinent topics, the second section provide definitions of terms given 





2. NON-CATEGORIZED DEFINITIONS 
Action: is a physical process, triggered and/or sustained by an agent. 
Action, (Purposeful) Human: is a planned/thoughtful action taken by man in order to 
achieve a certain outcome. 
Actor/Agent, Purposeful: is an agent, who initiates some physical processes in order for 
agent’s desired objects/states to be realized. 
Algebraic Process: an arithmetic process, where some of the numbers involved are 
variables, representing specific numerical sets. The numerical outcome of an algebraic process can 
itself be represented by a variable as, each combination of the values for numerical variables in the 
algebraic process yield a different outcome. 
Algebraic Parameter: a numerical component of an algebraic process that is 
fixed/constant; in contrast to a variable, which can be any of the members of a specific numerical 
set. 
Algebraic Expression/Form: a visual representation of an algebraic process composed of 
different symbols as visual representations of variables, parameters, and numerical operations. 
Algebraic Function: another term for an algebraic process or its outcome. 
The set of numerical values, which involving (input) variables of the process can take their 
values from, are called the “domain” of the function of the set of output values are called the 
“range.” 
Asset: is a resource owned/possessed by an agent. The most immediate asset of a biological 




Characteristic/Specification: is a distinguished trait, quality, or property of an object. The 
reliance of the given definition on synonyms coveys that the term is a primitive notion; i.e. humans, 
given their innate abilities, are able to distinguish certain aspects/features of worldly objects 
around them and are able to make distinction between different features. For example, humans can 
recognize color, as a visual feature of objects. 
(Characteristic) Value: is the condition/state/level/magnitude/amount a characteristic 
may take. Variation of a characteristic can be described by the change in its value. 
Characteristic, Erratic (Final): is an unpredictable (final) attribute of the outcome of a 
process. While some (final) aspects of a process may be erratic, others could be predictable. 
Characteristic, Random (Final): is a (set of final) attribute(s) of an outcome whose state 
is unpredictable in run by run operations of the process, but (collectively) predictable in the long 
run. 
Choice (in a Uncertain Choice) , Right: is the act/process that the agent would choose, if 
it had access to a perfectly informative program. 
Classification: is the act of fragmenting/partitioning/organizing/subdividing/classifying a 
population into a number of fragments/partitions/groups/divisions/classes, based on the value of a 
characteristics/specification. Classification can be done based on either qualitative or quantitative 
measures. 
The roughest/coarsest/crudest classification/distinction can be made in a binary/ 
dichotomous fashion by evaluating whether objects possess or lack thereof a characteristics. If no 





The act of classification, is an organizer mind’s effort to systematically capture and make 
sense of the variation (of the characteristics) inherent in the population. 
Classification, Joint: is the act of classifying a population based on more than one 
characteristics/specification. A joint class represents the fraction of the population that jointly 
possess certain/specific degrees of each of the polarizing characteristics. 
Class size: is the number of members belonging to that class. 
Class Size, Relative: is the ratio/quotient of the number of members belonging to that class 
to the population size. 
Counting: is the process of assigning a number to a set of distinct objects as the set’s size 
by establishing a one-to-one correspondence between each member (of the set) and the number 
“one,” the unit for counting, and then using the arithmetic operation of addition to calculate the 
sum (of units). 
Device/Means/Tool: is a (material) agent, with the ability to make/prevent changes in its 
surrounding world/environment. A device needs to types of ability, serviceability and 
survivability. 
Distribution, Propensity/ Relative Frequency: for a random (set of) attribute(s) of a 
process, is a function informing the rate at which each possible (set of) state(s) is being adopted if 
the process is being run many times.  
Event/outcome: is the result of a physical process in a system, characterized by the set of 




Function, Deterministic: is a relation between a set of input (algebraic) variables and a 
set of output (algebraic) variables, in which each (possible) input value(s) is associated with only 
one (of the possible) output value(s). 
Function, Expression of: is the algebraic form/formula for the function, where input 
variables and parameters are combined through mathematical operations. 
Function, Argument: is any of the input variables for the function. 
Function, Parameter: is any of non-variable quantities present in the (algebraic) 
expression of a function. 
Hypothesis: is a proposed, i.e. yet to be accepted, explanation for a phenomenon. 
Hypothesis, Quantitative: is a plausible/likely value (number) for a (physical) quantity or 
a (mathematical) function for a quantitative regularity/ structure. 
Hypothesis, Statistical: is a plausible/likely value (number) for a relative frequency or a 
(mathematical) function for a quantitative regularity/ structure. 
A statistical hypothesis is one of the possible probability distribution functions, 
characterized by its functional family and a set of values for the parameters of the functional form, 
which informs the probabilities (either relative frequencies or degrees of plausibility/ credibility) 
for each possibility in the space of possibilities (either a sample space or a hypothesis space).  
The relative frequency of event informed by a (statistical) hypothesis is also called the 





Indexing: is the act of classification without consideration of any specific 
characteristic/specification. The purpose of indexing is differentiation among various members of 
a population. 
Informative Program (regarding an Uncertain Process), A Perfectly/Completely: is a 
program providing with the information that enables (a previously ignorant) agent to (positively) 
predict the (future) outcome of every run of an uncertain process.  
An informative program itself is an uncertain process, as the agent does not know the 
outcome foreseen by the program until he/she runs the informative procedure for each run of the 
(original) physical process, he/she was uncertain about. The same credibility values assigned by 
the agent to the outcomes of the (original) physical process extends to the outcomes of 
corresponding perfectly informative process. 
Informative Program (regarding an Uncertain Choice), A Perfectly/Completely: is a 
program providing with the information that enables (a previously ignorant) agent to (positively) 
predict (a) the “right choice,” as well as (b) the (future) outcome of every run of each of the 
uncertain processes, if that process is being taken.  
Interaction: between two objects is their mutual effects on certain physical states of the 
objects. 
Language: is a means of creating and communicating information composed of a 
collection of symbols and a set of rules/ structures that can be used to connect symbols and to 
create complex constructs. Linguistic descriptions can be communicated by physical means, 
including visual signs, sound waves and electrical signals. Spoken and written languages as well 




Among other functions, a language can be used to create constructs in order to represent 
certain objects/states of the world and their connections. Linguistic representations/ descriptions 
may vary in terms of their preciseness/perfection. The assertion that a specific (linguistic) 
description precisely/ perfectly represents the real-world is a postulation, whose validity relies on 
the premise that the objects/states of the world and their changes follow the (arbitrary) forms and 
the rules of that language. The premise implies that the God/nature has been creating/changing the 
(preceding) objects/states of the world according to the (arbitrary) rules of that language, which 
have organically evolved and developed later in the minds of humans. 
Load/Demand: an abstract concept as a representation of what is imposed on a device by 
external environment, due to device’s existence and service, as well as its interaction with the 
environment. 
Machine: is a complex object, composed of multiple components, with the ability to sense 
and/or to change some physical states of the world. 
Machine, Biological: is a machine, whose components are living organisms. Humans are 
examples of advanced biological machines. 
Machine/Observer, Sensing: is a machine with the ability to sense/observe and 
differentiate some physical states of physical systems. 
Machine, Preferring: is a sensing machine that prefers some states of the world to the 
others, if given the option. 
Machine/Agent, Acting: is a machine with the ability to trigger/initiate a physical process 




Mathematics: is a collection of branches of knowledge, each studying a specific group of 
(abstract/mental) mathematical objects/constructs and the structures/patterns relating them.  
For example, arithmetic studies mathematical objects termed numbers and the operations 
for their manipulation, or algebra studies unknown (numerical) quantities, represented by symbols, 
the relationships between these quantities, and the rules for manipulating them. 
The most essential tool for development of mathematical knowledge is logical reasoning, 
in which conclusions (end points/results) can be drawn from premises (starting points) in a ruled-
governed (mental) process. 
Measurement: is the process in which a number is being assigned to the level of a certain 
characteristic of an object by comparing it with the unit level at a designated reference object. 
Measurement unit: for a certain characteristic, of continuous nature, is the level of the 
characteristic in a reference object. 
Model: is an entity in representation relation with another entity, i.e. either representing or 
represented by the other, where the relation is being established due to perceivable similarities, 
possibly created by partial imitation, or due to conceivable meanings, possibly created by 
symbolization or signification.  
An entity can be purposefully used as a model by (1) finding an existing or creating a new 
entity with some similarities with another entity, or/and by (2) attributing a meaning to an entity 
in relation to another entity. In (1), what differentiates the representation from the represented 
(composite) object is the specifics of the set of objects, their properties, and the “pattern of 
relations” between the attributes of the (parts of the composite) object; namely the different  




A model is an (system of/compound) object of certain attributes and relations, either 
internally and/or externally, with the potential to be partially copied/imitated in “forming” another 
object of similar attributes and relations; a replica. The specifics of to-be-copied attributes and the 
relations of a model system of objects, may be called the “pattern” of the system; thus, a model 
can be characterized based on its distinct pattern. Due to the similarity of patterns between a model 
and a replica, the latter me be seen as a representation of the former, at least in terms of the copied 
attributes. For an object perceivable to humans, an example feature is the visual look and an 
example internal relation is the dimensional proportions of various parts of the object. 
A model is an example embodiment of the kind of objects a certain processual code can 
generate; i.e. is a token of a type.  The code of the modeling process determines the specifics of 
the attributes and the relations to be imitated. An example code for a natural modeling process is 
the genetic code used by biological agents in reproduction, and an example (partial) code for a 
purposive modeling process by humans is the blueprint used in construction of an artefact. Within 
the philosophical framework of universals and/or types, a model can provide a concrete 
replacement for the abstract notion of the pertaining universal or type, where all instances or tokens 
can be seen as copies of a model instance or token. In other words, the concept of model grounds 
the concept of universal or type. In regard to the concept of representation, a model can be seen as 
a representation of either the processual/typical code and/or all the tokens the code can generate. 
What distinguishes a model from another are the same things distinguishing a system of 
objects from another, namely the member objects and their individual attributes, as well as the 
systemic relations between them. Models whose systemic specifics are close, can be conceived to 
form a “model family,” where common (systemic) attributes characterize the family and the 




proposition that a system “follows” a certain model means that we take the specifics of the system 
to be identical to those of the model system, the proposition that a system “follows” a model family 
means that we take a certain subset of the specifics of the system to be identical to common 
attributes of the system. By associating a system to a model or a model family, we take the system 
to be a complete copy of the model, or a partial copy of the members of the model family. 
Model, cognitive: is a subject’s mental representation of an entity that was originally 
outside one’s mind. All understandings of things are formed by relying on cognitive models and 
to some degrees are representations of entities from outside one’s mind. 
While a model is imitable, itself could be a representation of or modeled/imitated from 
another entity. This is specially the case for a mental understanding, as it is being formed (in the 
mind) to cognize an outside entity; thus, a (mental) representation of the entity, but can also be 
used as a model for understanding another outside entities, where the features of the mental 
understanding are being projected onto the other outside entity. In other words, a mental 
representation of an object is also a model to see other objects in its lights. If we denote the 
original/first outside entity as O1, the mental understanding as M, and any other outside entity as 
OX, the directional relation between the three can be denoted by O1 → M → OX, where M is 
modeled from and a (mental) representation of O1 , as well as a (cognitive) model for OX. In this 
sense, a mental construct being a model, can be attributed to either of the two representation 
processes it participates in, the one where the construct represents an outside entity or the other 
where another outside entity is seen alike the (previously formed) mental representation. 
Model, perceptual: is a mental entity, partially constructed from sensory input, whose 
specifics determine the way in which mind cognizes a certain object. Putting it differently, a 




upon receiving the same sensory stimuli. For example, the color red is the perceptual model human 
minds forms based on sensory signals from lights with the wavelength between 620 and 750 
nanometers and the frequency between 400 and 484 THz.  
The reason for naming an output of perceptual construction processes as a “model” is that 
(a) the features of the output are the essence what we understand as a “form,” i.e. a cognizable 
object of certain attributes and relations and (2) upon receiving sensory inputs of the same 
character at different times, the mind consistently generates mental output of the same character, 
as if the mind uses a token output as a prototype/model to imitate from and to “form” similar 
output.  
Model, conceptual: is a mental entity, formed by relating specific attributes of a number 
of conceived objects, which provides a kind of way for seeing similar conceptual instances; i.e. a 
model for understanding.  
While examples of conceptual models are omnipresent, an example from physical science 
is Newton’s model for the gravitation of heavenly bodies, which associates the specifics of bodies’ 
movements with a number of (inherent) attributes of the bodies, in a certain way.  A conceptual 
model can also be taken as a man-made idealization/simplification of a real-world 
object/phenomenon constructed in order to imitate/ simulate/ demonstrate/ describe/ explain/ 
elaborate/ predict certain aspects/ characteristics of the reality. 
Model, Mathematical: is a mental/ cognitive/ intellectual model, where certain aspects of 




Model, Quantitative: is a mathematical model, where certain aspects of an object/ 
phenomenon (or its behavior) are represented by interrelated quantities (that are in a state of 
equilibrium). 
Motivation: factors that internally, inside biological agent’s mind, arouse and direct 
agent’s action to preserve/change certain (external) states/objects of the world.  
The ultimate motivation of a biological agent can be synthetized as the “satisfaction of its 
needs.” Very complex (sustained) needs, such as a constant need to achievement or the (extreme) 
need to control one’s living environment, may be inferred from behavior exhibited from some 
humans. Success in meeting a need, might internally, inside biological agent’s brain, result in a 
state of pleasure/comfort or failure to do so in a state of pain/discomfort. 
Number: is a mathematical object, an abstract construct, developed (by humans) as a 
(mental) representation of a characteristic of a collection/ set of (physically) existing or imaginary 
objects/ states. When used regarding the physical world, numbers are the essential component for 
quantification processes, e.g. by counting, measuring, or calculating. Numbers can also be used as 
labels, which facilitates organizing processes such as sorting.    
Numbers were originally developed to represent the size/ magnitude of a set of discrete/ 
distinct objects (natural numbers). The concept was later extended to establish a representation, 
where units could be partitioned into smaller fractions (rational numbers). Further extensions 
resulted in development of new categories of numbers such as negative, irrational, and complex 
numbers. 
Number is a fundamental mathematical object, invented as a means for precisely 




The first (type of) numbers created (by humans) were “natural numbers,” as (mental) 
representations of the size of the sets of discrete objects obtained by the (simple) act of counting. 
In other words, there has been close relationship between the development of natural numbers and 
the basic arithmetic operation of addition. Later, the concept of number were (mentally) expanded 
to create more abstract types of numbers, such as integers, rational numbers, real numbers, and 
imaginary numbers. Some types of numbers are without a real-world analog/map and remain only 
as (abstract) objects (of the mind) suited for (mental) manipulations, according to (humanly) 
defined rules for manipulating such abstract entities. 
Numerical/Arithmetic Operation: any (mental) operation (on numbers), where a set of 
numbers interact, according to the rules of that operation, and yield a numerical result. Four basic 
arithmetic operations are addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. 
Numerical/Arithmetic Process: a process composed of a set of arithmetic operations, 
arranged in series and/or in parallel, which (eventually) results in a numerical output. 
(Numerical) Variable: a representative for every member of a heterogeneous set (of 
numbers).  
The term “variable” reflects the variation of the numerical character/value of members of 
a (heterogeneous) set of numbers. Oftentimes, a variable is visually represented by a symbol such 
as an alphabetic letter, e.g. x, y in English, ,  in Greek. 
Numeral: is a symbol invented to represent a number, as a mathematical object, in a non-
verbal mode of (human) communication, i.e. written/ pictorial. 
Observation: is the act of learning/receiving information regarding the pertaining class of 




Operation, Mathematical: is a basic/ core component of a mathematical process that takes 
a number of input mathematical objects, arguments, and delivers some output mathematical object. 
For example, the main mathematical processes in arithmetic are numerical calculations, which can 
use the basic (arithmetic) operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.  
Operation, Cartesian Production: is a mathematical operation that takes two sets and 
return a (product) set composed of all possible ordered pairs resulting from the association of each 
members of the first of two sets with every member of the second set. It is possible to extend the 
operation to take more than two input sets and return a n-fold/ n-dimensional product set. 
Physical Process: is a group of steps/ tasks/ stages, triggered/initiated by a change in 
certain aspects of (a number of) worldly objects, that results in either the preservation of the old 
status, the creation of new objects or a change in characteristics of (the same or different) worldly 
objects. The new reality, in either form, is the outcome of the process. 
Physical process is a set of interactions in a physical system, where the initial physical 
states of the objects change and results in the creation of new objects or the alteration of the 
physical state of the system. 
Physical Process, Repeatable: is a physical process that if be triggered and completed at 
a different time and/or space results in the same outcomes. 
(Physical Process) Realization Reference Set: for a physical process is the imaginary set 
containing all possible realizations of the process (past, present, and future). 
Physical Object: is any being that its existence, at any instance of time, can be further 




Physical quantity: is the magnitude of a physical characteristics (mentally) mapped to the 
mathematical object, variable. The value of a physical quantity can be directly measured using a 
(standard) measurement device or be estimated/predicted using some (idealized) 
mathematical/algebraic formulas/expressions. 
Physical State: is the level of any physical characteristic of an object, at any instance of 
time, which can be described qualitatively using a linguistic descriptor or quantitatively by 
assigning a number that quantifies the level in comparison with a (standard) unit of measurement.  
While the perception of a certain qualitative descriptor may differ across the human 
population, the perception of the quantitative measure for the same level of the characteristic is the 
same as it relies on a (arbitrarily set) external measurement unit. In other words, qualitative 
assessments are subjective, i.e. depends on the subject who evaluates, and quantitative assessments 
are objective, i.e. depends on an external reference object. For example, the length of an x-foot 
long object can be qualitatively described by a subject as long and by another subject very long, 
however, the quantitative description of the length characteristics remains the same, x, and is 
independent of both subjects. The uniqueness of the quantitative description is the result of human 
invention of two different set of tools. First, is the development of a precise language, in human 
mind, for expressing, manipulating, and relating abstract/mental objects termed numbers. Second, 
is the designation of a specific level of the characteristic, embodied in an externally existing 
reference object, as the measurement unit. The set unit, a real-world existence, can then be mapped 
to the number “one”, an abstract/mental existence, which allows for a description of the reality in 




Physical System: is any set of physical objects that may get involved in interactions 
resulting in changes in their initial states of the objects. The state of a physical system is the set of 
the physical states of all its objects. 
Prediction, Structural: is the forecast of a (set of) attribute(s) of an outcome of the process 
by using the process’ structural relationship and the (knowledge of the) states adopted by the initial 
and circumstantial attributes of the process. 
Prediction, Eventual: is the forecast of a (set of) attribute(s) of an outcome of the process 
by using the process’ eventual relationship and the (knowledge of the) states adopted by (other) 
final attributes of the process, other than the final attribute(s) we aspire to predict. 
Eventual prediction may not introduce a single state as eventual relationships may associate 
a specific set of states of (the rest of) final attributes to more than a single state for the (final) 
attribute of interest. 
Probability, Objective: a consensual relative degree of plausibility/credibility for the 
occurrence of an event or the validity/truth of a hypothesis with a given set of information and a 
given set of presuppositions. 
One reasonable rule for assigning probabilities to possible outcomes of a simple random 
sampling process is to equally divide the total probability of 1.0 among members of the population. 
As a result, the probability for the (compound) event/possibility that a random sample realization 
be associated with a given class is equal to the relative size of that class. This is the earliest 
assignment rule historically used in mathematical probability and is referred as classical 




ways through which the possibility may occur. Classical interpretation of probability is closely 
connected with the act of sampling with/without replacement. 
To physically verify the assumption that a given sampling process is random, we have to 
sample using the process to see if all members of the population are being selected with the same 
frequency. It is only after this physical experimentation that we can make an assertion regarding 
the legitimacy of the nondiscriminatory assumption for a random sampling process. 
An answer to a fundamental question regarding how to find the (joint) class an object 
belongs to before examining it, is that while we cannot say with certainty, but given the information 
at hand, we can differentiate a number of classes that the object is more likely to be associated 
with. 
Probability, Physical: is the degree by which a repeatable (random) sampling/selection/ 
realization process/procedure/mechanism differentiates a possibility relative to other possibilities. 
The relative degree of differentiation can be measured by repeating the action infinite 
number of times and counting the number/frequency of realizations for each possibility and 
calculating the relative frequency/proportion of occurrences for each possibility. The given 
definition makes physical probability an attribute of the random act/realization mechanism, rather 
than the outcomes.  
Physical probability of an outcome is the degree by which the (underlying) physical process 
tends to generate the outcome, relative to all other outcomes of the process. 
Physical probability distribution is being measured by running the process many times and 
finding the proportion of replications, where each outcome does occur. Such proportions are also 




Probability Distribution: is a function/rule that associates a probability to each (possible) 
value of a random variable. The domain for a distribution is the range of the random variable and 
the range for the distribution is the set of assigned probabilities.  
A probability distribution, when associated with the outcomes of a (physical) random 
process, represents an assessment/estimate of the relative frequencies/ propensities of the process, 
i.e. becomes an estimate of a frequency distribution. 
Probability (of an Event/ Outcome), Bayesian: is the Bayesian estimate of the physical 
probability of the event calculated by averaging the likelihood values of the event, given various 
(statistical) hypotheses, weighted by the plausibility/ credibility of each hypothesis. This Bayesian 
estimate can also be called credible physical probability. Also, because a Bayesian estimate is the 
result of an averaging (arithmetic) procedure, some has named it a Total Probability of the event. 
Plausibility/ Credibility of a Hypothesis, (Non-Informative) Prior: is a degree of 
plausibility/ credibility defined/ assigned/ established for a statistical hypothesis relative to other 
(competing) hypotheses, before incorporating the existing data on the outcome realized on various 
repetitions of the random act.  
Plausibility/ Credibility of an Event/ Outcome, Prior: is the average of likelihood values 
of the event, given various (statistical) hypotheses, weighted by the prior plausibility/ credibility 
value for each hypothesis. 
Uninformed prior credibility values for a statistical hypothesis relative to other (competing) 
hypotheses, are defined/ assigned/ established before incorporating the existing data on the 




Prevalence of a risky act: is the degree to which a risky act is credible as the preferred 
choice, relative to (all other) alternative acts. Mathematically, is the sum of the credibilities for 
every outcomes of the act, where the act is preferred to all other alternative acts. 
Prevalence of an act, in the light of a (perceived) perfectly informative program is the 
credibility of an event, in which the act turns out to be the “right choice.” Probability of an events, 
is the sum of the probabilities for the (basic/simple mutually exclusive) outcomes defining the 
event. 
Propensity: of a generating process toward an outcome is the physical probability of the 
outcome. 
Population: is the real (i.e. physically existing) set of a specific number of objects, each a 
realization of a physical process. 
Population/Reference set: is a set/group comprising all objects of interest with a number 
of common/shared characteristics/features. 
(Population) Variable: is the codomain/range/output of a function/rule associating a 
number/value to each of the members/classes resulting from an act of classification (of a 
population). The domain for a (population) variable could be the population, the set of all members, 
or a set of population classes. Any function of a (population) variable is also a (population) 
variable. 
I coined the term “population variable” to distinguish a variable used to describe the 




Population Class Size Distribution: is a function/rule that maps each class in the 
population to its size/relative size, the ratio of the number of members in that class to total 
population members. 
Process, Known: is a physical process that is completely known to an observer, i.e the 
underlying system, its initial state, and the outcomes of the process. 
Process, Controlled: is a purposefully triggered process that its advancement and its final 
outcomes are controlled by the agent. 
Process, Deterministic: is a physical process that if being run consecutively under the 
same initial and circumstantial states, it consistently delivers the same outcome. Every physical 
process is deterministic as long as humans keep their deep seated believes in causality.  
Process, Random: is a repeatable process that has more than a single set of outcomes. The 
initial state of the system and its evolution are such that the observer does not know the exact set 
of outcome to be realized before the commencement of each repetition. The randomness of a 
purposefully triggered process indicates that the agent is not in full control of the process, i.e. there 
are aspects of the process, which he cannot influence. 
Process, Independent Random: is a random process, where the realization of a set of 
outcomes in one repetition does not change the observer’s ability to predict the outcome of the 
process in coming realizations. 
Process, Stationary: is a physical process whose structural relationship does not change 
along the time. Since the available knowledge of the physical world is constructed upon the past 
events, any prediction of the realizations in the future requires the assumption that processes 




Process, Predictable: in respect to a (set of) attribute(s) of its outcomes, is a label for a 
physical process, for which the changes in the state of the corresponding (set of) attribute(s) in 
consecutive runs of the process is predictable. 
Process, Erratic: in respect to a (set of) attribute(s) of its outcomes, is the label for a 
physical process, for which the changes in the state of the corresponding (set of) attribute(s) in 
consecutive runs of the process are not predictable, either structurally or eventually. 
Predictability and erraticism are not inherent characteristics of a physical process, but of 
the (level of) knowledge available to the agent who is interested in the outcome of the process. 
Also, a physical process may be labeled erratic in respect to a specific (final) attribute, but it may 
be partially erratic in respect to another (final) attribute, and be predictable in respect to other 
(final) attributes. 
Process, Random/ Stochastic: in respect to a (set of) attribute(s) of its outcomes, is an 
erratic process that if being repeated many times, it exhibits a deterministic/ certain/ stable 
tendency/ propensity to adopt various states (relative to each other). 
A natural random process is yet to be discovered, but it is possible to develop a man-made 
process that (almost) exhibit predictability requirements, namely, (1) a (limited) state space, and 
(2) stable long-run behavior, but still remains unpredictable to an agent observing the realization 
of the subsequent outcome (of the process). However, if the observer learns the (hidden) pattern 
according to which outcomes are generated, it can rename the process from random to predictable. 
Process, Uncertain: is a (member of a class of) process, with some shared features, that 




intends to assess to the process, is unable to predict the outcome to-be-realized in each run of the 
process.  
Relation/Association: is a connection between a number variables. Relation/association is 
a primitive notion. In a relation, one variable is the reference/original variable and another is 
associate variable. 
Relation/Association rule: is a way by which (values of) a number of variables, are 
connected/ associated. In a relation, one variable is the reference/original variable and another is 
associate variable. 
Relationship, Structural: is a group of relationships connecting/ associating/ mapping/ 
corresponding the adoption of the each possible set of states for the initial and the circumstantial 
attributes of a physical process to the realization of a specific set of states (of the various attributes) 
of the outcome of a physical process. 
Relationship, Eventual: is a subset of structural relationships connecting/ associating/ 
mapping/ corresponding the adoption of an attribute of an outcome of a process with the set of all 
possible states for the other attributes of the outcome that may concurrently realize in the final 
outcome of the process. Eventual relationships can be obtained deductively by canceling out the 
(states of) initial and circumstantial attributes from the structural relationships 
Resistance/Supply: the ability of the device to withstand an imposed load. 
Resource: an agent’s means/tool to preserve/change certain (external) states/objects of the 
world.  
Sample: is a limited-size subset of the (real/ imaginary) set containing all possible 




Sampling Process: is process through which a member of the population/ reference set, is 
being chosen to be included in a sample set. Sampling is a “selective observational process,” where 
the observer can only learn the character of a select number of objects rather than every object. 
Sample, Random: is a sample collected such that the observer/ conductor of the sampling 
process is ignorant regarding the outcome to be observed before the completion of the process (i.e. 
he/she cannot predict the outcome in advance). 
Sample, Simple Random: is the product of an unbiased sampling process, where each 
member of the population/ reference is equally likely to be chosen relative to all other members. 
In such an unbiased selective observational procedure, if the process is being repeated many times, 
relative to the size of the population, each member (of the population) is being observed as many 
times as every other member.  
Sampling/Experimentation: is the act of selecting and inspecting/evaluating a member of 
the population in order to learn its class. 
Sampling/Experimentation, Simple Random: is sampling from a population in a way 
that the member to be selected is not predetermined and each member is equally likely to be 
selected. 
In other words, the process of simple random sampling does not discriminate across the 
population and each member is a possible selectee. The indiscrimination, however, creates 
uncertainty regarding the outcome of the selection. To quantify the uncertainty, probability 





Sample Space: is the set of all concrete outcomes for a random act, among which is being 
realized every time the act is being taken. A concrete outcome is the one that has a direct 
manifestation/ representation in the real-world; thus, its realization can (temporally and spatially) 
be verified. A frequency distribution function characterizes the sample space by informing the 
relative frequencies for all its outcomes, as they do realize in the real-world. 
Space, (Statistical) Hypothesis: is the set of all frequency distribution functions 
(hypothesized by the analyst) that one of which may give the true/ real relative frequencies of a 
specific sample space. A plausibility/ credibility distribution function characterizes the hypothesis 
space by defining/ assigning/ establishing the relative degrees of plausibility/ credibility for all its 
hypotheses. A plausibility value does not exist in the real-world, and is an artifact of human 
analysis resulting from an approach, Bayesian, man has developed to systematically address his 
lack of knowledge regarding (the true/ real) relative frequencies in a sample space. Since prior 
plausibility/ credibility values are arbitrary they do not have truth values, i.e. being true or false, 
and they cannot be compared/checked against an (externally) measurable quantity. 
Selector: is an agent/ device/ machine, either biological or non-biological that is able to 
sense and differentiate between certain (natural) objects/ states and favor some over the other. 
The (observation of the) behavior of the agent reveals its preference among a set of 
available objects/ states. Many organisms, including plants and animals, can sense, differentiate, 
and select among certain objects/ states available to them. 
Serviceability/Usability/Employability: the ability of a device to maintain its function, as 




Survivability/Durability/Reliability: the ability of a device to maintain its integrity, as a 
prerequisite for its serviceability, in the face of various sources of threat; external threats such as 
(gradual or sudden) changes in environment, as well as internal threats such as wear and 
depreciation. 
Set, Mathematical: a well-defined/ described collection of distinct (mathematical) objects, 
called members. A set can be defined/ described either by intention, i.e. by using a rule or semantic 
description, or by extension, i.e. by listing/ enumerating every member of the set. 
Set (of two), Ordered: a pair of two mathematical object, where the order of the 
appearance of object does matter. An ordered pair is also called a sequence of length two, or a 2-
dimensional vector is the mathematical objects are numbers.  
State /Object of interest/desire: is a subset of the outcome of a process that a preferring 
machine wants to be realized.  
Theory, Probability: a branch of mathematical study aimed at quantitative analysis of 
uncertainty/risk/randomness. 
Theory, Mathematical: a collection of axioms/principles and theorems/propositions 
aimed at a systematic study of combinations of certain (mathematical) objects. 
In the case of probability theory, objects of interest include simple random experiments/ 
trials and their outcomes, simple events, as well as compound events/outcomes in the form of 
sequences/n-tuples recording/capturing (simple) outcomes realized in consecutive repetitions of a 
simple random trial.   
Variable: is an abstract algebraic object, represented by a symbol/alphabetic character, 




Variables allow for formation of algebraic calculations, which are generalizations/ 
extensions of arithmetic calculations on a set of specific numbers to a situation, where the numbers 
are unknown/ unspecified. 
Variable is a theoretical construct, denoted by a symbol, e.g. X, in reference to the value 
of a characteristic. Variable is a surrogate/substitute for all possible conditions/states/levels/ 
magnitudes/amounts a characteristic may take. The concept of variable significantly simplifies and 
facilitates description and analysis of changes in a characteristics. 
Variable, Index: is an (integer) variable resulting from the act of indexing population 
members. 
Variable, Numerical/quantitative: is a variable whose possible values are number 
representing the degree to which a characteristic is possessed. 
Variable, Random/stochastic/aleatory: is any variable, associated with the population, 
whose values stochastically realize due to aleatory realization of population members in a random 
sample. Any random variable is described by probabilities assigned to its values.  
Variation: is a change/difference in condition, level, or amount. Closely related to the 
concept of characteristic/specification, variation is also a primitive notion; i.e. humans are innately 
able to comprehend changes in a certain characters of objects. For example, humans can recognize 






3. CATEGORIZED DEFINITIONS 
Topic A: Naming: 
Name/Label: is (one or more) words designating an individual entity. 
Address: is the description of particulars of a location. 
Nominal Address: is an address (created) based on the name of the object. 
Characteristic Address: is an address (created) based on the (particular) character of the 
object. 
Index: is an indicator for a member of a set in an ordered sequence of set members. An 
object’s index can act as its address in a sequence. 
Character-based Naming: is a naming method, where objects are being named according 
to the degree/intensity/type, by which they possess a character. 
Character-based Sorting: is a sequencing method, where members of a set are being 
ordered according to the degree/intensity/type, by which they possess a character. 
Position-based Indexing: is an indicating method, where sequence members are being 
indexed according to their position/address in the sequence. 
Combinatorial Process: is a process involving two (or more) sets, where every member 
of one set is being combined with every member of other set(s), producing a new object of multiple 
components, an n-tuple. 
The results of a combinatorial process are called combinatorial outcomes, which each are 




Sequential Combinatorial Process: is a combinatorial process that combines members of 
a number of sequences, rather than unordered sets. 
Multi-Attribute Indexing: is method for indicating at outcomes of a combinatorial 
process, where members of a multitude of ordered/sequenced sets are being combined. 
The method requires establishment of a sorting criterion as a means of prioritizing one 
combinatorial outcome over the others. 
Directional Index: is the index specifying the rank of members in one of the sequences 
combined through a combinatorial process. 
Sorting Variable: is a function of all attributes/dimensions characterizing members of a 
combinatorial space and is defined to assess the priority of each combinatorial outcome over 
others.  
The definition of a sorting variable can be based on a real or an arbitrary preference among 
characters characterizing components of combinatorial outcomes. Geometrically, a sorting 
variable provides a preferred movement path in the multi-dimensional combinatorial space, where 
each dimension is the characters, or a character-based index, characterizing one of the source 
sequences. 
Combinatorial/Collective/Integrative Index: is an index specifying the position of a 
combinatorial outcome in a sequence of the members of a combinatorial space, ordered based on 
a sorting variable. 
Arbitrary Combinatorial Index: is a combinatorial index, whose sorting variable does 
not reflect any real preference among combinatorial outcomes and is just a way of systematically 




Topic B: Discretization and Numerical Calculations: 
Domain: is a (continuous) collection of points, an analogy for members of the domain, 
defined by one or more (quantitative) characteristics, the number of which specifies the dimension 
of the domain 
Boundary: is a (continuous) collection of points, which divide the domain into two distinct 
subsets. A boundary is usually of one dimension less than that the number of dimensions defining 
a domain. 
Non-intersecting Boundaries: are a number of boundaries, which do not intersect inside 
a specific domain. 
Layer: is a subset of a domain bounded by a number of boundaries. 
(Discretized) Element: is a small subset of a (numerical) domain, with the same 
characteristics/ dimensions defining the domain. 
A discretized element in a continuous domain is specified by a range of values for each of 
the characters/dimensions of the domain. 
Single-Layer Element: is an element not crossed with any boundary; thus, only confined 
with external boundaries of the element.  
Multi-Layer Element: is an element crossed with one or more boundaries. 
Cross-Boundary Element: is a multi-layer element, in which two or more boundaries 






Topic C: Calculus: 
Number: is a mathematical object abstracted by human mind from its perception of the 
size of a crowd of discrete (similar) physical objects or the volume/ heft of a bulk matter or the 
magnitude/ intensity of a sensible quality, such as ambient heat or humidity.  
Numbers provides a means for quantifying various aspects of the physical world, where a 
number specifies the (precise) size/ magnitude of a certain aspect of a physical object. In other 
words, a quantified size/ magnitude of a physical aspect provides a concrete representation for the 
pertinent number, which is an abstract construct of the human mind.   
Number one, which is abstracted from human observation of a single physical object (of a 
kind), is central to the development of other numbers by using arithmetic operations. 
Quantification: is the process of assigning a number as the size/ magnitude/ intensity of 
certain physical aspect of a target object, by using a (standard) means of quantification. 
Quantification requires a physical representation for the number “one” as the unit of the 
physical attribute to be quantified. When the target physical attribute is the size of a crowd of 
discrete objects (who share certain features), each object is being mapped to number one and the 
size of the crowd is being found by the act of counting. When the target physical attribute is not 
comprised of discrete (countable) units, the process of quantification requires defining/ 
establishing a (standard) unit (amount) for the target (physical) aspect and a measurement device/ 
procedure to determine the magnitude of the aspect for a specific object. 
Character/Aspect/Property/Quality: is a feature of an object as perceivable by sensors 




State (of a character): is one of the possible distinct forms/variations of a specific 
character. For example, the character “color,” as perceived by human senses, can take various 
states such as red, green, and blue. 
Category/Class/Type: is the label for a set of objects, who share a number of (states of) 
specific characters.  
The most basic categories are the ones encompassing every object that shares a specific 
state of a character. For example, the category “red” includes every (real and imaginary) object, 
whose color is red.   
(Non-numeric) Variable: is a concept, constructed by human mind, as a means of 
reference to every possible state of a character, where the label for the state, that is realized (in an 
object), is set as the “value” of the variable. For example, if an object is sensed as red by a color 
detection sensor, the value of the color variable becomes “red.” 
(Numeric) Variable: is a mathematical object with the ability to take/ adopt any 
(numerical) value from a set of numbers.  
The concept of variable is being abstracted by human mind from the capacity of physical 
objects for evolution/ adoption, characterized by change in the magnitude/ intensity of some of 
their (physical) characters.  A variable provides a means for capturing every possible quantity a 
physical attribute may take. In other words, the (changing) quantity of a physical character 
provides a concrete representation for the pertinent variable, which is an abstract construct of 
human mind. 
Associated Variables: are a number of variables, who are tied together such that each 




Rule of Association: is a pattern, according to which variables become associated.  
The rule informs the “how” of association by specifying that each value of one variable is 
associated with what values of other variables. The specification requires an exhaustive list of 
induvial associations between values, provided either by a (detailed) description/enumeration or 
by a (general) formulation with the ability to generate the detailed list at will. 
Addition/ summation: is an arithmetic operation on two numbers resulting on a third 
number, larger than both input numbers.  
The mathematical operation of addition is being abstracted from the situations of physical 
growth in the size/ magnitude of a physical attribute. The growth in the size of a crowd of objects 
occurs due to arrival/joining of new masses to the crowd, either through the process of birth from 
within or through inflow from outside. The growth in the magnitude of a physical attribute results 
from the evolution of the object in response to changes in other attributes of the object and/or of 
object’s environment. Thus, physical processes such as birth/ generation, inflow, and evolution 
provide concrete representations for the abstract mathematical operation of addition. 
Deduction/ subtraction: is an arithmetic operation on two numbers resulting on a third 
number.  
The mathematical operation of addition is being abstracted from the situations of physical 
shrinkage/ decline in the size/ magnitude of a physical attribute. The decline in the size of a crowd 
of objects occurs due to departure/leaving of existing masses (from the crowd), either through the 
process of death (from within) or through outflow (from inside). The decline in the magnitude of 
a physical attribute results from the evolution of the object in response to changes in other attributes 




outflow, and evolution provide concrete representations for the abstract mathematical operation of 
addition. 
Algebraic Expression: is a mathematical object composed of a set of constant numbers 
and variables combined through numeral operations.  
The outcome of an algebraic expression is a variable whose value is determined by the 
numerical process delineated by the algebraic expression. An algebraic expression, as an abstract 
object, can be concretely represented a physical process where a series of growth/ decline, arrival/ 
departure, and evolution processes occur in series or in parallel. Thus, the value of the variable 
defined by the expression can be concretely represented by the magnitude of the target attribute at 
the end of the pertinent physical process. 
Algebraic Equation: is a mathematical object informing the equality (of the values) of 
two (variables defined by) algebraic expressions.  
An algebraic equation, as an abstract object, can be concretely represented by a physical 
event, which only occurs when the magnitudes of two physical attributes balance each other, i.e. 
be at equilibrium. 
Function: is a mathematical device/machine, which uses a numerical process/rule to 
assign/map to each possible (numeric) value of a (independent) set, another value from a 
(dependent) set.  
The (independent) set (of values), which the function takes/maps from/assigns to, is called 
the “domain” of the function, and the (dependent) set (of values), which the function gives/maps 
to/assigns, is called the “range” of the function. Every/all possible (numeric) member of domain, 




x and y, respectively. In a different terminology, x-values are “assignee” and y-values are 
“assigned.” 
The terms “independent” and “dependent” used to label variables, as mathematical objects, 
are not in reference to a concrete physical reality. A justification for the use character 
“dependency” for differentiating input and output variables is that in any process, it is (the state of 
the) input that determines (the state of) the output, not the other way around; thus, the output 
variable is “dependent” on the input variable.  
While my definition classifies a function as a (mathematical) device capable of the act of 
assignment/mapping, it is more common to see definitions, where a function is classified as the 
rule/ process underlying its act of assigning/mapping. It is also common to see definitions of a 
function that drop any reference to the underlying process or the device employing that process, 
and simply define a function based on associated variables. In such definitions, the dependent 
variable, y, is simply a function of the independent variable, x.  
Beyond immediate differences among these definitions, the mere existence of these 
variants, reveals more facts about the varying nature of “thinking processes” across human 
population. These variations become more evident, when human mind needs to apply fundamental 
abstract concepts such as device/machine, process/mechanism/rule, input, and outcome, to the 
abstract world of mathematics. In the absence of a “standard thought process,” thinkers may fail 
to distinguish between a mathematical device/machine, in this case a function, the process that the 
(man-made) device employs in its operation, and the outcome of applying the device.   
Rule of a Function: is the numeric operation used by the function, in which numeric 





A rule can be symbolically represented by a mathematical expression, where the (numeric) 
value of the input/independent variable is denoted by variable’s symbol, e.g. x. Rule of a function, 
written in (symbolic) algebraic language, is the only way to inform the “how” of the corresponding 
association process. Other means of representing a function including (1) spoken/written human 
language, (2) numerical tabulation, and (3) graphics, only inform the associations made by the 
function, without informing “how” the associations have come to the realization; i.e. why x* is 
associated with y* and not y**.  
The rule of a function informs the “type” of the (numerical) process the function uses for 
associating members of domain with members of the range. Replacing the symbol representing 
the independent variable with the (numeric) value of a specific member of the domain, yields a 
“token” of that type of process. The specific numeric value differentiates corresponding token of 
that type of a numerical (association) process from other token of that process. 
Inverse function: is another function whose direction of assignment is inverse of an 
original function such that it assigns to each member of range a member of domain. 
An inverse function can only be formed if the original function is one-to-one such that no 
two distinct members of domain are being mapped to a single member of range. The inversion (of 
the direction of the assignment process) results in a switch in the positions of the domain and the 
range as well as independent and dependent variables. The domain of the original function 
becomes the range of the inverse function and the dependent variable of the original function 
becomes the independent variable of the inverse function. The switch between the positions of 
dependent and independent variables are consistent with the fact that (the state of) “dependency” 
character of variables is determined by the direction of the (mathematical) process connecting 




the two variables. So, it is more accurate to perceive input and output variables as two 
mathematical objects connected through a mathematical process and call each (variable) an 
“associate variable” and take dependency-based labels as an indicator of the direction of 
association. 
Variable Transformation: is a mathematic process that takes a variable and gives an 
associate variable as its transform.  
Transformation process relies on feeding the variable as an input to a function (of choice) 
and receiving a dependent variable as a transform of the (dependent) variable. There are infinite 
number of transforms for a variable as there are many functions that can take the (independent) 
variable as their input. Common functions used for transforming variables include first and second 
order polynomials, as well as logarithm. Variables are being transformed for a variety of reasons 
including making algebraic manipulations easier, or providing a more familiar visual 
representation of the relationship between variables.  
Derivative of a function: is another function, which takes the independent variable of the 
original function as input and gives the “rate of change” in the magnitude of the dependent variable 
in response to a (infinitesimally small) change of the magnitude of the independent variable. 
In addition to the term the (instantaneous) “rate of changes,” the output of the derivative 
function can be labeled by terms including “interval width ratio,” “ratio of the differences” (at the 
limit), “sensitivity of output to input,” or simply the “derivative.” Although the use of the label 
“derivative” for the output variable of the “derivative function” might be confusing, it is in line 
with similar confusing labels such as the use of the label “function” for both the (mathematical) 




The rule for the derivative function, in its explicit algebraic representation as an equation, 
can be found through the process of “differentiation” and by manipulating the formula for the 
original function. The process involves development of the “difference quotient,” in an algebraic 
form, which is a function of two variables, the independent variable, x, and another variable, called 
the increment of x, denoted by x. When the increment of x approaches zero, it is possible to 
calculate the “limit” of the difference quotient, by manipulating its formula and by canceling out 
the variable x in the numerator and the denominator, and to obtain the rule for the derivative 
function.  
Rate of Change: (of two associated variables) is the ratio of the (induced) change in the 
magnitude of the dependent variable to the (inducing) change in the magnitude of the independent 
variable. Rate of change is the output of the derivative function. 
The simplest concrete representation of the rate of change is the magnitude of the change 
realized in one of the characters of an evolving system in a unit time. For example, when the 
evolving system is comprised of an object moving toward a target, the character required for 
precise/ quantitative description of the evolution is the spatial position of the moving object at each 
instance of time. The rate of change in the position of the object in respect to time, called the 
“speed” of movement, gives the magnitude of displacement realized in a time unit.    
The rate of change can also be used to mathematically describe a physical production/ 
consumption process over time, where by providing the required input, the process delivers its 
output. Since the generation/degeneration process occurs along the time, it is possible to describe 
the magnitude of (various aspects of) input or output in respect with time. While the rate of 
consumption gives the magnitude of (a certain character of) the input taken by the process during 




by the process. It is also possible to bypass the timeframe and directly associate the input and the 
output of the process. For example, in economics, the marginal cost of production is the cost, of 
input to a production process, for delivering a unit of the output. 
Anti-derivative of a function: is a function, whose derivative is the original function. 
Thus, the output of the original function gives the rate of the change for the anti-derivative 
function. 
The process to find the rule of anti-derivative function is called “integration,” which is the 
inverse of the algebraic process of “differentiation.” The input of the process of integration, i.e. 
the original function whose anti-derivative is sought for, is called the “integrand” function. A 
mistake similar to   
A consequence of the inverse relationship between differentiation and integration 
processes is the non-existence of a unique anti-derivative for an original (integrand) function, 
where adding a (constant) number to the rule of an anti-derivative results in the rule for another 
anti-derivative of the original function. The reason is that any original function can be perceived 
as the function plus the number zero, and the anti-derivative of zero could be any other (constant) 
number.  
A concrete representation of the output of an anti-derivative function is the total amount of 
input/output being generated/degenerated in a production/consumption process, after a specific 
time. To label the mathematical objects consistent with the physical analog, the output of the 
original function gives the “rate of generation” of the process and the output of the anti-derivative 




Derivative of a function: is another function, which takes the independent variable of the 
original function as input and gives the “rate of change” in the magnitude of the dependent variable 
in response to a (infinitesimally small) change of the magnitude of the independent variable. 
The rule for the derivative function, in its explicit algebraic representation as an equation, 






Topic D: Philosophy: 
Type/ Category/ Class: is an abstract construct developed to label groups of objects based 
on their common characters. Based on the defining character of a type, all members of a class are 
the “same.” 
Token: any of the members of a class of objects, who share a number of features. A token 
acts as a concrete representation of an abstract type. Tokens of the same type are “type-identical.” 
A Priori: is the (theoretical) knowledge obtained by means of deduction rather than 
empirical observation. 






Topic E: Mathematics: 
Formal: presented in an arranged/ordered fashion according to specific rules pertaining 
the appearance (of an object) 
Recipe: is a set of instructions developed to inform “how to” take certain acts including 
the act of creating/building a new system, or a token/instance of an (already known) system. 
Formula: is a statement informing the relationship between (various) characters of a 
(typical) system. 
Law/Rule: is a statement developed to inform the acceptability/legitimacy of an object, 
act, or a recipe, in a system of thought. 
Form: the appearance of a system or of a (linguistic) statement about the system, including 
pertinent rules and formulas. 
Formal/Axiomatic system: is a system of thought consisting of forms/symbols 
representing (1) a number of objects with certain characteristics, (2) rules for (acceptable) 
interactions between the objects, and (3) formulas relating (various) characters of (basic and 
compound) objects after certain interactions. 
Objects of a formal system are either basic/primitive or compound. While primitive objects 
are accepted (by users of the formal system) without a definition, compound objects are well-
defined in terms of the outcomes of interactions involving primitive objects. Formulas of a formal 
system are either axioms or theorems/propositions. While axioms are the result of an (initial) 
establishment/assignment (by developers of a formal system) and are accepted as they are, 
theorems are the result of applying a set of accepted rules of reasoning, as means of an analytical 




Examples of formal mathematical systems include Euclidean geometry, algebra, and set 
theory. In Euclidean geometry, primitive/basic/undefined objects include point, line, and plane. 
The first of the five axioms of Euclid asserts that it is possible to connect two points by a straight 
line-segment, which postulates formation of another object, a line-segment, as a consequence of 
the arrangement of other objects, namely the mere existence of two points. The first axiom also 
introduces a property/character for an arrangement consisting of two points, namely the length of 
the line-segment connecting two points. An exemplification of the interaction between objects is 
the crossing of three lines, which results in the formation of a new object; a triangle. An example 
of a proposition, is “triangle angle sum” theorem, which gives the magnitude of the sum of the 





Topic F: Physics: 
Random Physical Process: is a process, whose outcome changes in subsequent runs of 
the process and its observer cannot predict the (exact) outcome, before its realization. A random 
process may be (simply) selective or generative. 
An observer’s predictive inability is due to her/his lack of knowledge about the attributes 
influencing the outcome of the process; either by not knowing the exact input-output relationship 
or by not knowing the exact state of the influencing attributes due to unavailability of means of 
detection/sensation. 
Selective Random Process: is a process, in which an agent selects a subset from a 
reference/source set of already produced objects.  
A Selective process, by itself, does not result in generation of new objects or in 
modification of the (physical) attributes of existing objects, other than the objects’ (physical or 
conventional) address. If an observer knows the “how of selection” by knowing the address of 
every object in the reference set and the address to which the selective agent reaches out, she/he 
can predict the outcome of the process. For such knowledgeable observer, the selection process is 
predictable and not random, even as the outcome varies along subsequent runs/trials. For example, 
if an observer knows (1) the entire sequence of (varying/mixed) numbers a “random function” uses 
to generate a random number, and (2) the address (of the position), where the function reaches, at 
the beginning of a new (selective) run, she/he can predict the sequence to be selected and exposed 
by the process. 
Generative Random Process: (to an observer) is a process, whose exact outcome, in each 




A generative process results in the production of new physical objects or modification of 





Topic G: Modeling (of Reality): 
Class: is a collection of objects, who are grouped based on affinities between a number of 
their features; the defining characteristics of the class. 
Class members can be distinguished by slight differences in their defining characters, as 
well as (potential) differences in their non-defining attributes. 
Unit Magnitude: (of a defining attribute) is the (numeric) amount of the physical character 
defined as one, usually based on an agreed standard measurement system. The magnitude of the 
character in a class member informs the intensity of the attribute relative to the unit (of the 
measurement).  
Attribute Range: (in a class) is the difference between the highest and lowest magnitudes 
across the class. There is no unique range for a class as range is attribute dependent and class 
members can be (potentially) described with reference to (either of their) attributes.  
Class Size: is the number of the members of a class, which is different than the range of 
the magnitudes for class characteristics. While class size is an integer (number), the range can be 
a real number. 
Indexing: (of a class) is labeling class members by assigning numbers.  
While numerical labels can be assigned arbitrarily and without any physical basis, it is also 
possible to use defining physical attributes of a class, either individually or jointly, as a basis for 
indexing. An attribute-based indexing does not differentiate between the members with the same 




Law of the Class Size Conservation: is the rule asserting that the attribute(s) chosen for 
indexing a class must not influence the total size of the class. In other words, while a change in the 
indexing attribute(s) changes the member indices, the total class size remains attribute indifferent. 
Abstract Class: is a class, whose defining characters do not include spatial and/or temporal 
attributes. An abstract class is a “type” (of a class) with an unspecified size, which can be assumed 
as infinite. 
Concrete Class: is a class, whose defining characters do include spatial and/or temporal 
attributes. A concrete class is a “token” of a class type and has a finite size, due to its spatiotemporal 
constraints. 
Neighboring Class: is a class, in which the magnitudes of the defining characteristics of 
the class members are within a bounded range, a neighborhood (of numeric values). 
Concentrated Neighboring Class: is a neighboring class, whose neighborhood (of the 
magnitudes of the defining characters) is very narrow.  
In a visual representation of the magnitudes of the class, members are concentrated within 
an infinitesimal (numeric) range. 
Spread Neighboring Class: is a neighboring class, whose neighborhood (of the 
magnitudes of the defining characters) is not narrow. 
 In a visual representation of the magnitudes of the class, members are not concentrated 
around a single point. A spread class can be parted into a (finite) sequence of concentrated 
neighboring classes. The sequence members inform the “composition” of the spread class. 
Prevalence: (of a concentrated neighboring class in a spread class) is the proportion of the 




term prevalence can be substituted with terms such as relative frequency and (class) size 
proportion. 
Prevalence Distribution: (of a spread neighboring class) is the sequence of the prevalence 
values for the concentrated neighboring classes composing a spread class. 
Prevalence Density: (of a concentrated neighboring class in a spread class) is the 
prevalence of the class relative to the class range, i.e. the width of the neighborhood. Prevalence 
density at a point, defined by a specific magnitude of an indexing attribute, gives the prevalence 





Topic H: Fundamental Concepts (of Thought): 
Arrangement/Organization: is a way, in which a number of objects are positioned 
relative to each other. The position of a physical object can be spatial and/or temporal. Example 
arrangements include serial/ sequential/ chain-wise/ back-to-back/ in-succession and parallel/ 
concurrent/ side-by-side/ coexistent. 
Plan: is an arrangement of the components/parts making a whole. 
Plan of an action: is a (spatiotemporal) arrangement of the tasks (smaller actions) needed 
to be done, to achieve the end of the (purposive) action. The plan specifies the “what” and the 
“when” of the designated set of tasks. 
Method of an action: is (the general and the specifics) of the process needed to be initiated 
and maintained, to achieve the intended end of an action. The method details the “how” of an 
action/task. 






APPENDIX B: FRAMEWORK FOR THE THEORY OF DECISION ENTROPY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Theory of Decision Entropy is intended to provide a basis to establish a non-
informative sample space for the purpose of making decisions. The desired characteristics for this 
non-informative sample space are that it be rational and logical, consistent, and incorporate the 
deterministic properties of a decision (the set of alternatives, possible outcomes and associated 
consequences) but no information about the probabilities of outcomes. The Theory of Decision 
Entropy is derived from three principles that describe a non-informative sample space: 
1. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, then a 
selected alternative is equally probable to be or not to be the preferred alternative. 
2. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, then the 
possible differences in preference between a selected alternative and the preferred alternative are 
equally probable. 
3. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, then the 
possibilities of learning with new information about the selected alternative compared to the 





2. FORMULATION OF DECISION AND UTILITY THEORY USING INFORMATION 
POTENTIAL 
The Theory of Decision Entropy is derived from classical Decision Analysis and Utility 
Theory. This section summarizes Decision Analysis and Utility Theory and formulates it in a 
manner that provides the basis for the Theory of Decision Entropy.  
 
The following notation will be used (Figure B.1): 
• Ai is decision alternative i among 𝑛𝐴 alternatives; 
• ?⃑?𝑘 is a set of possible decision outcomes that affect the preference or utility 
associated with the decision alternatives amongst 𝑛𝜃 sets; 
• 𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) is the utility value that will be realized given that alternative 𝐴𝑖 
has been selected; and 
• 𝑃(?⃑?𝑘|𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) is the probability that decision outcome ?⃑?𝑘 will occur 
given that alternative 𝐴𝑖 has been selected and 𝑆𝑛𝐴 is the sample space (the subscript 
𝑛𝐴 is included with the sample space to denote that it is the sample space for making 





Figure B.1. Prior Decision Tree 
In accordance with Utility Theory, the selected alternative with the maximum expected 
utility value is the preferred alternative: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑗  𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐸𝜃(𝑢|𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
= 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐸𝜃(𝑢|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖] 
where 
𝐸𝜃(𝑢|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) = ∑ 𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑃(?⃑?𝑘|𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
all nx
 
and 𝐸𝜃(𝑢|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) is the expected utility value given that alternative Ai has 
been selected. Note that multiple alternatives are preferred if they all have the same expected utility 
value equal to the maximum expected utility value. 
The maximum potential effect of information on the decision for each decision outcome is 
related to which alternative would be preferred if ?⃑?𝑘 occurred (Figure B.2): 
  
𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ ?⃑?𝑘 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑗|?⃑⃑?𝑘  𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)





Figure B.2. Posterior Decision Tree 
A quantitative measure of the maximum potential effect of information for each decision 
outcome is the difference between the utility value if alternative 𝐴𝑖 is selected, 𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑), 
and the maximum utility value, 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖]: 
∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) − 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖] 
where  ∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) will be designated the information potential. The information 
potential is less than or equal to zero: ∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 if 𝐴𝑗 is the preferred alternative 
and ∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) < 0 if 𝐴𝑗 is not the preferred alternative. The more negative the value of 
∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑), the greater the difference in utility values between the selected alternative 
and the preferred alternative for that decision outcome. 
In conventional terms, the preferred alternative in the prior decision where ?⃑?𝑘 is uncertain 




subtracting the same value, 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖], from the utility values for all 
alternatives, 𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗, does not change the ordering of the utility values:  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑗  𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
= 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖] 
where 
𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) = ∑ ∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑃(?⃑?𝑘|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
all nθ
 
In addition, the value of perfect information about ?⃑? given that alternative 𝐴𝑗 has been 
selected (Figure B.3) is equal to the negative of 𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴): 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 ?⃑? 𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = −𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
= ∑ {𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖]
all nθ
− 𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)}𝑃(?⃑?𝑘|𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) 
 
 




When information is available, represented by 𝜀𝑟, the probabilities for different decision 
outcomes are updated through Bayes’ Theorem: 
𝑃(?⃑?𝑘|𝜀𝑟 ∩ 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) =
𝑃(𝜀𝑟|?⃑?𝑘 ∩ 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) × 𝑃(?⃑?𝑘|𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
𝑃(𝜀𝑟|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
 
where 
𝑃(𝜀𝑟|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) = ∑ 𝑃(𝜀𝑟|?⃑?𝑘 ∩ 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) × 𝑃(?⃑?𝑘|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
all nθ
 
Again, the selected alternative with the maximum expected value for the information 
potential is the preferred alternative: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝜀𝑟 ∩ 𝐴𝑘  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
= 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝜀𝑟 ∩ 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖] 
where 𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝜀𝑟 ∩ 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) is the expected value of the information potential 




The conventional value of information for an information scheme 𝑬 = (𝜀1, 𝜀2, … , 𝜀𝑛𝜀) 
given that alternative 𝐴𝑗 is selected in the initial sample space 𝑆𝑛𝐴 (Figure B.4) is related to the 
expected information potential as follows: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑬 𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
= ∑ {
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝜀𝑟 ∩ 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖]
−𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝜀𝑟 ∩ 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
}
all nε
× 𝑃(𝜀𝑟|𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) 
Note that while the probability for each possible information outcome, 𝑃(𝜀𝑟|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩
𝑆𝑛𝐴), depends on the decision alternative selected amongst the 𝑛𝐴 alternatives, the probability for 




𝑆𝑛𝐴), corresponds to having selected alternative 𝐴𝑗 in the initial sample space. In other words, the 
value of information depends the information scheme, 𝑬 = (𝜀1, 𝜀2, … , 𝜀𝑛𝜀), the effect of 
information on each of the decision alternatives being considered, 𝑃(?⃑?𝑘|𝜀𝑟 ∩ 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴), 
and the alternative that is preferred in the original sample space, alternative 𝐴𝑗 such that 









3. BASIS FOR NON-INFORMATIVE SAMPLE SPACE FOR A DECISION ALTERNATIVE 
The objective of the Theory of Decision Entropy is to establish a non-informative sample 
space for the decision outcomes, i.e., the n𝜃 values of 𝑃(?⃑?𝑘|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) for each of the 
nA alternatives. The theory is developed from the following three principles to establish the 
maximum lack of information about the probabilities of decision outcomes in a decision: 
1. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, then a selected 
alternative is equally probable to be or not to be the preferred alternative. 
2. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, then the 
possible differences in preference between a selected alternative and the preferred 
alternative are equally probable. 
3. If no information is available about the probabilities of decision outcomes, then the 
possibilities of learning with new information about the selected alternative compared to 
the preferred alternative are equally probable. 
These principles can be expressed mathematically using three axioms that establish a non-





Principle Number 1: If no information is available about the probabilities of decision 
outcomes, then a selected alternative is equally probable to be or not to be the preferred alternative. 
Axiom Number 1: Given that alternative 𝐴𝑖 is selected, the probabilities for possible 
decision outcomes are those that maximize the relative entropy (see Appendix I for a description 
of relative entropy) for the events that this alternative is and is not preferred: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒| 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
= −𝑃(𝐴𝑖 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
× 𝑙𝑛[𝑃(𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)]
− 𝑃(𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
× 𝑙𝑛[𝑃(𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)] − ln(2)
= − {𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 |𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]
× 𝑙𝑛{2𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}
+ {1 − 𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}
× 𝑙𝑛 {2{1 − 𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}}} 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  denotes the complement of 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑, or that 𝐴𝑖 is not preferred. 
For two states, 𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 and 𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , the relative entropy 
𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒| 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) is maximized in the ideal case where 
𝑃(𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) = 𝑃(𝐴𝑖 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) = 1/2 
or 
𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0|𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴] 
= 1 − 𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴] = 1/2  
If there are no possible decision outcomes, i.e., sets of ?⃑?𝑘, in which 𝐴𝑖 is preferred or in 
which 𝐴𝑖 is not preferred, then the probabilities for 𝑃(𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑|𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) are 0 or 




becomes equal to its minimum possible value, −ln (2), because there is no uncertainty in the 






Principle Number 2: If no information is available about the probabilities of decision 
outcomes, then the possible differences in preference between a selected alternative and the 
preferred alternative are equally probable. 
Axiom Number 2: Given that alternative 𝐴𝑖 is selected and not preferred, the probabilities 
for possible decision outcomes are those that maximize the conditional relative entropy for the 
possible non-zero values of the information potential, ∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘|𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑): 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙| 𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∩ 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
= ∑
−𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = (Δ𝑢i)𝑝|𝐴𝑖 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∩ 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]





𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = (Δ𝑢i)𝑝|𝐴𝑖 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∩ 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]
× 𝑙𝑛{nΔ𝑢i<0𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = (Δ𝑢i)𝑝|𝐴𝑖 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∩ 𝐴
𝑖




where the set of possibilities for ∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) < 0 are divided into nΔ𝑢i<0 possible 
values, each designated (Δ𝑢i)𝑝. 
The maximum value for 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙| 𝐴𝑖 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∩ 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩
𝑆𝑛𝐴) is zero and it is realized when the possible values of ∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) < 0 are uniformly 
distributed between the minimum and the maximum possible values. Note that the number of sub-
states for values or intervals of (Δ𝑢i)𝑝, nΔ𝑢i<0, is not important in maximizing the relative entropy; 
the entropy is maximized when the possible intervals (however many there are) are as equally 






The first and second axioms can be combined using the joint relative entropy of 
information where (𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑) and (𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) are the two main states and 
[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = (Δ𝑢i)𝑝] are the nΔ𝑢i<0 sub-states within the state (𝐴𝑖 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). Given 
that alternative 𝐴𝑖  is selected, the probabilities for all possible decision outcomes are those that 
maximize the total relative entropy for possible preferences and information potentials: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙(𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒| 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
= 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒| 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
+ 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙| 𝐴𝑖 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∩ 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
× 𝑃(𝐴𝑖  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
= − {𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]
× ln{2𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0|𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}
+ {1 − 𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}
× ln {2{1 − 𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}}}
+ {− ∑
𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = (Δ𝑢i)𝑝|𝐴𝑖 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∩ 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]
× ln{nΔ𝑢i<0𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = (Δ𝑢i)𝑝|𝐴𝑖 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∩ 𝐴
𝑖




× {1 − 𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]} 
 
The maximum value for 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙(𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒| 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) is zero and it is 
realized when it is equally probable that the selected alternative will be preferred, i.e., 
𝑃[∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘, 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 0 |𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴] = 1/2, and the possible values of information 
potential when the selected alternative is not preferred, ∆𝑢(?⃑?𝑘 , 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) < 0, are uniformly 





Principle Number 3: If no information is available about the probabilities of decision 
outcomes, then the possibilities of learning with new information about the selected alternative 
compared to the preferred alternative are equally probable. 
Mathematical Formulation: Given that alternative 𝐴𝑗  is selected in the initial sample space 
and the set of possible information outcomes is 𝑬 = (𝜀1, 𝜀2, … , 𝜀𝑛𝜀), the probabilities for possible 




𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝜀𝑟 ∩ 𝐴𝑖  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖]
−𝐸𝜃(∆𝑢|𝜀𝑟 ∩ 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴)
} ×all nε
𝑃(𝜀𝑟|𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴): 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛|𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) =
= − {𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]
× ln {2𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}
+ {1 − 𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}
× ln {2 {1 − 𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]}}}
+ {− ∑
𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= (vi)𝑞| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]
× ln {nvi>0𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴




× {1 − 𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴]} 
 
where the set of possibilities for 𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴






The maximum value for 𝐻𝑟𝑒𝑙(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛|𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴) is zero 
and it is realized when it is equally probable that the information will or will not have value, i.e., 
𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
= 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴] = 𝑃 [𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
> 0| 𝑬 ∩ 𝐴𝑗  𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝐴] = 1/2, 
and the possible values of the value of information when it has value, 𝑉𝐼𝑬,𝐴𝑗,𝑆𝑛𝐴
> 0, are uniformly 
distributed between the minimum and maximum possible values. 
Note that in the case in which the set of information outcomes is equivalent to perfect 
information about the decision outcomes, Principles 1 and 2 are consistent with Principle 3. When 
no information is available, Principle 1 means that there is an equal probability that the selected 
alternative will or will not be the preferred alternative (i.e., there is an equal probability that perfect 
information will nor will not lead to changing the selected alternative and therefore realizing 
information potential). Furthermore when no information is available, Principle 2 means that the 
possible values of information potential are uniformly distributed outcomes in which the selected 
alternative is not preferred (i.e., the possible changes in utility when the selected alternative is not 
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